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ABSTRACT 
 
Within liberal societies victims of gender-based violence have access to 
institutions of justice but these do not always guarantee them access to justice. 
There is a misfit between the assumptions of liberal institutions, and liberal legal 
institutions in particular – that victims of gender-based violence will approach them 
for justice - and the actions that women actually take when they suffer gender-based 
violence, not all of which include approaching liberal institutions. One of the causes 
of this misfit is various social actors’ gender discriminatory behavior. One example 
of gender discriminatory behavior is when various social actors represent women’s 
good as instrumental to some further good and not as an end in itself. In a similar 
and perhaps related way, women who suffer intimate partner violence sometimes 
see their own good as instrumental to the good of those they are in meaningful 
relationships with when they choose to remain in abusive relationships, or leave 
them. Even before any legal or disciplinary proceedings are underway, various 
individuals who interact with campus rape victims directly or indirectly thwart her 
efforts to obtain justice through a range of gender discriminatory behaviors. One of 
the gender discriminatory behaviors is the way in which they deploy shame to 
silence campus rape victims. The social nature of shame, and the uncodified but 
commonly understood gender discriminatory nature of rape myths suggests that 
the U.S. college context shares features of a shame culture. A weak substantive 
conception of autonomy provides the necessary normative content to disrupt the 
 ix 
social norms that support gender discriminatory practices and shape our social 
context in ways that allow us to make autonomy-enhancing choices. 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
My dissertation research is driven by the concern that even within liberal 
societies victims of gender-based violence have access to institutions of justice, but 
these do not guarantee them access to justice. My puzzle is why some women within 
liberal societies who suffer actionable gender-based violence like intimate partner 
violence or campus rape do not always access justice institutions to seek justice, 
although they may act in other ways.  
When victims of gender-based violence do not access justice institutions this 
ought to be of concern for, among others, two key reasons. First, a victim’s choice 
not to access legal institutions of justice is especially troubling because institutions 
of justice within liberal societies are premised on the assumption that access to 
institutions of justice would for the most part translate into access to justice. By 
justice here I mean the procedure and outcomes when legal institutions dispense 
the punishment that they in principle support, for example, a man who rapes a 
woman after rendering her unable to give consent through drug or alcohol 
consumption can expect to receive up to fifteen years imprisonment if he is 
convicted. If such a case does not even go to court the very question of punishment 
for the perpetrator does not even arise, thereby signaling a failure of the justice 
system. By institutions of justice I am referring to institutions within a liberal 
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society that are concerned with resolving disputes between individuals or groups, 
especially where these disputes include breaches of the law.  
Second, gender-based violence occurs within a gender-discriminatory social 
context that oppresses women in other patterned and systematic ways as well. 
There is a pattern to these forms of oppression in that they happen predominantly 
to women as a group, and they are systematic in that institutional structures 
support them in ways that make these forms of oppression regular in their 
application. While these other forms of oppression are not unrelated to gender-
based violence, they may exist independently of gender-based violence in particular 
instances. The following are some examples of these forms of oppression. For 
example, society rewards men financially in ways that it does not reward women. 
Women are also often disproportionately represented in low paid, less desirable 
and unstable jobs in which they have few if any benefits and little opportunity for 
advancement (Walker, Spohn, and DeLone 1996 in York 2011: 4) Employers also 
tend to push women into and out of the workforce depending on the boom and bust 
cycles of the economy (Anderson and Collins 2004 in York 2011: 4). The patterned 
and systematic way in which various individuals within and outside of liberal 
institutions oppress women makes attending to the reasons why victims do not 
access justice institutions when they suffer gender-based violence part of a wider 
effort to address gender-based oppression.  
The patterned and systematic forms of gender-based violence have 
consequences that reach further than the immediate act of violence. Women display 
adaptive preferences as precautionary measures against rape and these adaptive 
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preferences have consequences for many aspects of their lives. For example, when 
women go out in the evenings, they are likely to be more conscious of the time of the 
event than men are, to think about whether they will be alone at the time, where 
they will park their cars, who they will be with and so on (Shugart: 1994). They may 
also forgo the opportunity to go out if the risk of doing so is too great, and choose a 
less risky activity in its place. Victims of gender-based violence suffer loss of self-
esteem, shame and post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as a range of physical 
ailments (Street and Arias 2001). 
It is important to note that there is a gender discriminatory logic behind why 
certain behavior is deemed risky for females but not for males. Excessive and 
underage drinking is one example of this type of risk taking. While intoxicated 
underage male students are less likely to be targets of sexual assault, underage 
female students who pass out after excessive drinking are at higher risk of being 
raped. Emily Yoffe’s argument that college women should stop getting drunk to 
prevent men from raping them is an example of this gender discriminatory logic 
(Yoffe 2013). Likewise lack of parental supervision and other forms of risk taking 
have unequal consequences for male and female students. 
There is a misfit between the assumptions of liberal institutions, and liberal 
legal institutions in particular – that victims of gender-based violence will approach 
them for justice - and the actions that women actually take when they suffer gender-
based violence, not all of which include approaching liberal institutions. What are 
some of the factors that may help to explain the gap between the assumptions of 
liberal institutions and the actions victims of gender-based violence take? How do 
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individuals within liberal institutions directly or indirectly thwart a victim’s 
attempts at obtaining justice? Intimate partner violence and campus rape are two 
examples of gender-based violence that reveal both the challenges that various 
individuals present to women’s agency and reveal fresh insights that will enable us 
all to conceive of our agency in the face of gender-based violence in new ways.  
Most feminists have argued that when individuals exercise power in what 
many take to be private spaces like the family, they are able to threaten women’s 
equality and liberty. In this way, the personal is political. It is not that the state does 
not interfere in family life, but that the ways in which it does interfere often does not 
challenge hegemonic masculine privilege. When the state does interfere in ways that 
create choice for women, individuals may see that as the state interfering in the 
private sphere (Nedelsky 2011).  
Cynthia Enloe sees the personal as international, and illustrates the various 
ways in which states’ foreign policy requirements shapes the lives of women all over 
the world (2004). Some feminists argue that domestic violence ought to be included 
in the scope of international affairs, and when government officials deem torture to 
be a subject of international concern but leave domestic violence beyond the scope 
of international affairs, they neglect what is a principle source of violence against 
women on a global scale (Higgins 2010). 
Feminists agree on the extent of the problem presented by all forms of 
gender-based violence, including intimate partner violence and campus rape. One in 
three women in the world, which is one billion women worldwide, will be beaten or 
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raped in her lifetime.1 Within the US, Congress has passed laws that aim to address 
gender-based violence. In 1994 then-Senator Joe Biden, in consultation with 
advocacy groups drafted the Violence Against Women and Girls Act (VAWA). On 
March 7, 2013 President Obama reauthorized VAWA, and this reauthorized version 
of VAWA mandated schools to develop new initiatives to respond to stalking, sexual 
assault, domestic violence and dating violence (The White House Council on Women 
and Girls 2014). 
Title IX is a federal statute that the U.S. Congress passed in 1972 that protects 
college and university students from sex-based discrimination. Title IX has broad 
scope, and applies to athletics, admissions and financial aid, as well as sexual 
harassment. Much like anti-racial discrimination laws, Title IX also aims at securing 
civil rights on the basis of gender, and is enforced by the Office for Civil Rights. 
Sexual assault on college campuses is a form of sex discrimination, so courts apply 
Title IX to sexual violence on campuses.2  
In spite of laws against gender-based violence, violence against women 
persists. Within the US, one in seven men, and one in four women experience severe 
physical violence by an intimate partner (National Task Force to End Sexual and 
Domestic Violence Against Women 2013). As many as four million women are 
victims of intimate partner violence, and there is a fatality rate of at least three 
                                                        
1 http://www.onebillionrising.org/  
2 The Dear Colleague Letters are issued from the Office for Civil Rights and aim to 
provide schools that receive federal funding with guidance on how to interpret and 
implement the requirements of Title IX as it concerns sexual violence and sexual 
harassment on school and university campuses. The letter aims to educate students 
and school employees about sexual violence and how they should respond to it, and 
includes advice to schools on how to take proactive steps to prevent sexual violence 
on campuses. http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/publications.html 
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women lost to intimate partner violence each day (Bracken 2008: 1-2). Women are 
disproportionately victims of intimate partner violence: they are more than four 
times more likely to be beaten than are men; they are more than six times more 
likely to be slammed into something than are men; and they are nine times more 
likely than are men to be hurt through suffocation or choking (National Task Force 
to End Sexual and Domestic Violence Against Women 2013).  
Between twenty and twenty-five percent of college women nationwide 
reported having suffered rape or attempted rape over the course of their college 
careers (Talbot, Neill and Rankin 2010: 171; Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 
2009/2010: p. 56; The White House Council on Women and Girls 2014). U.S. 
universities report official crime rates on their campuses in accordance with U.S. 
federal law but these reports typically underestimate the real crime rates on 
campuses. Also, by just focusing on reported rapes universities tend to undermine 
the scope of the problem (Sanday in Wilkerson: 1999). It is not uncommon to find 
that women do not wish to report being raped. Koss found that 42% of female 
college students who had suffered rape had never told anyone at all about the 
experience. In another study of 650 college-age women, 42% reported that they had 
been victims of sexual assault, but only 28% of them sought help (Sable, Marjorie R., 
Fran Danis, Denise L. Mauzy and Sarah K. Gallagher 2006: 158).3 
Feminists recognize that the best way to understand violence against women 
is not to see that violence as simply the violence of one man against one woman, 
                                                        
3 Sudderth et al report that college students report anywhere between 35% and 
43% of the crimes committed against them (Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 2009-
2010: 56). 
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although that is often the locus of where the problem may come to the attention of 
others and to law enforcement (Hirschmann 2003). Feminists have shown that 
gender discriminatory laws, norms and institutional practices that make this 
violence possible and shape the way in which women experience the violence and 
react to it. I deepen this analysis – I use intimate partner violence to argue that aside 
from and perhaps as a consequence of these gender discriminatory laws, norms and 
institutional practices some women come to see themselves as instrumental to the 
good of others, even when they suffer abuse. I use campus rape as an issue area that 
allows us to see the ways in which various individuals display gender 
discriminatory norms and institutional practices that thwart campus rape victims in 
their search for justice, whether they do so directly or indirectly. Campus rape also 
allows me to highlight the role that shame plays in silencing campus rape victims. 
This is important in light of the quiet around shame as a silencing mechanism in the 
US, which deals a double injustice to campus rape victims. First they suffer an 
injustice in the form of rape, second various individuals use shame as a mechanism 
to silence them and third the fact that most Americans do not recognize the U.S. as a 
shame culture makes it more difficult for all stakeholders like campus 
administration and policy makers to address the silencing effects of shame in the 
college campus context. 
 It is important to note that individuals who interact with victims of 
gender-based violence often do so often as friends and family of victims or as shelter 
workers, police, campus officials and medical personnel, among others. Friends and 
family members have social roles as people who are in relationships of varying 
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degrees of closeness with victims. Shelter workers, police, campus officials and 
medical personnel, among others, have institutional roles as those who interact with 
the victim in a more formal and official capacity. Both individuals with social roles 
and those with institutional roles thwart a victim’s attempt at obtaining justice 
whether they do so directly or indirectly – in some cases their gender 
discriminatory behaviors may overlap and in other cases their motivations for 
silencing victims may differ.  
A note on terminology: women who suffer gender-based violence may refer 
to themselves as ‘victim’, ‘survivor’ or ‘thriver’ (Wozniak and Allen 2012) and my 
use of one term over another is admittedly problematic. Calling someone a victim 
may suggest that she is passive and has no agency. As the title of my dissertation 
suggests, various individuals compromise women’s agency, but women exercise 
their agency in various ways, so I in no way mean to depict women as passive or 
lacking in agency. Calling someone a survivor suggests that the woman has great 
inner strength and has been able to heal and move forward with her life. As the 
forthcoming chapters will show, various individuals thwart a victim’s healing and 
moving on process. My decision to refer to women who suffer gender-based 
violence as victims in no way intends to undermine their agency. In fact, my project 
is concerned with women’s agency – the ways in which individuals who behave in 
gender discriminatory ways sometimes thwart their exercise of agency, the ways in 
which individuals within and outside of liberal legal institutions misrecognize their 
agency and the ways in which women express their agency under conditions of 
gender discrimination. But my project moves beyond individual women’s 
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experiences and individual expressions of agency, and includes the ways in which 
various social actors construct women’s oppression through a range of gender 
discriminatory norms and practices. Because my analysis occurs at the level of 
interpersonal relationships, the wider societal level and at the level of institutions, 
calling a woman a survivor at the level of interpersonal relationships does not mean 
that she is a survivor at the wider social level or at the level of institutional 
oppression. The excerpts and news reports I include in my analysis show quite 
clearly that victims’ battles against gender discrimination at the second two levels 
are far from won. Within this gender discriminatory environment, a range of gender 
discriminatory norms and practices make women who suffer gender-based violence 
vulnerable to the violence even before it happens, and these norms and practices 
then continue to influence women’s agency after they suffer an attack. My choice to 
use ‘victim’ stems from the fact that while I want to recognize and respect women’s 
agency in the face of gender-base violence, I also do not want to underestimate the 
oppressive gender discriminatory context that creates victims, and that re 
victimizes victims in a range of ways even after they escape a particular experience 
of assault. However, in cases where women refer to themselves as survivors I will 
refer to them similarly. 
This is a feminist project - my research question is one that would be of 
interest to feminists, and my conversation partners are feminist theorists. What 
makes this project distinctively feminist is that it seeks to investigate some of the 
reasons for why there may be an absence of reports of gender-based violence rather 
than analyzing reports that do exist. In doing this I reveal new sources of injustice 
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on the basis of gender. Mine is also a feminist project in so far as I am committed to 
a feminist research ethic or orientation that is attentive to power relationships 
between myself and those whose experiences I analyze; to the power that 
agglutinates to presumed knowledge, especially my own; to my own context and 
social situatedness as well as the context and social situatedness of the women 
whose case studies I analyze (Ackerly and True 2010: 1). I commit too, to 
periodically examining my assumptions, reflecting on the ways in which I approach 
my research and understanding that the forces that shape gender-based violence 
will continue to change even as I study it. I acknowledge that the decisions that I 
have made regarding my research have been shaped by my own location, both 
political and social (Ackerly and True 2010: 3). My methodology is also feminist. By 
a feminist methodology I mean both a commitment and a perspective. It is a 
commitment to ending the oppression on the basis of sex and gender (Hirschmann 
2003: 30) and a perspective that takes into account the ways in which structures, 
practices and norms - be they political, economic or social - create injustices that 
women experience as a group. 
I will now provide an outline of the chapters that follow. In chapter two I 
argue that a weak substantive conception of autonomy provides the necessary 
normative content that will allow us to disrupt the social norms that support gender 
discriminatory practices both within and outside of liberal legal institutions. In this 
way a weak substantive conception of autonomy shapes our social horizon of 
choices in ways that will create a greater likelihood that victims of gender-based 
violence will have access to justice. This is because victims of gender-based violence 
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exercise their agency in relation to other people, law and social practices (Nedelsky 
2011). In these relations, the gender discriminatory practices of individuals within 
various social institutions, including but not limited to legal institutions, influence 
victims’ agency in ways that impede their search for justice (Hirschmann 2003). 
This is one reason why we cannot limit our call to institutional reform in line with a 
procedural view of justice. While institutional reform is necessary it is insufficient to 
create the autonomy-enabling context within which victims of gender-based 
violence can exercise their agency to obtain justice. Because agency is relational to 
other people and social practices as well, the choices that each one of us, including 
victims, makes with regard to gender-based violence shape the social horizon 
against which victims of gender-based violence make choices. Choices that inhibit 
our own autonomy shape our social context in ways that make it more difficult for 
other women to make autonomy-enhancing choices. Choices that enhance our own 
autonomy create a context in which it becomes easier for other women to make 
autonomy-enhancing choices. This is why the content of our choices matter. 
In chapter three I argue that various social actors see women as instrumental 
for a variety of ends. Similarly and perhaps relatedly women come to see themselves 
as instrumental to the good of others - even in situations in which they suffer abuse. 
Feminists have identified ways in which women who suffer intimate partner 
violence face a number of challenges in the form of external constraints in dealing 
with the violence. External challenges include economic constraints, immigration 
status, race, religious norms, fear of retaliatory violence and a flawed justice system. 
I deepen their analysis by arguing that women also face challenges from internal 
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constraints that arise from the ways in which various social actors socialize women 
into devaluing themselves in relationships with men. When women see their own 
good as less valuable than that of others, they may see themselves as instrumental 
to the good of others they are in meaningful relationships. The good of these others 
then plays a role in whether women choose to remain with abusive partners or 
leave them. When this happens it is indicative of the success with which individuals 
socialize women in gender discriminatory ways. 
In chapter four I argue that even before any legal or disciplinary proceedings 
are underway, individuals with social roles such as friends and family of victims or 
individuals with institutional roles such as campus police, medical personnel or 
stakeholders in their various capacities within the university who interact with the 
victim thwart her efforts to obtain justice, whether they do so directly or indirectly. 
In this way, the scope of people who are implicated in shaping how women who 
suffer campus rape respond to the assault is wider than just campus administration. 
One mechanism through which some of these individuals thwart victim’s efforts at 
justice is through shaming and blaming the victim into silence. Even those who use 
shame unintentionally should feel that they bear part of the collective responsibility 
for silencing women who are raped on college campuses because even their non-
malicious deployment of shame contributes towards silencing campus rape victims 
(May and Strikwerda 1994, Shen 2011). 
In chapter five I broaden the analysis of shame as a mechanism that 
individuals use to silence campus rape victims, and argue that the U.S. college 
campus context shares features of a shame culture. Most societies fall along a 
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continuum that has an ideal, purely shame based culture on the one hand and an 
ideal purely guilt based culture on the other. Shame cultures tend to be more 
collectivist while guilt cultures tend to be more individualistic in character. While 
the U.S. is an individualistic culture, its college campuses share two key features 
with shame cultures. The first is the social nature of shame that tends to prevent 
campus rape victims from seeking justice from social institutions, though they may 
act in other ways. The second is the way in which much of the information about 
campus rape exists in the form of rape myths that form part of an unwritten code 
that, despite its uncodified nature, most of the persons who interact with the rape 
victim and the victim herself know. The ways in which shame and rape myths work 
outside of the law, within social institutions like the university, indicate that despite 
its individualistic underpinnings, the United States in general and the U.S. college 
context in particular share features of a shame culture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
Chapter 2 
 
 
The Choices We Make Matter 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Gender-based violence is one of the patterned forms of oppression women 
suffer, and it is often attended by a patterned lack of justice for its victims. There is a 
pattern to gender-based oppression in that individuals within various social 
institutions direct these forms of oppression predominantly to women as a group, 
and they are systematic in that institutional structures, norms and practices support 
these forms of oppression and routinize them in their application to women (Cudd 
2006: 23). My concern in this chapter is with the content of choices that victims of 
intimate partner violence and campus rape make, the overwhelming majority of 
whom are women. I do not intend to place the entire onus of meaningful social 
change in this regard on women, or worse, to indulge in victim-blaming. I 
understand that institutional reform is key, but the more limited task I undertake in 
this chapter is to ask: What view of women’s agency emerges when we take into 
consideration the choices victims of intimate partner violence and campus rape 
make in seeking justice against gender-based violence? What conception of 
autonomy enhances women’s agency in a way that takes account of their relations 
to laws, structures and social practices? Relatedly, why are the choices they make at 
all important?  
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I argue that a weak substantive conception of autonomy is the answer, 
because not only is our ability to have meaningful choice important, but it is 
important that we make our choices reflect the fact that we are individuals within 
social contexts, and the fact that our choices shape those contexts. In my account I 
build on a relational conception of autonomy. I argue that it is precisely because our 
autonomy is relational to law, structures and social practices that we cannot be 
neutral on its content. The content of the choices we make matter precisely because 
we are in relationships with the law, structures and social practices, and the choices 
we make shape these laws, structures and social practices and have the potential to 
disrupt the gender discriminatory nature of these relationships.    
Within a liberal society that has social institutions like domestic violence 
shelters and courts that are tasked with addressing intimate partner violence, most 
people would expect victims of intimate partner violence to approach these 
institutions to obtain justice. However, victims of intimate partner violence may 
take actions that are often not viewed as fitting the expected course of action for a 
victim of intimate partner violence to take. For example, a victim of intimate partner 
violence may tell a friend or family member about the violence, but she may perhaps 
not approach a domestic violence shelter, nor lay a criminal charge against her 
partner.  
When women do access domestic violence shelters to seek help in leaving an 
abusive relationship, or when they approach the police and courts to seek justice for 
the violence they have suffered, they may face discriminatory behavior and 
practices from shelter workers, police and judges. For example, in one case, shelter 
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workers denied a Hispanic woman entry into a shelter for victims of domestic 
violence because she could not speak English, as staff believed the language barrier 
would not allow her to participate in a mandatory support group. Staff rejected the 
possibility of her son translating for her until a Spanish-speaking advocate could be 
found, arguing ironically that this would further victimize her. It did not seem to 
matter to the shelter workers that the woman had been living on the streets for the 
last two days, too afraid to go home, and that she had been mugged twice during 
that time. They were more concerned about following “proper” forms of 
“empowerment” (Hirschmann 2003: 121). This example speaks to the ways in 
which the institutional practices of these social institutions may sometimes 
dissuade victims from accessing them, and it illustrates the need for institutional 
reform that will respond to the needs of immigrant women who are victims of 
intimate partner violence.  
But various social actors also socialize women to see themselves and their 
good as instrumental to the good of others, and not to see their own good as an end 
in itself. When women who suffer intimate partner violence come to see themselves 
as instrumental to the good of those they are in meaningful relationships with when 
responding to the violence, it is indicative of effective socialization. If we affirm all 
choices women make in these situations we affirm the gender discriminatory 
socialization that makes women see themselves as instrumental to the good of 
others – even when they suffer abuse. It is important to remember that the content 
of the choices women who suffer intimate partner violence make matter precisely 
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because they are in relationships with the law, structures and social practices, and 
the choices they make have the power to shape these relationships in positive ways.    
When fellow students rape women on college campuses and these women 
fear losing their friends and reputation should others come to hear about their 
experience, they may be reluctant to reveal that they were attacked, even to their 
friends. One of the leading reasons that women who suffer sexual assault remain 
silent is shame. When victims do report the attack, they may suffer gender 
discriminatory behavior from sexual assault counselors, campus administration and 
medical personnel. Once again, it is because we are in relationships with laws, social 
structures, practices and one another that the choices we make in the face of sexual 
assault matter. They matter because the choices we make have the power to 
influence the very laws, social structures and practices that oppress women and 
make crimes like campus rape possible.   
I will first outline the state of the field with regard to agency. Second I will 
outline a conception of autonomy that is related to other people and to social 
institutions. Third I argue that it is because our autonomy is in an interactive 
relationship with the autonomy of others and to social institutions that the content 
of the choices we make matter. Fourth I argue that a weak substantive conception of 
autonomy encourages women to make choices that enhance their autonomy, and 
that enhances the autonomy of others.  
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Literature Review 
Having agency is a product of having the capacity to act (autonomy) and the 
conditions that facilitate that action (freedom) (Showden 2011: ix; Nussbaum 1999; 
Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999). Sen argues that it is important to recognize the import 
of individual freedom, but that it is equally important to recognize the significance 
of social influences on individual freedom (Sen 1999: xii). Nussbaum too argues that 
community makes conditions of freedom possible – if a community creates options 
and opportunities for women that endorse certain social norms, women in that 
community may be better able to endorse those norms “as good for themselves” 
(Nussbaum 1999: 54).4  
Feminists have revealed a variety of ways in which liberal societies restrict 
women’s autonomy: through violence and the threat of violence, economic 
deprivation (Cudd, 2006), gender discrimination in the family (Okin 1989), a lack of 
attentiveness to women’s female embodiment (Young 1990a) and what Cornell calls 
their ‘sexuate being’ (Cornell 1998), the development of adaptive preferences in line 
with limited or limiting and unfair arrangements (Nussbaum 1999), and legislation 
permitting pornography that is directly related to harms that women suffer 
(MacKinnon and Dworkin 1998). Young (1990a) and Hirschmann (2003) have 
emphasized the import of socialization on women’s embodied experiences (Young 
1990a) and the ways in which it produces a material reality that reinforces women’s 
oppression (Hirschmann 2003).  
                                                        
4 Rights on their own have no meaning unless they can be translated into actual 
functioning, for example, a society may grant an individual the capability to be 
healthy and the individual may or may not translate this capability into functioning 
as a healthy person (Nussbaum 2000: 14).  
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Ruth abbey argues that despite the feminist critiques of liberalism, many 
feminists argue that liberalism remains valuable because it provides the political 
and normative resources that can help improve women’s situations (Abbey 2011: 
2). A revised liberalism, on this view, may be more responsive to women’s needs 
than it currently is (Abbey 2011: 10).5  
Feminists have deepened the insights that come from our recognizing that 
our autonomy is influenced by the fact that we are social beings. Some feminists 
argue that we may, for example, reconceptualize liberal values like freedom, rights 
and individualism (Abbey 2011: 19; Nedelsky 2011) in ways that reflect the fact that 
we are social beings whose good is interrelated with the good of others.  
There are two main debates within which scholars conceive of autonomy. 
One way, as John Christman outlines, is to argue for basic autonomy versus ideal 
autonomy, where basic autonomy refers to the minimal condition of being 
independent, responsible and able to make one’s preferences known, and ideal 
autonomy refers to a condition in which an individual is maximally free of distorting 
and manipulative influences (Christman 2012).6 We are never atomistic, and never 
fully independent of other people in some consistent way. As Young points out, all 
human beings move into and out of periods of greater and lesser dependence on 
other people (Young 1990). Making one’s preferences known is not a satisfying 
conception of autonomy if it does not take account of the fact that there may be no 
                                                        
5 Cf. Carl Pateman who argues that liberalism cannot be redeemed because gender 
inequality is built into the very foundations of the social contract. For Pateman, the 
social contract just is a sexual contract in which men subordinate women (Pateman 
1988). 
6 The process of making one’s preference known need not be speech oriented as 
Christman suggests (Christman 2012). 
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unitary self that makes choices that are coherent with one another. This is because 
without a unitary self that expresses choices that are coherent with one another, it 
may be difficult to privilege the particular fragment of the disjointed self these 
preferences arise from. Instead, we may make choices that might appear to stand in 
tension with our feminist commitments. For example, a woman may resist society’s 
objectification of the female body, but also cringe at the thought of wearing shorts 
when the hair on her legs have grown a few centimeters in length.7 Making one’s 
preferences known is also not a satisfying conception of autonomy if it does not take 
account of the fact that we often make choices, not as neatly separate and atomistic 
individuals, but as subjects who are embedded in meaningful social relationships 
with others. This is because our choices are related to law, structures, social 
practices and those we are in meaningful relationships with, making it difficult for 
us to argue for a conception of autonomy that does not take this relationality into 
account. Ideal autonomy is of little use for the purposes of a practical politics and 
real-world decision-making, in which individuals are never free of distorting and 
manipulative influences.  
Christman characterizes the a second debate as that between moral 
autonomy and personal autonomy, where moral autonomy refers to the capacity to 
impose objective moral laws on oneself that then serve as an organizing principle 
for all questions related to moral obligation (Hegel 1820 in Wood 2000; Kant 1781 
in Meiklejohn 2009: 844; Rawls 1971). Personal autonomy refers to the capacity to 
make decisions regarding all aspects of one’s life, not just with regard to moral 
                                                        
7 I draw this example from Paloma Goni’s Huffington Post article I Don’t Shave my 
Legs (Goni 2013) 
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questions (Christman 2011; Dworkin 1988: 34-47; Feinberg in Christman 1989: 27-
53).8  
Feminist reflection on these debates uncovers their shortcomings. Both 
debates are limited to the individual and do not take account of the fact that we may 
not in fact be unitary selves with a single vision of the good. Nor does either debate 
take account of the fact that we may possibly be plural subjects who do not always 
make choices in line with a coherent vision of the good (Lehrman 1997), and who 
may be, in different ways, both free and unfree. For example, a victim of gender-
based violence may clam her right to an education but choose to remain silent in the 
face of gender-based violence. In that case she is free to the extent that she claims 
her right to education but unfree to the extent that she remains silent in the face of 
gender-based violence. Her autonomy then is plural - plural autonomy allows us to 
recognize that autonomy is never unidimensional, and that we make choices that 
are both free and unfree in different ways (Krause 2012).  
Adding feminist reflection to these debates also shows that they do not take 
account of the fact that we are not neatly separated individuals, but relational beings 
who stand in relationships with significant others. Relational autonomy provides a 
conception of autonomy that is related to laws, structures, social practices and other 
people (Nedelsky 2011). Recall that I argue that it is because our autonomy is 
related to laws, structures, social practices and other people that the content of our 
choices become important. Our choices have a social dimension to them, and they 
                                                        
8 It seems to me that most aspects of ones life should involve moral reflection. Using 
a toilet when so many people around the world do not have access to running water 
or sanitation or choosing heterosexual sex when some feminists argue that it 
bolsters patriarchy may be two examples.  
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have the power to shape laws, structures, social practices and the choices of other 
people.  
This is why I situate my position on the autonomy of victims of gender-based 
violence within the debate between a more heavily procedural conception of 
autonomy (Cornell 1998; Friedman 2003; Sommers 2007; Young 2006) and a more 
heavily substantive conception of autonomy (Cameron and Frazer 2000; MacKenzie 
and Stoljar 2000; MacKinnon and Dworkin 1997; Nussbaum and Glover 1995; Okin 
1989; Silbert and Pines 1993; Russell 2000; Yuracko, 2003). Let me explain both 
sides of this debate. 
For someone who argues for a procedural view of autonomy, ensuring that 
the enabling conditions for autonomy exist is both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for autonomy. Those who argue for a procedural conception of autonomy 
argue that for women to be autonomous they require a range of autonomy-enabling 
conditions which include being free of violence and the threat of violence, being free 
of paternalistic laws, having access to options that are free of stereotyping and sex 
discrimination (e.g. in employment and education) (Baehr 2012), and being able to 
imagine their lives otherwise (Cudd 2006; Meyers 2002). 
For someone who argues for a substantive view of autonomy, ensuring that 
the enabling conditions for autonomy exist is a necessary but insufficient condition 
for autonomy – the actual content of the choices women make must fall within 
certain parameters for them to count as autonomous (MacKenzie and Stoljar 2000). 
Those who argue for a substantive conception of autonomy argue that the content of 
women’s choice is also important - some choices simply cannot be autonomous 
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(Cameron and Frazer 2000; MacKenzie and Stoljar 2000; MacKinnon and Dworkin 
1997; Nussbaum and Glover 1995; Okin 1989; Silbert and Pines 1993; Russell 2000; 
Yuracko 2003). For example, Nussbaum argues that life and health just are better 
than death and disease; sexual pleasure just is better than pleasure-less and 
possibly painful sex after a clitoridectomy (Nussbaum 2003).9 Yuracko also argues 
that feminism is by its very nature committed to a substantive project because of its 
normative goals (Yuracko 2003). We must then, make commitments about 
substance before we can offer valuable normative gender perspectives. 
When I situate my position on autonomy within the debate between 
procedural conceptions of autonomy and substantive conceptions of autonomy it 
allows me to do two things. First it allows me to confirm the value of the autonomy 
enabling conditions that those who advocate for procedural autonomy appreciate. 
Second, it also lets me consider how the content of the choices women make, which 
is the subject of substantive autonomy, influences their autonomy, and the 
autonomy of those they are in relational networks with. It is important to see that 
our autonomy is relational to others, and that victims’ choices do influence others’ 
autonomy by shaping the social horizon against which others make choices. Choices 
that inhibit autonomy affect the social context in ways that make it more difficult for 
other women to make autonomy-enhancing choices. Choices that enhance 
                                                        
9 Cf. Baehr who categorizes Nussbaum as someone who argues for a procedural 
view of autonomy, citing the fact that Nussbaum does allow for the ascetic to 
compromise her bodily health. This is why Baehr argues that Nussbaum’s 
capabilities function as “identifying autonomy deficits in women’s lives and 
promoting the conditions that enable autonomy.” (Baehr 2012) I argue that 
Nussbaum’s anti-relativist stance on gender discriminatory issues would make her 
committed to at least a weak substantive view of autonomy, because she clearly 
does not approve of all choices that women may make.  
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autonomy create a context in which it becomes easier for other women to make 
autonomy-enhancing choices (Hirschmann 203).  
Not acting against an injustice (especially if it is egregious) is a moral wrong 
for at least two reasons: a.) It violates a moral duty we have to protect ourselves, 
and b.) If we understand our choices as at least partly informed by our social 
context, and as influencing that context, it violates any duty we may feel we have to 
others with regard to the kind of social precedents we set with our choices. Even if 
we do not believe we have moral duties to others, our relationality means that 
setting detrimental social precedents carries with it the risk that these precedents 
may later boomerang and engender forms of oppression that may more directly 
affect us (Song 2007).10   
My own conception of autonomy is in line with the most recent feminist 
understanding of autonomy not as simply noninterference (Berlin 1958 in Sandel 
1984), but as concerned with the conditions that enable or disable it and shape it in 
various ways (Friedman 2003; Hirschmann 2003; Nussbaum 1999; Sen 1999), as 
relational to other people, law, structures and social practices (Benhabib 1986; 
Nedelsky 2011) and as plural (Krause 2012; Lerhman 1997) such that victims do 
not always make choices in line with a coherent vision of the good (Krause 2012).  
Let me elaborate on what I mean by each of these descriptions, beginning 
first with conditions that disable autonomy. I am concerned with external 
                                                        
10 It may be damaging for a woman’s self esteem and sense of her own agency to 
hear that she has made the wrong choice when she does not act against an injustice 
(Friedman 2003: 156). This is why, in some cases, expressing one’s sense of her 
moral worth, without directly calling upon her to act, may be all one can do to 
bolster her self-worth, and in so doing, motivate her to act. 
 25 
conditions that disable autonomy, e.g. gender discriminatory behavior by 
individuals within various social institutions who interact with victims of gender-
based violence. But I am also concerned with disabling conditions that are internal 
to both the victim and those she interacts with. When I speak of conditions that are 
internal to the individual and those she interacts with, I am interested in the ways in 
which both a campus rape victim and those she interacts with may understand sex 
and sexual violence as shameful and how these understandings may shape the 
victim’s choices in seeking justice after she suffers an assault. In the case of intimate 
partner violence I am interested in the ways that various social actors represent 
women’s good as instrumental to some further end and not as an end in itself, and 
the ways in which women come to see themselves as instrumental to the good of 
others, even in situations in which their partner is abusing them. It is important to 
note that while emotions like shame are in one sense experienced internally by the 
individual, they still have a social component in so far as the individual experiences 
shame before an other, even if that other is her own internal spectator (Smith 1759 
in Raphael and Macfie 1976). Shame is also social in that the way in which victims 
and individuals within various social institutions experience and deploy shame has 
real consequences for the victim - these consequences are not limited to individual 
psychological harm but also influence the choices victims make. These choices then 
affect the external conditions of victims’ environments in ways that inhibit or enable 
the choices of others.  
Barclay and Nedelsky argue for the ways in which our autonomy is relational 
and not removed from our being situated in social contexts (Barclay in Mackenzie 
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and Stoljar 2000: 57; Nedelsky 2011). Following Nedelsky, by relational autonomy I 
mean autonomy that is related to law, structures and social practices, and that is 
constituted by networks of relationships ranging from intimate relationships with 
family and friends to professional relationships with colleagues, to participation in 
global networks (Nedelsky 2011: 19). On this view, our interactions with others and 
the messages we receive from them helps us shape our capacity for agency, just as 
the messages we give them helps shape their capacity for agency.  
I agree with Krause that we may not in fact be unitary selves with a 
unidimensional vision of the good, but that we may possibly be plural subjects who 
do not always make choices in line with a coherent vision of the good, and that, as a 
result, we may be free and unfree in different ways (Krause 2012). If one were to 
judge an individual’s decision as not being autonomous this does not mean that one 
would thereby judge the person making that decision as having no autonomy - she 
may well be making other decisions that we may deem autonomous (Charles 2010: 
426). This is in keeping with a plural conception of autonomy in which we make 
decisions that enhance and also undermine our autonomy, such that we are free and 
unfree in different ways. Gender-based violence provides a lens through which we 
can see individuals being free and unfree in different ways. For example, a 
privileged white upper middle class woman may be free in so far as she is able to 
make decisions regarding various aspects of her life. Yet she may remain silent 
about her partner abusing her and may be unfree in this way.  
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In keeping with a relational view of autonomy, I also argue that it is because 
of our embededdness in meaningful relationships that we may make choices that do 
not enhance our autonomy. What this means within the context of gender-based 
violence is that a victim sometimes prioritizes her relationships and the good of 
significant others over what many may deem to be more straight forwardly self-
interested concerns. In a more narrowly delineated definition of self-interest many 
may take what is good for the self to be separate from the importance we place on 
our relationships or the value we place in the good of those we are in meaningful 
relationships with. On this view, some may argue that she is prioritizing her 
relationships and the good of others over her own good, as though these are two 
separate goods. 
The point I wish to make in this regard is that victims of gender-based 
violence, like the rest of us, often see the relationships they are embedded in, and 
the good of those they are in meaningful relationships with, to be inextricably linked 
with their own good. When an individual makes a choice, she may do so as an 
individual who is interested not solely in her own good as separate from the good of 
those she is in meaningful relationships with, but as someone who cares for the 
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good of those others in similar ways as she cares for her own good.11 Likewise, she 
makes choices by taking into consideration the value she places in relationships.12   
It is difficult for victims of gender-based violence to separate out their own 
good from the good of those they are in meaningful relationships with. This makes it 
all the more important that victims of gender-based violence, like the rest of us, 
understand the ways in which individuals within various social institutions have 
come to link their good as victims with the importance they place on relationships, 
and the good they desire for those they are in meaningful relationships with. It is 
also important that victims of gender-based violence, like the rest of us, reflect on 
the ways in which individuals within various social institutions have taught us to 
place value in the good of those we are in meaningful relationships with even at risk 
to our personal safety.  
Note that I am not saying that we should not place importance on the 
meaningful relationships we are engaged in, nor that the good of those we care 
about should not be our concern. To the contrary, like most people, I believe that it 
is the quality of these relationships that brings happiness to and fulfillment in our 
lives. However, I argue that it is important that we understand the social 
mechanisms that make us place the good of those we are in meaningful 
                                                        
11 A case that illustrates this point well became evident during hurricane Katrina. 
The evacuation process did not accommodate pets. Some pet owners steadfastly 
refused to leave their pets behind, and the result was that many people and animals 
died as a result. In these cases, it is clear that these pet owners saw the good of their 
pets to be inextricably tied to their own, so much so that they risked their lives 
staying behind with their pets rather than evacuate and leave their pets behind 
(DiBasio 2012). 
12 See Taylor (1992) where he argues that making and sustaining our identities 
depends on our dialogical relationships with others (1992: 34).  
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relationships with over our own good. One example is that of women who remain in 
abusive relationships because they believe that staying is beneficial for their 
children, particularly if her partner is not abusive to the children as well. I also 
argue that it is important that we critically reflect on the ideological representations 
that make us prioritize relationships that undermine our autonomy. For example, a 
victim of intimate partner violence or a campus rape victim whose boyfriend 
assaults her may remain with her abuser because she may have internalized 
society’s ideological representations of heterosexual romance as something that is 
important for a good life. She may value the social capital of remaining with him and 
even risk her personal safety as a result. It is imperative that we reveal the 
unhealthy forms of socialization that encourage her to think in this way and to 
deconstruct them.  
I argue that a weak substantive conception of autonomy may help us 
deconstruct these unhealthy forms of socialization. I am not a relativist on issues of 
justice; I am committing to a weak substantive view of autonomy in which being a 
liberal does not entail supporting all choices. One of the ironies of unfettered 
liberalism is that it gives illiberal thoughts political voice. I also agree with 
Nussbaum that there are numerous instances of injustices that parade under the 
banner of moral relativism and ‘choice’ (Nussbaum 1999). In the place of relativism 
and ‘choice’ Yuracko argues, “encouraging women to live in accordance with a 
grounded and well-defined conception of human flourishing…is the most effective 
way to redress the gender inequalities that stubbornly persist in our society 
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(Yuracko 2003: 1).13 Society ought not to support choices that cause demonstrable 
harm, like paying women less for the same work, even in principle, because this 
power differential then pervades the family. (Okin 1989: 147). Likewise, we must 
challenge socialization in the form of ‘helpful advice’ that guides women into jobs 
that are compatible with a future that assumes that they will perform the primary 
caregiver role for children (Okin 1989: 145-146). Unfair division of labor within the 
family is another example of gender injustice, where a woman’s role as primary 
caregiver dramatically reduces her options (Baehr 2007) for work, study and 
leisure.14 Our challenge in this approach is to ensure that we are not overly 
confident about the substantive choices we make, or to impose them unjustly on 
others (Nedelsky 2011). 
One of the mechanisms through which society constrains the autonomy of 
campus rape victims is shame. I argue that together with other forms of structural 
oppression (Moghadam 2010: 285-286), the ways in which individuals within 
various social institutions socialize women into experiencing shame constrains their 
autonomy. The culturally specific ways in which society socializes women into 
experiencing shame will affect whether, and if so how, they will interact with 
institutions of justice that are meant to enable their autonomy. This suggests that 
like economic and political forces, culture, and in particular the acculturation into 
                                                        
13 Cf. Friedman (2003) who does not reject substantive conceptions of autonomy 
but who argues for a procedural and what she calls a content-neutral form of 
autonomy as the most basic requirement for autonomous choice. 
14 Bojer has argued that unless the nurture and care of children are included in the 
social contract, the subordinate position of women within society cannot be 
resolved. To this end, she suggests legal limits on overtime and compulsory parental 
leave for both parents (Bojer 2002). 
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shame, has structural dimensions. Social dynamics are a semi-structural form of 
oppression because a.) At any particular point in time, their particular configuration 
can be as constraining as are other structural forms of oppression but b.) They also 
have a fluid character and are therefore incrementally, and within certain limits, 
malleable. To the extent that women’s acculturation into shame constrains their 
choice, it appears to have linkages that constrain autonomy.15 These linkages 
suggest that for us to enable the autonomy of victims of campus rape will require us 
to undo the shame that campus rape victims experience. 
The excerpts of interviews and personal narratives I provide below aim to 
highlight the role of socialization in the choices women make. In the case of intimate 
partner violence the excerpt shows the role that women’s socialization into 
ideological misrepresentations of reality plays in keeping a woman in an abusive 
situation. In the case of campus rape, the personal narrative I use illustrates the role 
that women’s socialization into shame plays in silencing a campus rape victim. The 
other examples I provide highlight the ways in which the choices women make in 
the face of gender-based violence influence the choices that other women make in 
similar situations. These examples illuminates the fact that not only does 
socialization shape our choices but that our choices also have the power to rewrite 
social norms. They also show how institutions are responsive to women’s choices, 
and this emphasizes the fact that we can hold our institutions accountable and 
through our actions, instigate institutional reform.  
                                                        
15 I borrow the word ‘linkages’ from Narayan who uses it to argue that while there 
appear to be linkages between a woman’s sense of her socio-cultural situated-ness 
and her decision to make or not make a public claim against an injustice, there is no 
fixed causal determinism (Narayan 1997: 5).        
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Intimate Partner Violence 
 
Socialization may enable or disable the agency of victims of gender-based 
violence. When society constructs the nuclear family as the ideal, women may 
believe that this is the ideal they should aspire towards. In keeping with this 
ideological representation of the nuclear family, individuals within various social 
institutions often construct single mothers as inadequate parents, citing the 
argument that children of single mothers tend to get into trouble more than those 
who come from two-parent households, that children raised by single mothers tend 
to do drugs more often than children from two parent homes, that they tend to have 
lower grades and that they have a higher risk of falling pregnant at an early age 
(Lemieux 2013). Some people go so far as to describe a single woman as a  “troubled 
identity” (Reynolds and Wetherell 2003 in Towns and Adams 2009: 745), a label 
few would be happy to wear. Cara Lemieux argues that what those who criticize 
single mums people forget is that at one point there was a man, and that man is now 
absent, and we need to hold him accountable for his role in creating a household 
headed by a single mother. Lemieux argues that single mothers “get hit with a triple 
whammy” – society blames them for their family’s situation, they bear the 
responsibility of raising their children alone, and “they are cited as a main reason 
our society is going to hell in a handbasket.” (Lemieux 2013) 
When women subscribe to the nuclear family ideal, they may enjoy social 
approval, respectability and in some cases even the envy of those who do not live 
within nuclear families. One result of women subscribing to this ideal is that when 
they are victims of intimate partner violence they may remain silent about the abuse 
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they suffer. If they speak out against the violence they may fear disrupting society’s 
perceptions of them living the ideal life, and they may fear the loss of social prestige 
this will likely bring. They also risk others blaming them for their children’s 
behavioral problems.  
The agency of victims of gender-based violence is related to the good of 
others within her family. Women may stay in abusive relationships for the sake of 
their children, because they believe that their children would be better off having a 
father in the home, especially if he is not abusive towards the children. As Friedman 
notes, women may also fear losing custody of their children if their abuser threatens 
to take custody of them should she decide to leave him (Friedman 2003: 145). As a 
result of her valuing her relationship to her children, a victim of intimate partner 
violence may choose to remain with an abusive partner. 
The agency of victims of gender-based violence is also related to people 
outside of the family. Women and men may blame victims of gender-based violence 
for the abuse that those women suffer. It is troubling that in a study of 422 women 
in North Carolina, while nearly all rejected norms that approve of wife battering, a 
significant minority of 18, 8% accepted the idea that some situations justified a man 
beating his partner. These situations included if a woman flirted with another man 
and if she were “drunk, nagging, or having an affair” (Hirschmann 2003: 123). When 
women themselves justify the abuse of other women, they help create a social 
context in which women fear others blaming them for being abused, thereby making 
it generally more difficult for any woman to speak about the abuse she suffers. One 
consequence of other people blaming the victim for her abuse is that women may 
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then blame themselves for the abuse they suffer. Research shows that women who 
suffer intimate partner violence may blame themselves for provoking the abuser 
(Rand 2003: 29) or they may blame themselves for not being conciliatory enough 
(Friedman 2003: 146).16 
The agency of a victim of intimate partner violence also stands in 
relationship to, and is shaped by, social practices. One example is when, in everyday 
conversation, both men and women express a belief that women are responsible for 
making relationships work (Hirschmann 2003: 122). As a result, when women 
suffer intimate partner violence, aside from feeling responsible for the fact that they 
were assaulted, they are also more likely to feel responsible for not making the 
relationship work.  
Casie’s example below illustrates the way in which competing emotions of 
love and hate in her relationship with her husband and her commitment to making 
the relationship work influenced her agency as a victim of intimate partner violence. 
He was not just her abuser. He was also the man she both loved and hated.  
When it was happening I hated him, I I used to actually wish he was 
dead or gone, I really - when it was actually physically happening 
between slaps or between - some of the sessions of violence would go 
on for an hour and a half two hours and he’d berate me and then he’d 
bash or kick or slap or punch something – Dur - actually living in it 
was how I hated him, I hated him with a vengeance and I hated myself 
even more, for sitting there for being in that position and I hated him 
for putting me in that position, I hated myself for allowing myself to be 
there. The next day or the next hour or after the ‘kiss and make up’ it 
was this terrible sense of trying to make him feel better about what 
                                                        
16 Some women go so far as to feel responsible for the abuser, especially if he is an 
alcohol or substance abuser (Hirschmann 2003: 113) and may even blame their 
own abuse on their partner’s alcohol consumption (Friedman 2003: 146), thus 
deflecting responsibility away from their partner. 
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he’d done because he was so sorry, because he loved me so much and 
‘God Casie you’re the last person I want to hurt I know you’re the only 
person who loves me for what I am,’ the wine and roses kicks in and 
then I would just feel sorry that it had had to happen and I would 
reinforce his unbelief in himself by believing what he was telling me. 
And letting that be the truth between us that he was sorry and that I 
know he didn’t mean it and that he had all this pain inside him and it 
wasn’t his fault that he unleashed it on me, it was just that I was here 
and it was because I loved him so much and he knew it was safe and - 
and really that was love was all about was supporting him through 
good and bad - better or worse (Casie p. 22: 6 in Towns and Adams 
2009: 745-746).   
 
In Casie’s case we can see how at least two ideological constructions served 
to placate her and keep her within the abusive relationship. The first was that of 
romantic love, and the value that people place on gestures of wine and flowers as 
evidence of romantic love. The second, related to the first, were words that invoked 
the sacredness of marriage vows, namely, “good and bad - better or worse.” Society 
tends to place worth in both these ideological constructions, and in Casie’s case 
these constructions served to keep her within an abusive relationship. 
There are similarities in the ways in which individuals within a variety of 
social institutions constrain the autonomy of victims of intimate partner violence 
and victims of campus rape. Like victims of intimate partner violence, the agency of 
victims of campus rape involves more than simply noninterference (Berlin 1958 in 
Sandel 1984). Like intimate partner violence, the conditions that enable or disable 
agency shape the ways in which campus rape victims view their choices 
(Hirschmann 2003). Their agency too is related to other people, law, structures and 
social practices (Benhabib 1986; Barclay in Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 57; 
Nedelsky 2011). The autonomy of victims of campus rape is also plural (Krause 
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2012; Lerhman 1997) such that victims do not always make choices in line with a 
coherent vision of the good (Krause, 2012). I elaborate on this in the next section. 
 
Campus Rape 
External conditions influence the agency of victims of campus rape, e.g. 
gender discriminatory behavior by the various people who interact with victims as 
well as conditions that are internal to both the victim and to those she interacts with 
influence her agency. In the latter case, I am concerned with the ways in which both 
the victim and those she interacts with trade in shame in ways that shape the 
victim’s choices with regard to whether or not she chooses to report the assault. 
A study by Sable et al revealed that among thirteen barriers to female rape 
victims reporting the assault, the leading three barriers were “shame, guilt, 
embarrassment,” “concerns about confidentiality” and a “fear of not being believed” 
(Sable, Marjorie R., Fran Danis, Denise L. Mauzy and Sarah K. Gallagher 2006: 157). 
Thompson, Sitterle, Clay and Kingree found that college women were more likely to 
cite as reasons for not reporting a sexual versus a physical attack their being 
ashamed, their fear of being blamed, and their not wanting others to know about the 
attack (which presumably will also involve being shamed) or a reluctance to getting 
the police involved (Thompson, Sitterle, Clay and Kingree 2007: 277). 
In what follows I will focus on the role that shame plays in silencing campus 
rape victims. The way in which individuals within various social institutions 
construct shame around sex often results in their also attaching shame to both 
crimes of a sexual nature, and to victims of sexual assault. The shame around sexual 
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violence places an unfair emotional burden on campus rape victims with the result 
that students who suffer rape or sexual assault may feel too ashamed to admit to 
others, and sometimes even to themselves, that someone has raped or sexually 
assaulted them (Hirschmann 2003: 113).17  
Let us now look at the way in which shame may operate to silence a campus 
rape victim. The case of Angie Epifano is illustrative in this regard.  
My Enlightenment occurred when I least expected it. Four days into 
the Ward, I was sitting in on an introductory Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Rehabilitation meeting since there was absolutely 
nothing better to do……….As my fellow patients went around the 
circle it all suddenly clicked. I realized why I never spoke about the 
rape, why I had refused to tell my school friends, why I had totally 
broken down, why I had steadily degenerated over the past few 
months. I was ashamed, and because of this shame I could not begin 
healing (Epifano 2012). 
 
A rape victim may sometimes remain silent about her experience rather than 
risk reporting the rape and having others shame her. In order to address the silence 
of campus rape victims, we need to do two things. First we need to understand the 
various ways in which our relationships to law, structures, social practices and 
other people helps to construct the shame around sexual violence. Second we must 
accept that shame does operate within U.S. college campuses and that it may work 
to silence campus rape victims (this is the subject of chapter five). Understanding 
the ways in which we each help to construct shame around sex and sexual violence 
is the first step towards deconstructing the ways in which various social actors 
attach shame to both to sexual violence and to the campus rape victim as well.  
                                                        
17 Hirschmann makes the case for how society constructs stigma, shame and 
responsibility in gender-biased ways that also prevent women from acting against 
intimate partner violence (Hirschmann 2003: 113). 
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Victims value their social relationships, and they may fear placing those 
relationships at risk by reporting a rape. Women tend to be less likely to report a 
rape when they know the perpetrator. One reason for this is because they may 
struggle with feelings of self-blame, and this can discourage or delay their reporting 
the rape. A second reason is that a victim may fear losing the friends and 
acquaintances she has in common with her attacker. A third reason a victim may not 
report a rape is because she may fear that her peers may blame her for being 
'shambley', which is a college campus expression that makes reference to someone 
whose life is generally in shambles or who lacks composure, especially in the 
context of binge drinking. In this way, a victim’s reporting the attack threatens to 
generate problems that will radiate throughout her campus network.  
 
Conclusion 
Access to liberal institutions of justice does not equal access to justice. There 
is a misfit between institutions of justice promoting victims’ agency in the face of 
gender-based violence in principle and the gender discriminatory behavior of 
individuals within those institutions that may thwart victims’ agency. Society 
creates institutions of justice with rules and goals that purport to promote the 
autonomy of victims of gender-based violence, but the people who inhabit these 
institutions display gender discriminatory behaviors that do not serve to further 
those goals. As a result, victims of gender-based violence make choices within a 
relational social context in which various social actors are able to act in ways that 
may thwart the agency of these victims. It is because victims’ agency is relational to 
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individuals who display these discriminatory practices that victims have access to 
liberal institutions of justice but this does not equal their having access to justice. 
Individuals within various social institutions also misrecognize the agency of 
victims of gender-based violence. One of the reasons for this is that the law tends to 
treat gender-based violence much like it treats other cases of stranger assault. Yet 
gender-based violence is dissimilar from stranger assault. What distinguishes 
gender-based violence from other cases of assault by a stranger is that in cases of 
gender-based violence, the man assaults a woman because of her gender. He 
assaults her because the social context makes sexual assault on individuals of her 
gender possible, just as the same social context also makes it difficult for a 
prosecutor to successfully prosecute him for the assault. Most often it is a family 
member, a friend or an acquaintance that assaults the woman.18 One result of the 
law dealing with gender-based violence in this way is that the law then treats 
individual instances of gender-based violence as “discrete events” that follow 
“traditional liberal conceptions of harm.” (Showden 2011: 47). As a result of the way 
in which the law treats gender-based violence, individuals within various social 
institutions may expect the agency of a victim of gender-based violence to resemble 
                                                        
18 This is not to say that men are not victims of sexual assault. In cases where a man 
sexually assaults another man, the attacker “feminizes” his victim, thus making the 
sexual assault of men also a gender issue. In the case of a sexual attack on a male, the 
attacker does this because of existing social ideas about men being more powerful 
than women, and their being able to exert that power through sexual violence with 
some impunity. By sexually attacking another man, he exerts his power over his 
male victim in much the same way that men may exert their power over female 
victims. The trauma for male victims of sexual violence is severe, because many of 
them have been socialized to associate being penetrated sexually with being female. 
And they have often also been socialized to understand that to be female is to be 
“less” than a man. In any event, gender-based violence has at its heart unequal 
gender relations. 
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the agency of a victim of stranger assault. But the agency of a victim of gender-based 
violence may not resemble the agency of a victim of stranger assault. The agency of 
a victim of gender-based violence is related to laws, structures, social practices and 
other people in quite a different way from the relationship of a victim to a stranger 
who assaults her. While the victim of intimate partner violence may risk losing 
financial support from her partner were she to report the assault, or a victim of 
campus rape may risk being ostracized by her peers for being the victim of a sexual 
assault or for reporting the assault, the victim of a physical assault by a stranger 
may not risk losing financial support from her partner. She may also be more likely 
to enjoy the sympathy of her peers as a result of the assault, and the support of her 
peers as she reports the assault.  As a result of these factors, the agency of victims of 
gender-based violence may not resemble the agency of victims of stranger assault. 
When the agency of the victim of gender-based violence does not resemble the 
agency of victims of stranger assault, individuals within a variety of social 
institutions may misrecognize her agency.  
Showden rightly argues that not all women who stay with abusive partners 
are “dupes or lacking in agency” because there are a variety of actions that they take, 
regardless of whether they leave or stay, “that could count as agentic” (Showden 
2011: 38). Victims of gender-based violence exercise their agency in choosing to 
report the violence, in choosing to share their experiences with only a few trusted 
others, or in choosing to remain silent altogether. Showden argues that in order for 
us to assess their agency, we must see victims as they are situated within specific 
social and cultural contexts. In one context staying with an abusive partner could be 
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a “mere iteration of gender norm expectations” (Showden 2011: 38) but in another 
context “it could be an attempt to struggle with, resist, or otherwise assert one’s will 
toward opening up future horizons of action and self-development.” (Showden 
2011: 38) In all these cases, women display agency. What is at issue is for us to 
understand their agency in light of the social context within which they act, and 
more importantly, to attempt to change the social context in ways that will 
positively influence their agency. 
Women’s choices are plural, making them free and unfree in different ways. 
For example, a woman who is well educated may be free to the extent that she may 
have greater employment options that someone less educated may have. But she 
may also struggle to report that her boyfriend raped her because of the stigma 
around sex and sexual violence, making her unfree in this regard. The fact of 
plurality in the choices that victims of gender-based violence make is an indicator 
not just of the variety of choices that women make, but it is also a reflection of the 
socially constructed constraints under which women make their choices. Some of 
the choices victims make are made in conditions that are far from ideal. The result is 
that victims of gender-based violence are both free and unfree in different ways 
(Krause 2012; Lerhman 1997) and make choices that both enhance and undermine 
their autonomy. 
I argue that a weak substantive conception of autonomy encourages women 
to make choices that enhance their autonomy, and that enhances the autonomy of 
others. It builds on a relational conception of autonomy by not only recognizing the 
importance of relationships and the ways in which we may reconstitute these 
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relationships through law, but it highlights the ways in which individual women’s 
choices alter the social horizon against which they and others will make future 
choices. It is important to notice that when victims of gender-based violence 
respond to the violence they suffer, the content of the choices they make helps 
construct the social conditions that may enable or disable their own and others’ 
future actions. Showden rightly argues that when we make choices to alter our lives 
in some way, we project our will into the world, and in doing so we develop and 
nurture our internal capacities for autonomy. But the choices we make also change 
the external relations that shape our creative capabilities (Showden 2011: xi). We 
must be attentive to these choices and relations because as indirect forces they 
“work through the psychology of the oppressed to mold them and co-opt them to 
result in choices and decisions that harm the oppressed while benefiting the 
privileged.” (Cudd 2006: 157)19 It is through the choices that we make that we 
“contribute to the histories that carry us forward” (Evans and Lawlor 2000: 3 in 
Showden 2011: 22).  
Our autonomy is related to that of other people, and within this relational 
context, the histories of the choices victims make do influence others’ autonomy by 
shaping the social horizon against which those others make choices. Choices that 
inhibit autonomy affect our social context in ways that make it more difficult for 
other women to make autonomous choices. Choices that enhance autonomy create a 
                                                        
19 Cudd argues that it is important to understand how indirect psychological forces 
work to aid in men’s oppression of women. In this regard she says, “indirect 
psychological forces cause inequality through the choices and decisions of the 
members of the oppressed group themselves, as they try to live in the face of other 
inequalities and injustices” (Cudd 2006: 157). 
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context in which it becomes easier for other women to make autonomy-enhancing 
choices (Hirschmann 2003). In this way, victims’ choices influence their own 
autonomy or capacity to act, and the autonomy or capacity to act of those they are in 
relational networks with.20  
Joanna Espinosa, a student who recently filed a complaint against the 
University of Texas-Pan American for violating Title IX by creating a hostile 
environment on campus by engaging in victim-blaming has this to say, “I’m not sure 
I would’ve come forward if all those people hadn’t done it before me. I needed the 
validation. I needed someone to confirm, “You’re right you’re not blowing things out 
of proportion.” (Espinosa in Grinberg 2014) CNN noted that while they do not name 
survivors of sexual assault, they did so in this article because the women concerned 
chose to come forward “in the hopes of holding their schools accountable and 
encouraging others to speak up.” (Grinberg 2014) (my own italics) 
Sophie Karasek, a student at the University of California, Berkeley, confirmed 
this sentiment by saying, “We’re recognizing the snowball effect that comes from 
speaking out.” (Karasek in Grinberg 2014) Karasek’s view is substantiated by data – 
the Office for Civil Rights received 11 complaints in 2009 and 2010. That number 
grew to 18 in 2011, dropped by 1 to 17 in 2012, and climbed significantly to 30 in 
                                                        
20 Charles Taylor expresses this forward-looking aspect of our lives well when he 
argues, 
The issue for us has to be not only where we are, but where we 
are going………Since we cannot do without an orientation to the good, 
and since this place is something that must always change and 
become, the issue of the direction of our lives must arise for us 
(Taylor 1989: 47). 
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2013. For the 2014 fiscal year, which began in October 2013, the Office for Civil 
Rights has, as of February 2014, received 16 complaints (Grinberg 2014).  
The fact of our relationships to laws, structures and social practices makes it 
important that we recognize and utilize our agency in ways that will enhance our 
collective freedom and autonomy. The fact that we are embedded in these 
relationships makes it all the more important that we make choices that will shape 
our relationships to laws, structures, social practices and others in positive, agency-
enhancing ways. We are all in this together, and the choices we make are important 
for our own autonomy, but they are equally important for the autonomy of those we 
are in relational networks with. It is clear that a victim of gender-based violence will 
be able to make choices that enhance her autonomy if those she is in relationships 
with are supportive of her autonomy-enhancing choices. This relationality suggests 
is that in order for us to create an autonomy-enhancing social context within which 
victims of gender-based violence can make autonomous choices will require a shift 
at the social level, in which individuals collectively recognize and address the 
external and internal conditions that enable and challenge victims’ autonomy. This 
brings me to my argument for weak substantive autonomy.  
A weak substantive conception of autonomy is not exhaustively prescriptive 
but it does provide enough normative content to help deconstruct the social norms 
that support gender discriminatory practices. It can also help shape the social 
horizon of choices in ways that will, given our relationality, positively influence the 
choices other victims of gender-based violence make. 
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Some choices simply cannot be autonomous (Cameron and Frazer 2000; 
MacKenzie and Stoljar, 2000; MacKinnon and Dworkin 1997; Nussbaum and Glover 
1995; Okin 1989; Silbert and Pines 1993; Russell 2000; Yuracko 2003). Selling 
oneself into slavery would be an obvious example. The content of our choices do 
matter. “Choice feminism” is a term coined by Linda Hirschman in which she argues 
that feminism should give women choices but not pass judgment on what they 
choose (Snyder-Hall 2010: 255). Ferguson argues persuasively that choice feminism 
is motivated by a fear of politics. I agree with Ferguson when she argues that while 
choice feminism includes all women and all the choices they make and is inclusive 
and non-judgmental, it allows feminists to sidestep “the difficulties of making the 
personal political” (Ferguson 2010: 247) and enables them to avoid demanding 
meaningful change from their friends, family and lovers (Ferguson 2010).21 
Some choices just simply are better than others, and like Nussbaum, I do not 
hesitate to point out that they are. Hirschmann, like Ferguson, argues that it is 
important to point out the merits and demerits of certain choices, because to remain 
silent, withhold judgment or to support all choices indiscriminately is to betray 
feminism (Hirschmann 2010: 276). I argue it is also a way in which we betray our 
present and future selves as well as those we are in social relationships with. 
                                                        
21 Cf. Snyder-Hall argues that since the mid 1990s, third-wave feminism, in being 
inclusive, non-judgmental and pluralistic, is really not exhibiting a thoughtless 
endorsement of “choice” but is rather exhibiting a deep respect for self-
determination and pluralism (Snyder-Hall 2010) Even the term “choice feminism” is 
misleading Snyder-Hall argues, because the word ““choice” trivializes what are often 
hard decisions.” (Snyder-Hall 2010: 256) 
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As someone who endorses a weak substantive conception of autonomy I 
would prescribe that victims of gender-based violence not only report the violence 
they suffer, but also resist and report the gender discriminatory practices they 
encounter from individuals who inhabit institutions of justice. I would argue that 
reporting the violence just is better than not reporting it, because reporting the 
violence allows the victim the opportunity to engage the legal process to obtain 
justice, no matter how unappealing it may be for her to report the violence or to 
follow through with legal proceedings. Her resisting gender discriminatory behavior 
by individuals who occupy positions within institutions of justice just is better than 
her not resisting such behavior or avoiding accessing institutions of justice for fear 
of encountering such behavior. If she does not resist their gender discriminatory 
behavior she allows it to continue unchallenged. If she does resist their gender 
discriminatory behavior she challenges the gender discriminatory socialization and 
practices that make it possible for men to perpetrate gender-based violence. In 
doing so, she will help alter the social context to make it more likely for other 
women to resist such practices as well. 
Let me be clear that I do not place the full burden of altering the social 
context within which gender-based violence happens on victims of the violence. 
Legal intervention is important because law is often necessary to ensure that people 
do the right thing (Nedelsky 2011). For example changes in the Dear Colleague 
letter that made it illegal for universities to retaliate against campus rape victims for 
going public about their assault made it more difficult for universities to silence 
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campus rape victims. In doing so it also made it easier for campus rape victims to 
come forward without fear of retaliation.22 
I would also urge social institutions to identify the ways in which individuals 
who inhabit them display gender discriminatory behavior towards victims of 
gender-based violence, and educate these individuals into altering their behavior. 
But it is also important to notice that social institutions are, or can to some extent be 
coerced into being, responsive to the choices victims themselves make, as the 
example below illustrates. 
Landen Gambill’s (now ex) boyfriend raped her on the University of North 
Carolina (UNC) campus. Together with four other students she filed a complaint 
against UNC for routinely violating the rights of victims of sexual assault on the 
campus, and for failing to assist victims in their recovery after the assaults. When 
the university sent a warning to Gambill that she may have violated the school’s 
honor code for speaking out against the university’s handling of sexual assault cases 
on campus and that she faced possible expulsion if she were found guilty, Gambill 
filed a new complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights. 
In the new complaint she claimed that the university retaliated against her by 
threatening her with a possible honor code violation (Kingkade 2013e). UNC-Chapel 
Hill Chancellor Holden Thorp then asked the honor council to suspend the charges 
against Gambill (Kingkade 2013f).  
                                                        
22 In another example of how changes in the law can ensure that people do the right 
thing, Ecuador’s law requiring businesses that hire more than 25 people to hire 4% 
of disabled people started a social transformation for the disabled in the country 
(Caselli 2013). http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23692217  
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Gambill’s choice to complain - first about the university’s handling of sexual 
assaults on the campus, including her own, and then about the fact that the 
university administration intimidated her with charges of violating the honor code – 
accomplished at least four things. First it raised public interest in the issue of 
campus rape on the UNC campus. Second it helped enforce existing legislation that 
aims to protect student’s rights and their safety - the complaint instigated an 
investigation by the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights of UNC’s 
handling of sexual assaults on their campus, for which the university could be found 
guilty. In this way the Office for Civil Rights signals that it will hold universities 
accountable. Third it helped to check any possible abuses of power by the 
administration – Gambill’s complaint that the university aimed to intimidate her 
with the charge of an honor code violation resulted in the university administration 
dropping the charges against her. Her actions helped to disrupted the effectiveness 
with which university administrative officials socialize students into quietly 
accepting their authority. Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, Gambill’s choices 
no doubt altered the social context on the UNC campus, and the social horizon of 
choices against which students on the UNC and on other campuses see as possible 
choices of how they may respond to sexual assault and intimidation by campus 
administrations. Her choices made it a little less likely that students on the UNC 
would be able to sexually attack other students with relative impunity. Her choices 
made it less likely for the UNC administration, and other university administrations 
in general, to try to intimidate other campus rape victims into silence. Her actions 
have probably alerted university administrations across the U.S. to the fact that they 
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can be held accountable for gender discriminatory behavior, thus making it less 
attractive for them to discriminate against campus rape victims. Her choices made 
the UNC campus a little safer overall for students. 
Admittedly Gambill has shown extraordinary courage and tenacity in the face 
of intimidation by university officials, an example of courage and tenacity that many 
rape victims may find difficult to match. However, a weak substantive autonomy 
would demand that each one of us, including victims of campus rape, take every 
possible action to counter gender discrimination. We should do this with a view to 
demanding institutional reforms that make liberal institutions responsive to the 
needs of victims of gender-based violence. We should demand accountability from 
the liberal legal institutions that are meant to serve justice, in principle. We should 
do this as one way of shaping the social horizon against which victims and others 
will then make choices.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Familial Violence and the Problem of Instrumentality 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I argue that various social and political actors represent 
women as instrumental to some further end and not as ends in themselves, and that 
in a similar and perhaps related way, women may see themselves as instrumental to 
the good of others even in the face of intimate partner violence, thereby enabling 
their own oppression. In addition to and as a consequence of the many other socially 
constructed factors that play a role in women’s decision-making when they suffer 
intimate partner violence, what is at the heart of many decisions that women who 
suffer intimate partner violence is effective socialization. This socialization makes 
them prioritize the good of significant others that they are in meaningful 
relationships with into account both when they choose to leave abusive 
relationships as well as when they choose to remain in those relationships. I will 
present excerpts from interviews with women who have suffered intimate partner 
violence to show the influence that concern for the good of significant others had in 
how they negotiated the experience of intimate partner violence and how it 
influenced their decision to either stay in the relationship or leave. The argument 
presented in this chapter will deepen the contextualized analysis of intimate partner 
violence that other feminists have provided, by highlighting the ways in which 
women who suffer intimate partner violence come to see themselves as 
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instrumental to the good of others, even at the cost of their personal safety, thereby 
further enabling their own oppression. 
It is a puzzle that some victims of intimate partner violence who have access 
to liberal institutions often do not access these institutions as one would expect, 
although they may act in other ways. Individuals within various social institutions 
often assume that should any member of their society be a victim of intimate 
partner violence, that member would approach liberal institutions to seek justice, 
because liberal institutions are meant to serve justice, in principle. When they do 
attempt to access these institutions, individuals who occupy roles within these 
institutions display gender discriminatory behaviors that may make it difficult for 
them to obtain justice, or to access resources. The implication of this gender 
discrimination is that there is a gap between the assumptions of liberal institutions 
(that they are able to address injustices like intimate partner violence) and the 
reality of many victims not approaching them, or approaching them and then 
experiencing unsatisfactory results. 
Intimate partner violence is a serious social problem, and one that both men 
and women are subjected to. One in seven men, and one in four women experience 
severe physical violence by an intimate partner (National Task Force to End Sexual 
and Domestic Violence Against Women 2013). Within the U.S., as many as four 
million women are victims of intimate partner violence (Bracken 2008: 1) with a 
fatality rate of at least three women lost to intimate partner violence each day 
(Bracken 2008: 2). Women are disproportionately victims of intimate partner 
violence: they are four times more likely to be beaten than are men; they are six 
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times more likely to be slammed into something than are men; and they are nine 
times more likely than are men to be hurt through suffocation or choking (National 
Task Force to End Sexual and Domestic Violence Against Women 2013).  
As a result of this violence, victims of intimate partner violence suffer loss of 
self-esteem and experience shame and guilt (Street and Arias 2001). Victims may 
also suffer post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which is a consequence of ““death 
or serious injury, or threat to one’s physical integrity” or witnessing such an event, 
or learning that a family member or close friend has experienced such an event.” 
(Cudd 2006: 92) Among the symptoms of PTSD are hypervigilance, insomnia, 
difficulty concentrating, depression, amnesia and an exaggerated startle response. 
The effects of PTSD often make victims unable to cope effectively in society, with 
possible material losses as a result of an inability to cope at work, and a loss of social 
ties that may follow these psychological states (Cudd 2006: 92). When we take into 
account that it is not just the victim of intimate partner violence who may suffer 
these symptoms but also those who may witness the violence or learn of it, the 
effects of intimate partner violence are society-wide.  
Other feminists have approached the problem of intimate partner violence 
with an eye to how a variety of factors go into making this violence possible. These 
include external constraints like legal challenges that women who suffer intimate 
partner violence face, economic constraints that keep them within abusive 
relationships and racial discrimination that affects women of color. They also 
include internal constraints that arise from the ways in which individuals within 
various social institutions socialize women into devaluing their own gender and 
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their work, and to feel a greater responsibility than men do to maintaining 
relationships. Feminists have also criticized the ways in which various social and 
political actors have used women as instrumental to some other end, and not as 
ends in themselves. What these critiques around instrumentality have missed is the 
way in which women who suffer intimate partner violence may come to see 
themselves as instrumental to the good of others they are in meaningful 
relationships with. I have chosen to use excerpts from interviews that illustrate the 
ways in which the fact that victims of intimate partner violence may see themselves 
as instrumental to the ends of others may influence the ways in which they respond 
to intimate partner violence – it may be a reason for them to remain in the abusive 
relationship just as it may become a reason for why they choose to leave.  
I will first outline the state of the field with regard to intimate partner 
violence. Second I will discuss some of the ways in which social construction shapes 
women’s responses to intimate partner violence. Third I will discuss the ways in 
which various social actors socialize women into devaluing themselves, and this 
creates internal constraints on how victims of intimate partner violence respond to 
the violence. Fourth I will outline the problem of how social and political actors 
depict women and women’s good as instrumental to some further end and not as 
ends in themselves. I argue that in a similar and perhaps related way to these others 
seeing women as instrumental to a variety of other ends women may come to see 
themselves as instrumental to the good of those they are in meaningful relationships 
with. Fifth I will provide excerpts from interviews with abused women that show 
how in cases of intimate partner violence women see themselves as instrumental to 
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the good of others, and how this influences whether they remain with abusive 
partners or leave them. This self-understanding of being instrumental to the good of 
others influences how they respond to the violence and it helps perpetuate their 
own oppression. 
 
Literature Review 
Feminists recognize that the best way to understand violence against women 
is to see that violence not as simply violence of one man against one woman, 
although that is often the locus of where the problem may come to the attention of 
others and to law enforcement (Hirschmann 2003). Rather, feminists have shown 
that to understand this violence is to understand the wider social context that 
makes this violence possible (Hirschmann 2003; Nedelsky 2011). In this wider 
context, both socialization and social construction are at work.  
Socialization is “something that is done to people by particular other people” 
and is “at least quasi-conscious or intentional” (Hirschmann 2003: 12) - it refers to 
lifelong learning that occurs through social experience (Macionis and Gerber 2011: 
103) and it is “the process by which people learn characteristics of their group’s 
norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors” (Cheney 2009). For example, a mother may 
teach her child the value of certain behaviors, and a woman may learn what the 
norms of beauty are in her society though the images that magazine editors and 
advertisers select for their cover pictures – that is the power of social experience. In 
this way, individuals and groups within society socialize other individuals into 
norms, values, attitudes and behaviors. However, this socialization is not entirely a 
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top-down affair – in later phases of life individuals do shape their social reality 
through their own creative interaction with society.  
Social construction goes much deeper than socialization. Social construction 
involves “much less overt forms of social production” (Hirschmann 2003: 12) but it 
does create social phenomena and shapes our material reality. It is the idea that all 
people “are produced through social formations, and not simply limited by them.” 
(Hirschmann 2003: 12) In Ferguson’s words, “It is not simply that [we are] being 
socialized; rather, a subject on whom socialization can do its work is being 
produced.” (Ferguson in Hirschmann 2003: 12) These social formations include 
social and legal institutions. For example, how we speak about, think about, 
interpret and understand social phenomena produces our material reality (Bem 
1993: 2). These ways of speaking, thinking about, interpreting and understanding 
social phenomena occur within the context of our social, political and legal 
frameworks. The material reality that emerges then determines the boundaries of 
what we can do and be (Hirschmann 2003: 79; Nussbaum 2000). Through 
habituation, socialization and social construction become normalized in a society 
and it becomes difficult for us to see the power at work in the way in which 
individuals create the social, political and legal structures within which we live 
(Foucault 1989), and the ways in which these shape how we relate to one another 
(Nedelsky 2011). The social construction view shares features with the ‘adaptive 
preferences’ view in that social construction shapes individuals’ preferences in 
accordance with the options they see available to them (Hirschmann 2003: 11). On 
the adaptive preferences view what appear to be women’s individually chosen 
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preferences really are the product of the ways in which social structures and outer 
forces construct certain choices as desirable (Hirschmann 2003: 12). 
Hirschmann shows how both social construction and socialization influence a 
woman’s choice. She uses a typology of factors external to the self, like the number 
and type of choices that social institutions make available to her, the impediments 
these institutional policies and individuals within them present to her making a 
choice she may prefer, and these correspond roughly to the outcomes of social 
construction. She also outlines factors internal to the self, like will and desire that 
correspond roughly to being products of socialization (Hirschmann 2006: ix). On 
Hirschmann’s reading when women choose not to leave abusive relationships it is 
because various levels of external and internal constraints socially construct and 
constrain their choice (Hirschmann 2003: 127). Both types of factors shape a 
woman’s will and desire as a choosing subject. 
Nussbaum argues that we are fundamentally social, and that our ends 
include shared ends. For Nussbaum, gender discriminatory external conditions, 
both social and political, affect women’s human capabilities and these external 
conditions result in women having capabilities that are unequal to men’s 
(Nussbaum 2000: 1). By capability Nussbaum means those things that we can do 
and be, and that are “informed by an intuitive idea of a life that is worthy of the 
dignity of a human being” (Nussbaum 2000:5). Within these gender discriminatory 
political and social circumstances, various social actors treat women as 
instrumental to the ends of others, and not as ends in themselves. Some of these 
instrumental roles include being “reproducers, caregivers, sexual outlets, agents of a 
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family’s general prosperity.” (Nussbaum 2000: 2)23 While Nussbaum does not deny 
the role of socialization, she focuses more heavily on the ways in which social 
construction is at work in the gender discriminatory social and political institutions 
that shape women’s capabilities.  
Nedelsky agrees with Nussbaum that legal rights are one way of 
implementing values. One example that comes out of Nussbaum’s work is the way in 
which we can use rights as a way of protecting and advancing human capabilities 
(Nedelsky 2011: 244). But Nedelsky criticizes Nussbaum for the fact that despite 
Nussbaum’s focus on human sociability and shared ends, she still tends to lapse into 
“a strong insistence on separate individualism” (Nedelsky 2011: 29). Nedelsky 
argues that when Nussbaum does this, she misses the fact that what matters about 
our individuality is entirely consistent with the importance we place on our 
relationships with one another (Nedelsky 2011: 30). Nedelsky argues that the 
“relational dimension of human experience” is “central to the concepts and 
institutions by which we organize our collective lives.” (Nedelsky 2011: 3) Nedelsky 
argues against the idea of individuals as independent, bounded selves (Nedelsky 
2011: 14) For Nedelsky, “the self is relational because human beings become who 
they are – their identities, their capacities, their desires – through the relationships 
in which they participate.” (Nedelsky 2011: 4) These relationships include intimate 
relationships with parents, lovers, less intimate relationships with teachers and 
                                                        
23 For Nussbaum, women’s instrumental value may sometimes be strongly positive 
just as it may be negative (Nussbaum 2000: 2). With regard to development, 
Nussbaum argues that problems of poverty and development cannot be confronted 
until the “international political and economic thought” is not attentive to the 
problems that women face because of their gender (Nussbaum 2000: 4). 
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employers, as well as economic relations, gender relations and relationships to 
governmental power that are more structural in nature (Nedelsky 2011: 4). 
Relationships are also constitutive of our conceptions of the law, our autonomy and 
the self (Nedelsky 2011: 3).24 In particular, Nedelsky argues that law is a powerful 
mechanism that structures human relationships. This makes it possible for the law 
to be able to use concepts like rights, autonomy and the self in ways that both reflect 
our relationships with others and also restructure human relations in ways that 
deepen and broaden in our relationships with others to further justice for all 
(Nedelsky 2011). Nedelsky’s view takes account of both socialization and social 
construction. In this regard Nedelsky says,  
[V]iolence against women cannot be prevented until the relations 
between men and women are transformed – which means that 
transformation of these social and intimate relations must be an 
objective of the liberal state. A conception of rights that routinely 
directs our attention to structures of relationships is better suited to 
facilitate that transformation than one, like the traditional liberal 
conception, aimed at the protection of boundaries. Yet there is no 
issue that more powerfully invokes the need for legally protected 
boundaries than violence (Nedelsky 2011: 200).  
 
 
Social Construction, Socialization and Instrumentality 
Hirschmann, Nussbaum and Nedelsky recognize how social construction and 
socialization work to perpetuate injustices against women. I deepen their analysis 
on socialization and social construction by showing that these processes may be so 
effective that women may come to see themselves as instrumental to the good of 
others they are in meaningful relationships, even in the face of intimate partner 
                                                        
24 For example, our relationship to employers, teacher and parents shapes our 
autonomy (Nedelsky 2011: 3).  
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violence. When women see themselves as instrumental in this way they not only aid 
in their own oppression, but they also reinforce the processes of socialization and 
social construction that constrains their and other victims’ choices in the face of 
intimate partner violence.25 
Hirschmann’s typology of external and internal constraints is an effective 
way of showing how the processes of social construction and socialization operate 
to oppress victims of intimate partner violence. I deepen this analysis by showing 
how these processes may lead women to see themselves as instrumental to the good 
of others they are in meaningful relationships with, even in the face of intimate 
partner violence. It is important to notice the ways in which socially constructed 
institutions and norms external to the self present external constraints to women’s 
agency. But it is also important to notice the ways in which various individuals have 
socialized women so that they also come to have internal constraints to their 
agency. Together with other socially constructed external constraints, this 
socialization influences their capacity to “do and be” (Nussbaum 2000). When this 
socialization is most effective, women may come to see their good as instrumental to 
the good of others and not as a good in itself, and they may exercise their agency in 
ways that perpetuate the idea that they are instrumental primarily for the good of 
those others. In this way they aid in their own oppression. This is why it is 
important to notice the ways in which women are socialized into seeing themselves 
as instrumental to the good of others, and to notice the ways in which social 
                                                        
25 As I argued in chapter one, they thereby also contribute to the formation of the 
horizon of choices against which other women make choices.  
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construction works to disadvantage women. I argue that while feminists have 
critiqued the ways in which various social actors have constructed women as 
instrumental to a variety of ends, they have missed the ways in which, as a result of 
the intersection of oppressive socialization and oppressive social constructions, 
women have come to see themselves as instrumental to the good of others. Intimate 
partner violence is an issue area that illuminates this insight well.  
Feminists have identified, among others, economic constraints, immigrant 
status, racial discrimination, religious norms, retaliatory violence and a flawed 
justice system, as well as the intersection between these, as external constraints that 
shape the way in which women experience and react to intimate partner violence. 
 
External Constraints to Women’s Agency 
Economic  
Where an abusive partner is the chief breadwinner, an abused woman may 
fear material harm should she leave him (Friedman 2003: 145). There are several 
socially constructed reasons for this. In paying women less, employers are allowed 
to maintain an illusion of social relations in which all women are married, and are 
married to men, thereby ignoring the fact of single mothers as well as the fact of 
lesbian relationships where the joint income of both partners would generally be 
less than that of a heterosexual couple. Batterers may prevent women from working 
or studying during their relationship so as to increase the woman’s dependence on 
them, with the result that should she choose to leave the relationship, she will also 
lack employable skills. Here a batterer may rely on tropes about a woman’s place 
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being that of a caregiver in the home. A woman who leaves her abuser may, as a 
result of facing gender discrimination in employment opportunities and pay scales, 
find it very difficult to find a job that pays her enough to support herself and her 
children (Hirschmann 2003: 111; Okin 1989). In this case, we can see how the social 
construction of gender discrimination in the economy influences a woman’s 
decision to remain with an abusive partner.  
 
Immigrant Status 
Economic constraints intersect with immigration status to make the plight of 
immigrant women who suffer intimate partner violence that much worse than that 
of most non-immigrant women (Barnett 2001: 18). A 2000 study reported that 48% 
of Latinas reported that they experienced an escalation of intimate partner violence 
after they immigrated to the U.S. (Dutton, Orloff and Hass 2000 in Bracken 2008: 1). 
In a similar study done by Tjaden and Thoennes, 60% of Korean immigrant to the 
U.S. women reported being physically abused by their spouses (Tjaden and Thoenne 
2000 in Bracken 2008: 1).26 Immigrant women may be illiterate or face language 
barriers that make it difficult for them to access information about resources that 
may otherwise be available to them (Hirschmann 2003: 119) or to access resources 
                                                        
26 Various explanations have been offered for the higher prevalence of intimate 
partner violence in immigrant communities - among these is that immigrant 
women’s culture allows them to accept abuse (Erez in Bracken 2008: 1). Levinson 
used anthropological data to argue that intimate partner violence is more prevalent 
in societies where divorce is not easily attained, where men control decisions and 
finances within the family and where violence is often used to resolve conflict 
(Levinson in Bracken 2008: 2). 
 62 
when they do have the necessary information (Erez in Bracken 2008: 1).27 Women 
who are in relationships with undocumented workers may also fear that their 
partners will be deported if they report the violence, with the subsequent loss of 
financial support this implies for them (Hirschmann 2003: 119). In this case, we can 
see how the intersection of immigrant status within an economic context that 
discriminates against women further constrains women’s choice when they suffer 
intimate partner violence. 
 
Race 
The problem of leaving an abusive spouse is often compounded for women of 
color because of racism in hiring practices as well as the inherent racism in the U.S. 
legal system, which women of color may not wish to subject themselves or their 
partners to. For women of color, gender intersects with racial discrimination both in 
the economy and in the legal system to constrain their decision-making in the face 
of intimate partner violence. Additionally they may face censure from their own 
community, should they call on the police, for being ‘traitors’ to their own 
(Hirschmann 2003: 118).  
 
 
                                                        
27 In one case, shelter workers denied a Hispanic woman entry into a shelter for 
victims of domestic violence because she could not speak English, as staff believed 
the language barrier would not allow her to participate in a mandatory support 
group. Staff rejected the possibility of her son translating for her until a Spanish-
speaking advocate could be found, arguing ironically, that this would further 
victimize her. It did not seem to matter to the shelter workers that the woman had 
been living on the streets for the last two days, too afraid to go home, and that she 
had been mugged twice during that time. They were more concerned about 
following “proper” forms of “empowerment” (Hirschmann 2003: 121). 
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Religious Norms 
Some women may feel a responsibility to a higher power like God or a moral 
norm that requires that she maintain her marriage under any condition, even at 
high cost to herself (Friedman 2003: 146). In these cases, it does not help that 
religious leaders also fail to support women when the latter approach them for help 
(Barnett 2001: 7). In some cases women may not even seek help from clergy if 
others have socialized them to believe that their husband has a religious right to 
“discipline” them. For example, the Christian Domestic Discipline movement, which 
has a few thousand followers in the US, advocates that husbands beat their wives to 
maintain discipline within the family and wives within the movement “consent” to 
this practice (Bennett-Smith 2013). This is an example of the ways in which women 
face constraints on their agency from the beliefs and practices of the religious 
institutions they belong to and the ways in which they also internalize these beliefs 
that then shape how they respond to intimate partner violence. 
 
Retaliatory Violence and Stalking 
A woman may not leave an abusive partner out of fear that her husband may 
engage in retaliatory violence should she leave (Rand 2003: 29; Barnett 2001: 10). 
Women are also less likely to report intimate partner violence while they are in an 
abusive relationship because of a fear of retaliatory violence, but they feel more able 
to do so after they separate from those partners (Hirschmann 2003: 112). 
Separation too is fraught with risk. Intimate partners who are physically abusive are 
more likely to kill women who leave the relationship – statistics show that women 
who leave abusive relationships are at 75% more risk of their partners killing them 
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than those who remain within those relationships (Rand 2003: 27). Some women 
who leave abusive relationships report that living in fear of partners who stalk them 
long after they leave can be worse than actually continuing to live with those 
partners, and women’s anticipation of that kind of stalking and harassment may 
hold women back from leaving (Friedman 2003: 145).28   
 
Justice System 
The justice system itself presents significant barriers to women who suffer 
intimate partner violence. For example, police may view intimate partner violence 
as a ‘domestic matter’; additionally they may take a conciliatory approach to 
abusers or deem scratches on the man as evidence that the violence was mutual, 
and not the result of the woman acting in self-defense (Hirschmann 2003: 104). 
Anecdotal evidence abounds in the media and in scholarly journals about judges 
who trivialize women’s complaints and even disclose their whereabouts to their 
abusers. Despite evidence that wife and child abuse are related, judges may still 
grant custody to male abusers, or grant them visitation rights that force the abused 
woman to have continued contact with her abuser. Judges may even believe that 
women are unfit mothers because they have suffered abuse, and some judges use 
the fact that the batterer has violated a protection order as evidence that the woman 
is an unfit mother (Hirschmann 2003: 116). 
                                                        
28 In other cases, a victim may not seek help because she may be physically isolated 
from sources of support, for example, if she lives in a rural area (Davis, Taylor and 
Furniss 2001). 
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As Friedman notes, women may not leave an abusive relationship because 
they fear losing custody of their children to their partner should they leave him 
(Friedman 2003: 145). In other cases, women may fear that reporting the abuse to 
law enforcement may prompt child protective services to investigate the family, and 
possibly remove her children from her care (Barnett 2001: 6). Women may resist 
leaving an abusive partner if they know that women who secure a separation or 
divorce from their spouses may lose alimony in many cases while those who do 
obtain court orders for child support are often unsuccessful in actually collecting it 
(Hirschmann 2003: 111). These possibilities highlight structural problems with the 
law, which is often ineffectual in securing financial support for spouses and children, 
and often ineffectual in ensuring that the child support reaches the women and 
children who need it when it does provide a court order for child support.  
Medical personnel who treat abused women may also file child abuse reports 
against abused women because they believe that wife abuse harms the child 
(Hirschmann 2003: 118). Medical personnel are often the first point of contact that 
an abused woman has with the outside world but often their internalized logic of 
gender discrimination makes them ignore the connections between the injuries they 
see and intimate partner violence. This is why medical personnel screen for intimate 
partner violence in only 6 to 10% of cases when studies indicate that 20% of 
emergency room visits and 25% of homicides are the result of intimate partner 
violence (Hirschmann 2003: 117). It is true that when men abuse women in front of 
their children, this harms the children, but when medical personnel file child abuse 
reports against the woman and child protective services remove children from their 
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mother both medical personnel and individuals who work for child protection 
services perpetrate a further injustice against the abused woman.  
Nuisance property laws or crime-free housing ordinances further constrain 
how some women respond to intimate partner violence. Victims of intimate partner 
violence may fear reporting the abuse by calling 911 because of a growing trend 
across hundreds of towns and cities in the U.S. that have adopted nuisance property 
or crime-free housing ordinances. These laws aim to lessen the burden on police 
and to protect neighborhoods from “seriously disruptive households” (Eckholm 
2013). The problem, as ACLU lawyer Sandra S. Parks argues, is that these 
ordinances “turn victims of crime who are pleading for emergency assistance into 
‘nuisances’ in the eyes of the city…..They limit people’s ability to seek help from 
police and punish victims for criminal activity committed against them.” (Parks in 
Eckholm 2013) 
When Lakisha Briggs’ abusive boyfriend arrived at her place last summer she 
feared calling the police because she would have violated Norristown, 
Pennsylvania’s ordinance which allows officials to pressure landlords to evict a 
tenant if police have been called to the property three times within four months 
(Eckholm 2013). The fact that Briggs’ right to call on police for help was 
undermined by the way in which the ordinance worked highlights the dilemma 
some victims of IPV face when they have to choose either their personal safety from 
an abusive partner or eviction. That night, her boyfriend Mr. Bennett attacked her 
with a broken ashtray leaving her with a gash on her head, and a four-inch stab 
wound in her neck. Even though Briggs begged her neighbor not to call the police 
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before she lost consciousness, her neighbor did so and medical personnel arrived to 
take Briggs for emergency treatment. Norristown officials asked her landlord to 
evict Briggs within ten days or face losing his rental license. The town backed down 
after Briggs contacted the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (Eckholm 2013).29  
Victims of intimate partner violence often face a choice between going back 
to their abusers or facing homelessness because of a shortage of housing for victims 
of IPV (Haugen 2012). Between 1996 and 2000, the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) allocated some $50 million annually to housing, and annually increased 
that by $175 a year from 2000 to 2005. In 2005 government did not reauthorize 
provision for shelter funding, so direct funding for housing for victims of intimate 
partner violence was reduced to nothing. In its place, VAWA reauthorization left 
shelter funding to grants, or what they called, “Collaborative Grants to develop 
Long-Term Housing for Victims” (Haugen 2012: 1067). Each day of 2010 saw an 
average of 9, 000 unmet requests for help (Haugen 2012: 1068).30  
 
Internal Constraints to Women’s Agency 
Feminists recognize that the gender specific ways in which various social 
actors socialize male and female children plays a major role in how women deal 
with intimate partner violence. Hirschmann discusses internal barriers to women’s 
                                                        
29 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/us/victims-dilemma-911-calls-can-bring-
eviction.html?hp&_r=0 
30 Haugen questions of what use VAWA is when it raises awareness about intimate 
partner violence, is often the driving force behind organizations and battered 
women’s shelters, but does not extend enough funding to these organizations and 
shelters such that they are often forced to turn away women and children who need 
their services because of this lack of funding (Haugen 2012: 1066). 
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responses to intimate partner violence that I take to be a product of socialization 
because we can identify particular individuals who relay these norms, attitudes and 
behaviors to women. For example, Hirschmann argues that a woman may choose to 
stay with an abusive partner because she may have observed her father beating her 
mother and internalized the belief that violence is a ‘normal’ expression of love, or 
she may stay because of the way in which people around her may euphemistically 
interpret a man’s controlling behavior, which may be psychologically abusive, as 
‘endearing’ features of his love and care for every aspect of her life.  
From a young age, various social actors socialize girls into devaluing their 
own gender and occupational successes, and to focus instead on relationships and 
affiliations with male partners. No wonder then that teenage girls tend to seek 
approval from boys (Barnett 2001: 8) and that women may stay with abusive 
partners as a result of depression, low self-worth, feelings of loneliness, having a 
sense of bearing responsibility for the relationship, holding traditional values about 
men’s and women’s roles, and their fear of the stigma that attaches to divorce or the 
need for control (Hirschmann 2003: 112-113).  
Fairy tales and other traditional narratives, including love stories 
begin the process of socializing young women into the idea that the starting 
point of a happy life is when they meet a man and share a committed, loving 
and intimate relationship with him (Towns and Adams 2009: 745). The ideal 
end of this relationship is most often marriage (Towns and Adams 2009: 
746-747). Romance novels and on-screen love stories reinforce this trope 
during girls’ teenage years and in later life. As a result of these forms of 
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socialization, victims of intimate partner violence may hold beliefs about love 
and romance that entrap them in abusive relationships. Meyers describes 
this phenomenon well when she argues, 
The culturally entrenched tropes, mythic tales, and pictorial 
images that depict women serve as a kind of shorthand in which 
group norms are crystallized and through which these norms become 
embedded in the ‘geology of desire’ (I borrow Barbara Herman’s 
phrase; Herman 1991: 787). Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to say 
that these figurations fossilize gender norms in the geology of culture, 
for they integrate these norms into the corpus of common sense, 
where they are protected from criticism (Beauvoir 1989, Chapter 9; 
Kittay 1988; Rooney 1991). Mere social convention – normalized 
gender – is thus naturalized (Meyers 2002: 25).  
 
Students for example may believe that jealousy is a normal aspect of dating. 
Women in abusive relationships may believe that other women have problems that 
are comparable to their own, and that other women also have problems with love 
and mutual trust (Barnett 2001: 8). Women may also believe that intimate partner 
violence is commonplace (which, given the statistics, it is) and so they see their own 
situation as not very unusual and so something they should put up with. When 
people around a victim of intimate partner violence place value in attitudes of love, 
commitment and hope this may make her feel a need to display those attitudes and 
stay in an abusive relationship because this accords with the value she and many 
around her have come to place in those attitudes (Barnett 2001: 8-9). A woman may 
experience the thought of separating from her partner, permanently or otherwise, 
or of him rejecting her as threatening enough for her to believe that dealing with his 
sporadic aggression may be a better option than leaving him. She may even blame 
his aggression on herself and a failure on her part to maintain the relationship 
(Barnett 2001: 8). 
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Women may remain with abusive partners because they believe that a two-
parent home is important for their children. As a result, they may deem having their 
partner in the home to be more important than having to tolerate his abuse (Barnett 
2001:9). This is especially so if the man is not abusive towards their children, 
leading the woman to believe that her children are better off having a father in the 
home (Friedman 2003: 145). One reason for this is because society often constructs 
single mothers as inadequate parents, citing the argument that children of single 
mothers tend to get into trouble more than those who are not. Some people go so far 
as to describe a single woman as a  “troubled identity” (Reynolds and Wetherell: 
2003 in Towns and Adams 2009: 745), a label few would be happy to wear. 
Within the context of the family, various social actors often construct a 
woman’s love for her children in terms of self-sacrifice, and this construction of 
motherhood may also shape how women respond to intimate partner violence. 
Women serve as instrumental to the good of their children in various ways, and to 
various ends. Women’s relationships with and concern for their children are also a 
contributing factor in how they respond to abuse.  
Social construction favors men as a group. And socialization favors them as 
well. As far as social construction goes, men enjoy advantages over women in their 
interaction with most social institutions, e.g. most men enjoy an advantage over 
most women in terms of hiring practices and terms of employment, and they enjoy 
an advantage over women in most religious belief systems as well. They enjoy an 
advantage in socialization as well, because various social actors often socialize boys 
to value themselves and their work. These actors also often give boys mixed signals 
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about bad behavior – even if caregivers punish boys for bad behavior, these 
caregivers may see this behavior as something that they expect of boys, because, as 
the saying goes, “boys will be boys.” As a result, boys themselves may use their 
punishment for bad behavior as something they should be proud of and they may 
even fear being labeled as “goody-goody” for their good behavior by their peers. In 
this way boys receive an almost tacit license to behave badly (May and Strikwerda 
1994: 138). 
Men may find it more difficult to speak of the intimate partner violence they 
suffer because most people associate being a victim of intimate partner violence 
with being female, and they may fear being ridiculed were they to speak out. 
However Barnett argues that while male victims find that their colleagues will 
accept their victim status with some humor, and their bosses tend to be 
sympathetic, abused women tend to experience unsympathetic bosses who tend to 
blame them for the abuse, and who may seek to suspend their employment, making 
women reluctant to share their experience of abuse with others (Barnett 2001: 6). 
To summarize this section of the chapter, women who suffer intimate 
partner violence face challenges from external and internal constraints. They face 
challenges from the intersection of discriminatory laws, socially constructed 
economic disadvantage and other non-legalized forms of discrimination, for 
example, everyday forms of discrimination against individuals on the basis of 
gender, race and immigrant status. At the level of laws and institutions social 
construction works to oppress women, and on the more interpersonal level 
socialization aids in making women conform to gender expectations that further 
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disadvantage them. Social construction and socialization are so effective that 
women may have normalized the processes that systematically devalue them to the 
point where women may come to see themselves as instrumental to the good of 
others - even in the face of intimate partner violence.  
 
The Problem of Instrumentality 
Most feminists have criticized instances in which various social and political 
actors socially construct men and women as instrumental to some other end. In 
these cases individuals within various social and political institutions construct men 
and women as instrumental to some other end, and to the extent that their 
depictions of individuals become normalized in a society, they may socialize men 
and women into accepting these representations of themselves. Earlier I mentioned 
the ways in which states constructs masculinity to serve their foreign policy 
objectives. Here I will confine my discussion to the ways in which various actors use 
women as instrumental to some further end.  
Bina D’Costa (2003) and Cynthia Enloe (2004) show how states use women 
as instrumental for the ends of nation building and foreign policy objectives 
respectively. It is not uncommon to find those who champion the cause of women’s 
development citing women’s development as instrumental to some other social 
good. “The Girl Effect” campaign is a good recent example of this problem. The 
campaign’s website cites investment in girls as important because girls are “agents 
of change” and because “the cost of excluding girls is high.” By calling girls agents of 
change, campaign organizers cite girls’ education as being instrumental to delaying 
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child marriage and teen pregnancy, but also resolving issues like HIV/AIDS and 
poverty. In referring to the cost of excluding girls from education, campaign 
organizers cite the lost potential of income from educated girls to be in the region of 
$10 billion in both India and Uganda, and $69 billion over the course of educated 
girls’ lifetimes in Bangladesh.31 Uma Narayan criticizes Kristoff and WuDunn, the 
authors of Half the Sky for presenting women as instrumental in these ways – she 
argues that the book is replete with instances of the authors depicting women as 
economic and political resources that are instrumental to some other good and not 
as ends in themselves (Narayan 2010: 282).  
I argue that women should see their own good as a legitimate end in their 
decision-making, and as a good in itself, particularly when they are suffering abuse. I 
agree with Hirschmann that women may choose to remain within abusive 
relationships because of various external and internal constraints. But I think that it 
is equally important to explore the ways in which, within the context of these 
constraints, men and women construct the ideological content of meaningful 
relationships in ways that result in women seeing themselves as instrumental to the 
good of others when they negotiate their responses to intimate partner violence. 
These others may include, among others, their children, parents, siblings, and 
ironically, even their abuser. I am recommending that in addition to critically 
analyzing the social construction of legal and other institutions, which no doubt 
shape the ways in which women act in response to gender-based violence, we also 
                                                        
31 http://www.girleffect.org  
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unmask the socialization that makes it possible for women to see themselves as 
instrumental to the ends of others. 
Hirschmann will agree that women’s sense of their being instrumental to the 
ends of others is a consequence of socialization, social construction and what she 
calls ideological misrepresentation of gender roles. Nussbaum will agree that when 
women see themselves as instrumental to the good of others, this shapes what they 
can do and be. Nedelsky will agree that the ways in which women come to see 
themselves as instrumental to the good of others is a consequence of the ways in 
which our relations with one another and with social institutions structure our 
gender relations. All three will agree that intimate partner violence is an issue area 
that highlights the problem of women’s instrumentality – not just as nation builders, 
foreign policy specialists and human development experts craft it - but also as 
individual women factor it into their decision making in situations in which their 
very safety is at risk.  
Hirchmann (2003) and Cudd (2006) argue that oppressive external forces 
shape the inner lives and choices of the oppressed in ways that reinforce the 
disadvantageous representations that oppressed individuals have of themselves. I 
argue that the processes of socialization are so effective that women may treat 
themselves as instrumental to the ends of others when they take the good of 
significant others into account when responding to intimate partner violence. I do 
not subscribe to a view of relationships in which individuals remain insulated from 
the needs and wants of their loved ones, because it is precisely our vulnerability to 
the needs and wants of those we are in relationships with that makes those 
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relationships meaningful. However, vulnerability ought to be mutual and reciprocal, 
and even where that vulnerability is mutual and reciprocal, women ought not to 
treat themselves as instrumental to the good of others in situations in which they 
are suffering abuse - it is difficult to argue that they should do so when they often 
live with a constant threat to their safety and wellbeing. 
Social, political and legal institutions construct the power imbalance between 
men and women through laws and practices that discriminate against women. The 
socially constructed nature of these relationships makes them open to being 
reconstructed in ways that can address the power imbalance between men and 
women so as to positively influence the ways in which women respond to intimate 
partner violence. Institutional reform is necessary for women to have the requisite 
legal and economic resources to leave abusive relationships. But this is insufficient. 
It is also necessary that in addition to institutional reform, we also socialize one 
another differently such that women see themselves and their good as ends in 
themselves and not only as a means to the ends of others. This will apply to women 
who do not suffer from intimate partner violence just as it will apply to victims of 
intimate partner violence and make them more willing to report the violence they 
suffer. A woman’s greater willingness to report the violence may reveal to her 
options that, while not being perfect, may open several avenues of relief for her. For 
example, among other things, if she and her partner voluntarily attend couples 
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therapy it may end the violence in a relationship she values, or it may facilitate exit 
options for her in a relationship that she may believe has run its course.32 
When women see themselves as instrumental to the good of those they are in 
meaningful relationships with, they may remain in abusive relationships. This is 
perhaps because they are invested in relationships that they do not wish to 
jeopardize by leaving. Women may make their decisions about how to respond to 
intimate partner violence by considering what the consequences are for those they 
are in meaningful relationships with, whether those others are children, parents, 
siblings or their abusive partner. Victims of intimate partner violence may take into 
consideration, among other things, the financial implications their leaving the 
abuser will have on their children, their fear of their children losing a father figure 
were they to leave, or they are unwilling to cause their children or parents the 
emotional pain that may result from their leaving their partner. In this regard, it is 
important to note that in many cases, women do not see the man who abuses them 
as only their abuser, but also as someone they care about and with whom they are in 
a meaningful relationship with, so they may even craft their responses to their 
partner’s violence in ways that make them instrumental even to his good.  
 
 
                                                        
32 Studies show that the difference in recidivism between subjects who go into 
treatment as a result of being mandated to do so by the court, and those who are 
arrested but do not go for treatment is small. When courts mandate men to go for 
treatment they often do not do so, and those who discontinue treatment 
prematurely often remain as violence-free as men who complete their treatment. 
These results suggest that court mandated treatment for spouse abuse is not as 
effective as its advocates propose (Rosenfeld 1994: 205).  
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Excerpts of Women’s Instrumentality in Intimate Partner Violence 
 
I want to draw attention to the many ways in which women see themselves 
as instrumental to the ends of others, and how it is consideration for others, rather 
than consideration for themselves, that drives their responses to intimate partner 
violence. The following are examples in which victims of intimate partner violence 
appear to see themselves as instrumental to the good of those they are in 
meaningful relationships with. Notice that in their accounts of how they chose to 
respond to the violence, these women draw on their socialization.   
This is an excerpt from an interview with a woman who suffered intimate 
partner violence in Canada. 
My hope was to get away from my husband. At that time, my condition 
was difficult. I have nobody to look after me since my parents and my 
sisters are living in my home country. I have nobody here. No 
relatives, no friends. I am like a lonely tree. Once in a blue moon, I 
called my parents. They did not listen to my story. They did not want 
to believe the truth. They wanted to hear a different story. They 
wanted to believe or tell others that I was in a very good position. 
[Her husband came to her country of origin, married her and 
sponsored her to Canada] … my parents compelled me to stay with 
him. They thought if I left my husband, it would be shame for our 
family and it would affect my sisters' marriage prospects. I had 
nobody to rely on. I stiffened like a rock. I thought this was my fate 
and I decided to stay with him. … [She later decided to leave him, once 
her sisters were married]. Welfare gave me a chance to hide from my 
husband for a while without having to go to work. The welfare money 
is not enough…everybody would agree with me. Nevertheless I am 
relieved even though I did not get a job yet at least I can eat one meal 
a day because of the welfare money (Mosher et al 2004: 15). 
 
In the above excerpt, we can see that it is very important that the state 
provide material support to women who suffer intimate partner violence. When the 
state does not provide adequate material support to abused women, it makes it very 
difficult for them to leave their abusive partners. Institutional support and reform is 
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necessary to provide women with adequate material resources. It is equally 
important that we notice that while state support was necessary for her to leave, it 
was not sufficient. She was for a time still hampered in leaving her partner because 
her parents had socialized her into believing that if she left her husband she would 
bring shame on the family. She saw herself as instrumental to not bringing shame on 
her family by staying with her partner. She left him after her sisters got married, 
which suggests that she had seen herself as instrumental to their marriage 
prospects as well. In this way, she made the way in which she responded to the 
violence she suffered instrumental to the good of her parents and siblings. The way 
in which her family members and the wider community had likely constructed her 
role as a daughter, a sister and a community member made her remain with her 
abuser until a key restraining factor – the fact of her sisters not yet being married - 
was removed. It is true that she may not have been able to leave her partner even 
after her sisters were married were it not for the support he received from welfare, 
but welfare appeared to be of support to her only after she felt she had fulfilled her 
responsibility to her family.  
 Gloria, a 41-year-old woman in the U.S. from Mexico suffered intimate partner 
violence for some 26 years of her life. She says,  
 What made me stay with him was that my mother was still alive at 
that time. My father had died in 97', but my mother didn't die until 
2008. It was then that everything stopped, because if I would have left 
him before they died it would have caused them a great deal of 
emotional pain. However, all that ended when they died. When they 
died, I stopped feeling the need to protect them (Gonzalez 2010: 82). 
 
 Gloria’s parents socialized her into believing that were she to leave her 
husband, it would cause them “a great deal of emotional pain.” (Gonzalez 2010: 82) 
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Gloria treated herself as instrumental to the emotional well being of her parents for 
as long as they were alive and only left her abusive husband when her parents died. 
In placing her consideration for her parents’ emotional wellbeing above her own 
need to leave her abusive spouse she treated herself as instrumental to the 
emotional good of her parents over her own happiness and safety.  
In Lindgren and Renck’s study, one woman who had several children from an 
earlier relationship and then one from her abusive spouse described how she would 
not even cry as her partner assaulted her out of her concern not to wake her 
children. This woman “described how she thought and acted as she was lying on the 
kitchen floor being hit repeatedly about the head: ‘‘And I don’t cry out because I 
don’t want to wake the children’’” (Lindgren and Renck 2008: 117-118). In this 
example, a woman whose husband was beating her around the head resisted crying 
out because she did not want to wake her children. In doing so she saw her quietly 
accepting the beating as instrumental to her children’s good.  
Within an abusive relationship women’s concern for their children is a 
restraining factor in keeping them in the relationship just as much as it can serve as 
a consideration in making them leave the relationship. Women who chose to leave 
abusive partners cited worries about how their children were affected by the 
violence they saw, or worries about whether, or realizations that, the man had also 
subjected their children to violence. For example, one woman described how the 
fact that her eleven-year-old son came between her and her husband time and again 
as a way of protecting her was a turning point in her choice to leave. In her words, 
...and it was not the first time he had stood between him and me. And I 
thought but what the hell am I doing here, what do I expect of this. How 
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many times is my son to stand and protect me so that his dad doesn’t hit me 
(Lindgren and Renck 2008: 121). 
 
In another case, an abused woman reported, 
And then I know that on one occasion . . . he was angry with me and I 
don’t really know why. I think it was because she [the baby] cried and 
then he went for me and took hold of my hair in the back of my neck 
and just turns me round as I stood like this (as if holding a baby) with 
xxx [the baby], turns me to the wall and then stands and begins 
banging her and me against the wall. I try as much as I could to resist 
but it is not so easy, so both she and I go into the wall ...and I shout 
and ask what are you doing, what are you doing . . . . And I think of her 
and she is crying hysterically. He did this ten or fifteen times and then 
left. And there I was, first I was, it hurt and I was worried about her 
and everything . . . but above all the shock . . . I didn’t think he would 
ever do anything to her. It was then, I think, the penny dropped that I 
had to get away from here . . . somehow (Lindgren and Renck 2008: 
121). 
 
For the woman in the above example it appears to be more her daughter’s 
safety that prompted her to leave the abusive relationship, and not her own.  
For a third woman, her realization that her children had been sexually 
abused was key in her decision to leave her abusive spouse. 
And then I understood that he had violated my children. So I called 
him at the crayfish party and said what the hell do you think you’re 
doing, then I began to dare to put my foot down and I didn’t give a 
damn about the consequences. And I said you are not welcome, 
enough is enough, now you’re out for good (Lindgren and Renck 
2008: 121). 
 
A fourth case was that of a woman from the Eastern Shore of 
Maryland who reports having ignored several red flags in her marriage until her 
husband assaulted her son.  
There were probably several red flags when I reflect on that marriage, 
but I was in deep denial. The first indication of a problem was when I 
began having physical symptoms. I had severe colitis and panic 
attacks. I also suffered from migraines. Other red flags were the facial 
expressions and reactions to my husband’s behaviors I noted in the 
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few friends who visited me toward the end of the marriage. A major 
red flag was when my husband was asked to leave the church because 
of inappropriate behavior with his 14-year old Sunday school student, 
who incidentally was also our babysitter. I completely believed in my 
husband’s innocence, and remained steadfastly loyal until I 
discovered my husband had been physically abusive to my son. I 
found out that he had tied my son to a chair and had beaten him with 
a belt. That woke me up. That was when I knew something was wrong. 
I also had found out that he had punched our son in the face to the 
point of knocking him over the back of our couch. I realized he was 
dangerous and I left. I left because I could no longer deny that my 
children were now in danger (Bracken 2008: 42). 
 
In a fifth case, a woman identified as Daisy in Bracken’s study, describes the 
only time she felt able to do anything was when it involved her son, 
I remember one time my ex-husband was all drunked up and wanted 
to correct my son… I do remember pushing him and telling him not to 
touch our son when he was drinking…and he knew that I meant it. 
About the only time I feel I had any strength was whenever it had 
anything to do with my son (Bracken 2008: 79). 
 
What these examples show is that these women were motivated to stay, 
remain silent while being beaten, leave or otherwise resist their abusive partners 
when they acted in the interests of others they were in meaningful relationships 
with. In all these cases these women saw themselves as instrumental to the good of 
others rather than seeing their own good as an end in itself. What these examples 
show us is that relationships are important to these women, just as they are to those 
of us who do not suffer abuse. But what these examples highlight is the ways in 
which socialization can be so effective as to make women see themselves as 
instrumental to the good of those they are in meaningful relationships with, even 
when they suffer intimate partner violence. To the extent that those of us who are 
not victims of intimate partner violence can recognize how our own socialization 
allows us to think of ourselves as instrumental to the good of those we are in 
 82 
meaningful relationships with, we can understand the reasoning of these victims of 
intimate partner violence.   
 
Conclusion 
In all the above cases, the women acted for the good of significant others 
when they responded to intimate partner violence. They saw themselves as 
instrumental to the good of others as a reason for staying with their abusive 
partners, and as a reason for leaving them. Women may make decisions to stay out 
of concern for what they believe are the best interests of their children. Women may 
remain in abusive relationships because they do not want their leaving to be the 
cause of any adverse social fallout for their sisters or a source of pain to their 
parents. Likewise they may leave because they do not want their staying in abusive 
relationships to be a source of pain to their loved ones. They may choose to leave an 
abusive relationship when they believe that the consequences of staying are 
negatively affecting their children.  
What we see in the excerpts of interviews reproduced in this chapter are 
women who sometimes, or perhaps oftentimes, put others before themselves, even 
when they suffer abuse. In doing so, they make themselves and even their personal 
safety instrumental to the wellbeing of those they are in meaningful relationships 
with. Individuals seeing themselves as instrumental to the ends of others may be a 
natural consequence of what it means for any individual to be social. There are 
better and worse ways in which we can serve as instrumental to the good of others.  
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Both men and women are subject to violence, but in different ways. While 
state construction of masculinity may make men more susceptible to, among others, 
military violence, a range of actors construct gender in ways that make women 
susceptible to remaining in situations in which they suffer intimate partner violence. 
When women treat themselves as instrumental to the good of others this forms part 
of a wider social and political culture that uses women’s sexuality, women’s labor 
and women’s development as instrumental to some other end. Given this fact, the 
considerations that women take into account when responding to intimate partner 
violence are important to help us understand how to address intimate partner 
violence. What we find is that in some situations in which women suffer intimate 
partner violence, they sometimes make decisions even against their own personal 
safety because they are seeking to accomplish some good for those they are in 
meaningful relationships with. The ways in which women treat themselves as 
instrumental to the good of others, even in situations of intimate partner violence, is 
indicative of the success with which various social actors socialize women to 
devalue themselves and even their safety.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Violent Familiars: Challenges Camus Rape Victims Face 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There has been a spate of news reports of rape on college campuses 
nationwide.33 Campus rape is a significant social problem that has recently received 
attention at Vanderbilt University, Yale University and Amherst College, among 
others.  
In January this year, The White House Council on Women and Girls and the 
Office of the Vice President issued a report, “Rape and Sexual Assault: A Renewed 
Call to Action” in which the Obama administration outlines the scale of the problem 
of rape and sexual assault, and cites college women as a being especially vulnerable 
to sexual assault. It recounts the efforts the administration has taken to address the 
problem, the many shortcomings in the ways in which liberal institutions continue 
to fail victims, and urges that all stakeholders do more to address the problem of 
violence against women. 
Campus rape is an issue that renders clearly visible the discrepancy between 
the assumptions of institutions of justice – that crime victims have access to 
institutions of justice, and will therefore obtain justice - and their failure in 
delivering justice.  
                                                        
33 When I speak of college campuses, I am referring to campuses in which 
instructors teach students on site as opposed to primarily online, and where a 
significant number of students live on campus and socialize with one another in 
university housing.  
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Even if it is true that all victims of campus rape may not consciously or 
formally seek justice following the assault, at least some do. Even if all campus rape 
victims do not call what they seek “justice” this does not exclude the possibility that 
they expect justice be done. In fact, several recent cases in which campus rape 
victims lodged complaints with the Office for Civil Rights did so because they 
believed that the university did not abide by the Office for Civil Rights’ guidelines on 
how to deal justly with victims of sexual violence. 
An increasing number of young women are now calling their universities to 
account for not handling their complaints of sexual assault adequately. For example, 
Sarah Beth O’Brien is one of a group of Vanderbilt students who filed a complaint 
with the Office for Civil Rights in her freshman year. She said that she and others 
who were raped at Vanderbilt were afraid of coming forward because they had 
heard “horror stories” from earlier complainants of the lengthy process associated 
with reporting their assaults to university officials. In O’Brien’s words, “In spring 
2010, I joined the majority of victims of rape who remain silent about their assault. I 
could not imagine facing the institutional and communal feelings of betrayal and 
shame.” (O’Brien in Jarrett 2013) Two former and four current students, including 
O’Brien, filed federal Title IX complaints against Vanderbilt University on November 
14, 2013 for the university’s alleged “mistreatment of sexual assaults.” (Jarett 
2013)34 
                                                        
34 In October 2013 the Office for Civil Rights opened 25 investigations into the way 
in which colleges and universities have handled sexual assaults on their campuses, 
and whether they have done enough to fulfill their Title IX obligations to protect 
students (Khan 2013). Among the universities that are under federal investigation 
for failing to take reports of sexual harassment and violence on their campuses 
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 I will first outline the state of the field with regard to campus rape. Second I 
argue that even before any legal or disciplinary proceedings are underway, 
individuals within key social institutions interact with the victim in ways that 
attempt to thwart her efforts to obtain justice, whether they do so directly or 
indirectly. Third I show how individuals within all social institutions are likely to 
attempt to silence a rape victim because they experience a heightened sense of their 
own vulnerability or inadequacy when they have to deal with her experience. Lastly 
I will show how campus administration officials may attempt to silence a rape 
victim because they experience a conflict of interest with their roles as university 
officials who may experience a need to maintain a good reputation for the 
university. 
 
Literature Review 
Feminists agree on the extent of the problem presented by gender-based 
violence. According to a 2000 report by Fisher et al, between twenty and twenty-
five percent of college women nationwide reported having suffered rape or 
attempted rape over the course of their college careers (Talbot, Neill and Rankin, 
2010: 171; Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 2009/2010: p. 56).  
U.S. universities report official crime rates on their campuses in accordance 
with U.S. federal law but these reports typically underestimate the real crime rates 
on campuses (Sanday in Wilkerson: 1999). I suspect that universities are motivated 
                                                                                                                                                                     
seriously include the University of Connecticut, University of Colorado-Boulder, 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Occidental College, Swarthmore College 
and the University of Southern California (Kingkade 2013l; Kingkade 2013m).   
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to underplay the real crime rates on their campuses because both parents and 
students are likely to take student safety into consideration when making choices 
about the university the prospective student will attend. If I am right, then 
universities that reflect higher crime rates in their reports can expect to find a 
decrease in student applications, with a corresponding fall in the revenues they 
could receive from higher numbers of student admissions.35  
Studies show that it is not uncommon to find that women do not wish to 
report being raped. For example, in a national sample of 6, 159 students enrolled in 
32 institutions of higher education in the U.S. Koss, Gidycz and Wisniewski found 
that 42% of female college students who had suffered rape had never told anyone at 
all about the experience (Koss, Gidycz and Wisniewski 1987). In another study of 
650 college-age women, 42% reported that they had been victims of sexual assault, 
but only 28% of them sought help (Sable, Marjorie R., Fran Danis, Denise L. Mauzy 
and Sarah K. Gallagher 2006: 158).36 
Eviatar Zerubavel argues that “conspiracies of silence are clearly socially 
patterned” (Zerubavel 2006: 5) and it is the patterned nature of the silence around 
gender-based crimes like campus rape that make them a systematic form of 
injustice. Maureen Mahoney argues that we can also see silence as an avenue to 
power, which is contrary to the position that some feminists take that “voice” is 
“central to women’s experience and exercise of power.” The latter feminists see 
                                                        
35 Interestingly, universities may set themselves up as “families” or small close-knit 
communities, and when university administration fails a campus rape victim, they 
mirror the gender injustices Okin and others point out that we see within families. 
36 Sudderth et al report that college students report anywhere between 35% and 
43% of the crimes committed against them (Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 2009-
2010: 56). 
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women’s recovery of an authentic “voice”, and an ability to express it as key to their 
strength, and as necessary for overcoming their subordination (Mahoney 1996: 
603). Mahoney argues that just as women’s voices are multiple and also diverse in 
terms of women’s cultural and personal histories, so too is the meaning of silence. 
According to Mahoney, silence – the inability or unwillingness to speak – is also 
multidimensional and complex (Mahoney 1996: 603). Mahoney argues that silence 
need not always be equated with powerlessness, pointing out that in an interview, 
the silence of the interviewer is not a sign of powerlessness. Gaps in a slave’s 
narrative or her silence may likewise be an act of defiance and so it too is not 
entirely powerless (Mahoney 1996: 604). Silence, on Mahoney’s account, contains 
the possibility of power. Let me say that I acknowledge the possibility of power in 
silence in the cases Mahoney describes above, but when it is a systematic silence 
around a gender-based issue like campus rape, silence re-inscribes the injustice. 
When women remain silent in cases of campus rape it may protect them from 
further abuse by individuals they may interact with, with regard to the rape, but it 
does not contain the possibility of power. 
It is important to notice that silence operates to different degrees because 
some victims are less vocal than others and the same victim may move into and out 
of moments of silence at different times depending on who she is speaking to, and 
where she is in her healing process. So my point is not that campus rape victims are 
silent altogether, but rather that individuals with social roles and individuals with 
institutional roles attempt to silence them in various ways, with varying degrees of 
success. Epifano’s recounting of her experience of campus rape below shows that 
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individuals with social roles and those with institutional roles attempted to silence 
her, and that there was a time in the past when she did to some extent feel shamed 
into silence. It is important to notice that I am only able to make my argument about 
the silencing effects of shame because women like Epifano spoke out about the 
efforts that the individuals she interacted with made to silence her, and because she 
did not remain silent altogether.  
Feminists recognize that male violence against women is patterned and 
systematic. They also recognize that individuals within various social institutions 
who subscribe to gender discriminatory norms and who display behaviors in 
keeping with these norms create an environment in which victims of gender-based 
violence suffer a miscarriage of justice that is also patterned and systematic 
(Hirschmann 2003; Nedelsky 2011; Cudd 2006). There is consensus among 
feminists that this miscarriage of justice is rooted in a set of gender discriminatory 
practices that negatively influences women’s agency (Cudd 2006; Enloe 2004; 
Friedman 2003; Narayan 1997; Nedelsky 2011; Nussbaum 1999; Okin 1989; Song 
2007; Shen 2011).  
The patterned and systematic forms of gender-based violence have 
consequences that reach further than the immediate act of violence. Instead, the 
violence affects among other things, women’s health and the choices they make that 
relate to their personal and professional lives (Campbell, Sefl and Ahrens 2003; 
Cudd 2006; Street and Arias 2001).  
Rape is a problem for women’s health. Rape victims’ assessment of their 
health and physical wellbeing is significantly poorer than the national norm. 
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Survivors of sexual assault also appear to have more health problems than other 
women and these health problems may last for years after the assault (Campbell, 
Sefl and Ahrens 2003: 90; Street and Arias 2001). For example, rape victims report 
more psychological distress, more sexual activity and more alcohol use compared to 
non-victims (Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 2010: 58). Victims who suffer trauma 
are likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a significant 
minority attempts to commit suicide. PTSD makes victims’ alertness to danger 
maladaptive – they may go into a state of alertness to danger even when there is no 
danger present; victims may relive the trauma over and over again with all its 
emotional intensity, and they may suffer from periods of dissociation from reality 
(Cudd 2006: 159). PTSD and depression can impede a student’s ability to succeed at 
school, and studies have linked anxiety and depression to higher dropout rates from 
school (The White House Council on Women and Girls 2014: 14).   
With regard to choices that relate to their personal and professional lives, 
women display adaptive preferences as precautionary measures against rape, and 
these adaptive preferences create disadvantages for them in their personal and 
professional lives. Cudd argues that what is wrong with adaptive preferences is that 
the woman forms them under circumstances of social inequality: she may find 
certain choices desirable under conditions of social inequality when she would not 
find those same choices desirable under conditions of social equality (Cudd 2006). 
Shugart outlines some of these precautions: When women go out in the evenings, 
they are likely to be more conscious of the time of the event than men are, and to 
think about whether they will be alone, where they will park their cars, who they 
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will be with and so on. Women may make arrangements to carpool. A woman also 
generally tends to be far more conscious of her surroundings than men tend to be, 
and women tend to take extra safety precautions like locking themselves in 
securely. Adaptive preferences include forgoing certain academic opportunities like 
traveling abroad for study programs, working until late at the library or taking night 
classes. They may also forgo economic opportunities like not taking on certain jobs 
because they perceive a greater risk of sexual harassment. All of these adaptive 
preferences restrict women’s movements and delimit their personal and 
professional opportunities in ways that most men’s are not.37 Ironically, as Shugart 
points out, the threat of rape makes it more difficult for women to earn money, but 
at the same time it requires her to have more money, because she will want to avoid 
public transportation and live in a ‘safe’ neighborhood, which obviously costs more 
(Shugart: 1994). 
When university administrations offer rape prevention techniques, focus on 
individualistic strategies like self-defense classes, encourage students to take 
precautions against someone attacking them, and provide facilities like call boxes 
and ride services, they ignore the fact that the incidence of acquaintance rape on 
college campuses is far higher than stranger rape (Wilkerson 1999). For example, all 
Vanderbilt emails that relate to sexual assault have this component. I recently saw 
                                                        
37 For example, I recently forewent an opportunity to enjoy socializing and 
networking with faculty and students at a reception held at Sewanee: The University 
of the South’s Gender and Sexual Diversity House. In forgoing this opportunity I lost 
out on the possibility of making new friends and developing valuable working 
relationships with professionals in my area of research. I did so in part because I 
could not dispel my fear of walking home alone in the dark when I know that at least 
two convicted sex offenders live within a five mile radius of my apartment. 
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notices in Vanderbilt’s central library that urged students to take responsibility for 
their own safety as well. One example of university administrations placing the onus 
on women not to be raped instead of attempting to change the social context that 
makes rape possible is evident in the following security notice sent out to the 
Vanderbilt community on August 8, 2012 in response to a sexual assault on campus. 
The section of the email entitled “Risk Reduction Tips” reads as follows,  
Always stay aware of your surroundings, trust your instincts and let 
friends know where you are going. 
Consuming alcohol reduces your ability and others' ability to make 
good decisions. 
Stay alert and TRUST YOUR INSTINCTS -- If you feel uneasy, leave. Go 
to a safe location and notify VUPD. 
  
In this way, university administrations tend to place the onus on women not 
to be raped instead of attempting to change the social context that makes it possible 
for men to rape, often with impunity. In following this approach they also tend to 
ignore the socially constructed nature of gender-based violence. The reality is that 
the scope of the problem is in fact far wider than individual instances of rape and it 
encompasses the way in which various social actors contribute to the social 
construction of masculinity.  
Men on college campuses perform hypermasculinity in peer groups that 
often perpetuate the marginalization and objectification of women. The 
amalgamation of all-male networks and constructions of “hostile masculinity” 
produce ““emotional detachment, competition, and the sexual objectification of 
women” as the norm in all-male spaces (Bird 1996: 122 in Rich, Utley, Janke and 
Moldoveanu 2010: 270). I found illustrative examples of this phenomenon in Sharon 
Bird’s research into the maintenance of hegemonic masculinity in which she 
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observed and recorded conversations in two coffee shops and three taverns 
frequented by men. In these interactions, she recorded men referring to women as 
‘them’, as ‘other’ and as objects they used for their pleasure. For example, Bird noted 
how men competed with one another in narrating their sexual exploits. In one man’s 
words, “I've run across those kind.... I'll tell 'em, "I'll buy ya a beer." [And the 
hypothetical woman replies,] "Na, I'll buy you a beer." Then I'm thinkin' she's ready 
to get outa there with me. I just want one I can step out with, shoot up her, and get 
back in the bar in 5 or 10 minutes” (anonymous man in Bird 1996: 129) Not to be 
outdone, another man added his story as follows, “Aw, shit, I had one down near 
Vegas.... Well, to make a long story short, when it was time to hit the rack we went 
back to her room.... We found a bucket of ice and a bottle of liquor at the door with a 
note from some other guy attached to it.... I just went ahead and drank the stuff and 
screwed her!” (anonymous man in Bird 1996: 129) 
The ways in which some men objectify women explains why the likelihood of 
men raping women appears not to be evenly distributed throughout college 
campuses. A 1999 survey of 477 male students at a large Southwestern Division 1 
university revealed that athletes and fraternity brothers held significantly more 
negative gender beliefs and were more in agreement with rape myths than the 
control group (Shen 2011: 66). Among fraternities, those in which men treat women 
less respectfully, and engage in behaviors, conversations and jokes that degrade 
women are higher-risk places for women than fraternities where men do not behave 
in this way (Boswell and Spade 1996: 137).  
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Shen rightly points out that when individuals place an exclusive focus on 
fraternities as the source of the problem, they are able to deflect attention away 
from their own role in the construction of the problem (Shen 2011). Rape is a 
socially constructed problem and one in which even those with no criminal history 
participate. Larry May and Robert Strikwerda argue that, through engaging in 
various sexually discriminatory behaviors, ordinary men can be held collectively 
responsible for rape. It is these more routine, everyday sexually discriminatory 
behaviors that make rape more likely. May and Strikwerda (1994) give an account 
of how they, as part of a group, individually narrated fictional sexual exploits and 
then gradually began to talk about possibly raping women they passed in the street. 
Given the part they played in performing masculinity in this way May and 
Strikwerda question whether they share responsibility for the rapes that other men 
had committed, where these men had similar formative experiences as their own 
and where those other men’s formative experiences were perhaps supported by 
May and Strkwerda’s performances of masculinity (May and Strikwerda 1994). 
 
Challenges After the Assault  
Recall that my research is driven by the concern that even within liberal 
societies victims of gender-based violence have access to institutions of justice, but 
these do not always guarantee them access to justice. This is especially troubling 
because institutions of justice within liberal societies are premised on the 
assumption that access to institutions of justice would for the most part translate 
into access to justice. By justice here I mean institutions of justice dispensing the 
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punishment that these institutions in principle support, for example, a man who 
rapes a woman after rendering her unable to give consent through drug or alcohol 
consumption can expect to receive up to fifteen years imprisonment if he is 
convicted. If such a case does not even go to court the very question of punishment 
for the perpetrator or justice for the victim does not even arise, thereby signaling a 
failure of the justice system. By institutions of justice I am referring to institutions 
within a liberal society that are concerned with resolving disputes between 
individuals or groups and punishing crimes, especially where these disputes include 
breaches of the law. Given the scope of this chapter I take institutions of justice to 
include courts as well as judicial boards concerned with disciplinary procedures 
within universities.  My including the latter as institutions of justice may appear to 
be unfounded, as the Office for Civil Rights tasks universities with guaranteeing the 
safety and security of students, and not with dispensing justice. However, given that 
disciplinary committees within universities may mete out punishments to an alleged 
perpetrator based on a preponderance of evidence that includes suspending him for 
a semester or expelling him from the university altogether, means that perpetrators 
and complainants may view these committees as sites of justice. They may do so 
despite the fact that within a liberal society courts serve the function of dispensing 
formal justice and disciplinary committees hand down less dire punishments than 
courts do. In several recent newspaper reports some campus rape victims cited 
their dissatisfaction with the punishments that disciplinary committees meted out 
to their rapists, which suggests that victims do expect these committees to act justly, 
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even though they may not be institutions of justice in the same legal sense as courts 
are.  
When various social actors delay or thwart a rape victim’s efforts at 
obtaining justice they re-inscribe the injustice of the rape. It is with this assumption 
that I attempt to provide one answer to the question of what thwarts rape victims’ 
efforts at obtaining justice in general, but what silences them within the college 
context in particular.  
I argue that key social institutions like the family, medical institutions, law 
enforcement and universities are inadequate to the task of addressing campus rape 
for two reasons: Even before any legal or disciplinary proceedings are underway, 
individuals within these institutions, such as friends and family of rape victims who 
have social roles or campus police, medical personnel or stakeholders in their 
various capacities within the university who have institutional roles interact with 
the victim in ways that may thwart her efforts to obtain justice, whether they do so  
directly or indirectly. The fact that individuals within social institutions make the 
rape victim feel shame results in the rape victim not wanting to proceed with 
reporting the rape. When individuals with social roles or those with institutional 
roles deploy shame to silence campus rape victims they render the social 
institutions that liberal societies task with supporting the rape victim in her search 
for justice inadequate.  
I focus on college campus rape for two reasons: First the socially intense 
college context and the involvement of campus administration throws into sharp 
relief the way in which various individuals thwart the rape victim’s efforts to obtain 
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justice, whether they do so directly or indirectly. Second, I do so because college 
women are one of a few groups of women who are in a high-risk category – college 
women are three times more likely to experience sexual violence than women in the 
general population (Rich, Utley and Janke 2010: 268).38  
My research on this topic began after an alleged rape on the Vanderbilt 
campus made me curious about the factors that led the victim in the case to seek 
medical assistance after the assault but not to provide a description of the male 
student who allegedly raped her. I reproduce the email that the Vanderbilt police 
department sent out describing the incident. I will then look at an article written by 
a rape victim from Amherst College for two reasons: First, the article allows me to 
explore the ways in which individuals with social roles and those with institutional 
roles thwarted her efforts at obtaining justice. Second, the article illuminates the 
role that shame played in hampering her efforts at obtaining justice. I will use the 
work of psychologists Brené Brown and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman to suggest a broader 
applicability of my theory about shame as it relates to campus rape victims. 
The theoretical implications of this research are that various social actors 
including feminists, campus rape activists, individuals holding social roles within 
families, or those who have institutional roles within universities or hospitals, may, 
after reading my work, pay attention to the ways in which they may perpetuate 
gender discriminatory practices that thwart a campus rape victim’s efforts at 
obtaining justice. They may also factor the role that shame plays in thwarting 
                                                        
38 Other groups that are highly vulnerable to sexual abuse are the cognitively 
disabled (Clifford 2012), female military personnel (Yermen 2012) and even 
undergraduates who study abroad (Kimble, Flack and Burbridge 2012). 
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victims’ search for justice into their understanding of campus rape.  The latter 
implication is important because shame, together with guilt and embarrassment, is 
among the leading barriers to female rape victims reporting the assault (Sable, 
Marjorie R., Fran Danis, Denise L. Mauzy and Sarah K. Gallagher 2006: 157) and yet 
it remains under-theorized in relation to campus rape.  
The practical implications of my research will be that individuals who engage 
with a campus rape victim may be better placed to identify their own gender 
discriminatory practices that thwart the campus rape victim’s search for justice, and 
hopefully avoid them in their own behavior towards her. These individuals may also 
be able to focus on the role that shame plays in silencing campus rape victims, and 
reflect on the ways in which they contribute to the construction of shame as it 
relates to campus rape victims. 
Key social institutions like the family, medical institutions, law enforcement 
and universities are inadequate to the task of addressing campus rape. One 
indicator of their inadequacy is the fact of underreporting. I outline some of the 
challenges that campus rape victims face when they do report an assault. Below I 
argue that even before any legal or disciplinary proceedings are underway, 
individuals within key social institutions who interact with the victim thwart her 
efforts to obtain justice, whether they do so directly or indirectly.  
In this section of the chapter I will use an email that the Vanderbilt University 
Police Department sent to the university community on September 4, 2012 to 
illustrate the problem of underreporting of campus rape. I then use an article 
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written by an Amherst College campus rape survivor to make the three arguments 
stated above.  
 
Underreporting 
Underreporting refers to the phenomenon in which crime or other statistics 
as reflected in official reports are lower than is actually the case, because these 
crimes or other statistics are not captured in official data. On September 4, 2012, the 
Vanderbilt University Police Department sent out the following email to the 
university community that illustrates the problem of underreporting with regard to 
campus rape: 
Subject: VUPD SECURITY NOTICE: SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS 
  
*TIMELY SECURITY NOTICE* 
DATE: 09/4/2012 VUPD#: 12-92646 MNPD#: 12-722064 
WARNING: SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS 
At approximately 4:40 p.m., Sept. 2, 2012, VUPD was informed by 
Vanderbilt University Medical staff that a female student was 
reporting that she was the victim of a forcible rape in a dormitory by 
another student during the early morning of Sept. 1, 2012. The 
student reported that the suspect is an acquaintance she had met at a 
party in a fraternity house on Sept. 1, 2012. Sexual assault is non-
consensual sexual activity, ranging from unwanted sexual touching to 
forced intercourse. 
DESCRIPTION: The student did not wish to provide a description of 
the male student. VUPD is continuing to investigate the incident. 
IF YOU HAVE INFORMATION RELATING TO THIS OR A SIMILAR 
INCIDENT, 
PLEASE CALL THE VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT AT (615) 322-2745. 
IF YOU WISH TO REMAIN ANONYMOUS, 
CALL NASHVILLE CRIME STOPPERS AT 74-CRIME (615-742-7463) 
Risk Reduction Tips 
Always stay aware of your surroundings, trust your instincts and let 
friends know where you are going. 
Consuming alcohol reduces your ability and others' ability to make 
good decisions. 
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Stay alert and TRUST YOUR INSTINCTS -- If you feel uneasy, leave. Go 
to a safe location and notify VUPD. 
Please Remember Our On-Campus Resources 
Psychological & Counseling Center 322-2571 
Employee Assistance Program 936-1327 
Student Health Services 322-2427 
Margaret Cunninggim Women’s Center 322-4843 
Project Safe 322-1333 
  
REPORT SUSPICIOUS PERSONS, VEHICLES, OR ACTIVITIES 
IMMEDIATELY! 
ON CAMPUS, DIAL 911 OR USE A BLUE LIGHT PHONE! 
(NOTE: from a cell phone, call 615-421-1911) 
*In compliance with the U.S. Department of Higher Education and 
the Jeanne Clery Act, Security Notices are issued to provide timely 
warning information concerning a potentially dangerous situation 
on or near Vanderbilt University. This information is provided to 
empower our students and employees the information necessary 
to make decisions or take appropriate actions concerning their 
own personal safety. 
 
What caught my attention in this email was the fact that the alleged rape 
victim seemed to be clear that the sexual encounter was nonconsensual, and that 
she needed medical assistance, and yet she chose not to seek justice, either through 
approaching a disciplinary committee within the university, or through filing a 
police report. It appears that while the rape victim probably spoke about her 
experience to medical personnel she chose to remain silent when it came to 
providing a description of her assailant before campus police. Vanderbilt University 
medical staff informed the police about the incident. 
Underreporting on campus rape is one of the ways in which we can see how 
effectively individuals within various social institutions silence campus rape victims, 
to the point where it appears that campus rape victims are silencing themselves. 
Students confront the evidence of underreporting first hand when they compare 
 101 
official university reports on rape with their personal encounters with campus rape 
victims - while university statistics may indicate perhaps one rape every year or 
two, students report that they encounter many rape victims on their own dorm floor 
(Wilkerson 1999).  
According to a 2006 report by the U.S. Department of Higher Education’s 
Center for Alcohol and other Drug Abuse and Violence Prevention, surveys of 
current students indicated that victims report only 25% of campus violence to 
campus police or to the wider community (Mayhew, Caldwell and Goldman 2011: 
255) Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson argue that college students report between 
35% and 43% of the violent crimes they suffer. Women report cases of sexual 
victimization even less than they do other crimes – Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 
report that only 4% to 12% of women report sexual victimization to law 
enforcement officials (Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 2010: 56). The National 
College Women Sexual Victimization Survey estimates that college women report 
fewer than 5% of the attempted or completed rapes they suffer to law enforcement 
while The White House Council on Women and Girls report cites a 2007 study that 
suggests that only 12% of student victims report an attack to law enforcement 
(Kilpatrick 2007 in The White House Council on Women and Girls 2014: 14). One 
study by Koss revealed that a full 42% of college rape victims never told anyone at 
all about the attack (Sable, Danis, Mauzy and Gallagher 2006: 158). These statistics 
suggest that underreporting is a very serious problem with regard to campus rape.  
Studies show that women who report to the police tend to have better 
psychological recovery than women who do not (Thompson, Sitterle, Clay and 
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Kingree 2007: 277). When women do not report their experiences to the relevant 
authorities, these authorities may not be able to direct them to legal, social and 
health services that they may be eligible to receive. When official data do not reflect 
the actual numbers of crimes, this may create the impression among university 
administrations and even law enforcement officials that the problem is less severe 
than it is, with the result that these institutions may direct fewer resources to 
addressing the issue than would be the case were official data more accurately 
capturing a fuller extent of the problem.  
The fact that women know their attacker affects whether or not they report 
the violence. Women tend to be less likely to report a rape when they know the 
perpetrator, and between 78, 5% to 90% of women who are victims of sexual 
violence on college campuses know their attackers (Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 
2010: 57). 43%-73% of women do not label their experience as rape, even when it 
fits the legal definition of rape. One reason for this is that the victim knows the 
perpetrator and she may even trust him, with the result that she may be left feeling 
unsure about whether what he did was criminal (Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 
2010: 57). A second reason is that victims may struggle with feelings of self-blame, 
and this can discourage or delay their reporting the rape. Third, given that the 
campus rape victim tends to be isolated from family and older school networks, she 
may feel even more of a need to fit into the socially intense atmosphere of the 
college campus. Within the college context, when the rape victim reports the attack, 
her reporting threatens to generate problems that will radiate throughout her 
campus network, and she may fear losing friends and acquaintances she has in 
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common with her attacker. Fourth, government regulations that require campuses 
to report rape may make many victims unwilling to speak to anyone about their 
experience, for fear that their disclosure about the attack may implicate them in 
investigations they are unwilling to be a part of.39 This unwillingness to report 
stems in part from the challenges that campus rape victims may face when they do 
report the assault.  
 
Challenges of Reporting  
Even before any legal or disciplinary proceedings are underway, individuals 
within key social institutions who interact with the campus rape victim thwart her 
efforts to obtain justice, whether they do so directly or indirectly. When various 
social actors silence campus rape victims, victims’ silence then inadvertently helps 
to maintain the silencing subculture of the campus environment. This is despite the 
fact that legislation exists that aims to address gender discrimination more broadly 
and sexual violence more specifically on college campuses. 
Title IX is a broad ranging federal law that aims to reduce discrimination in 
education, and addressing gender discrimination is one aspect of the law. Under 
Title IX, a federal law that aims broadly to eliminate discrimination in education, 
universities have an obligation to address and prevent sexual harassment against 
their students, no matter who is perpetrating the sexual harassment – be it other 
students, school officials or teachers.40 The Dear Colleague Letter dated April 4, 
2011 requires schools to “take immediate and effective steps to end sexual 
                                                        
39 http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.html 
40 http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/titleix.php 
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harassment and sexual violence” and provides guidelines on the Office of Civil 
Rights’ expectations regarding the steps schools need to take to achieve the end 
outlined by Title IX.41 The Dear Colleague letter requires schools to distribute 
information to students about the their rights under Title IX, to appoint a Title IX 
coordinator to address complaints of sexual harassment and sexual assault, and to 
craft and publish their grievance procedures that can assure students of “prompt 
and equitable” resolutions of their complaints (Sieben 2011). The 2011 Dear 
Colleague letter requires universities to use a “more likely than not” standard of 
evidence and not the “clear and convincing” standard that some universities may 
have been using.  
The Dear Colleague Letter of April 24, 2013 also makes it clear that if 
universities retaliate against students who bring civil rights problems to the 
attention of university administration they will be in violation of federal law.42 A 
University of North Carolina student, Landen Gambill, filed a complaint with the U.S 
Department of Education Office of Civil Rights in which she alleged that the 
university “routinely violated the rights of sexual assault survivors and failed to 
assist them in recovery after the reported abuse” (Kingkade 2013c). The University 
of North Carolina sent a warning to Gambill that she may have violated the school’s 
honor code for “disruptive and intimidating behavior” against her alleged rapist and 
informed her that she faced possible expulsion if the honor council found her guilty. 
Gambill had never named her alleged attacker publicly but if the university’s 
disciplinary committee had found her guilty of disruptive and intimidating behavior, 
                                                        
41 http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104_pg2.html 
42 http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201304.html#ftn2 
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she faced disciplinary measures. Punishments for honor code violations at the 
University of North Carolina may include suspension, expulsion, grade penalties and 
community service, among other options (Kingkade 2013c). Gambill then filed a 
new complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights. In the 
new complaint she claimed that the university retaliated against her by threatening 
her with a possible honor code violation for speaking out against the university’s 
handling of sexual assault cases on campus (Kingkade 2013e). UNC-Chapel Hill 
Chancellor Holden Thorp then asked the honor council to suspend the charges 
against Gambill (Kingkade 2013f). As a result of these types of retaliatory 
disciplinary measures and other forms of gender discriminatory behavior by 
campus administration and others, students may be reluctant to report an attack to 
university officials or to the police.  
Under Title IX a campus rape victim may file a campus report and a police 
report at the same time, she can expect to report sexual violence to campus 
administration officials without fear of retaliation, and she can expect to see 
university administration officials taking steps to end sexual violence on her 
campus. In line with Title IX requirements university administration officials advise 
students to approach them in the event of being raped, but the fact that many 
students do not do so signals an institutional failure that warrants investigation.  
Despite the fact that Title IX has instituted safeguards for women to report 
the violence they suffer without fear of retaliation and with the expectation that the 
university will work towards creating a safe, non gender discriminatory 
environment on campus, women who experience violence may often not tell anyone 
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at all about their experiences (Murray and Kardatzke 2007: 83). Those who do 
speak about the sexual violence they have experienced are more likely to share their 
experiences with friends than with police or counselors (Murray and Karatzke in 
Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 2009-2010: 56). Of those who did tell someone, 
66% told friends but not family or school officials. Of those who sought help 
following the violence, 75% sought help from a friend rather than from a 
professional (Sable, Danis, Mauzy and Gallagher 2006: 158), which suggests that 
women are reluctant to approach police and mental health professionals. Angie 
Epifano’s experience, which I will recount below, suggests that women experience a 
real problem in the way in which police and mental health professionals treat them 
when they access both institutions of justice within universities as well as health 
care institutions.  
Federal government guidelines with regard to campus rape are also not 
above criticism: there is a contradiction between the Office for Civil Rights’ goal to 
end gender discrimination in higher education and their objective to treat alleged 
perpetrators of sexual violence and their victims fairly. The Dear Colleague Letter, 
published by the Office for Civil Rights, recommends allowing both the alleged 
perpetrator and complainant to produce character witnesses at a hearing in the 
interests of “fairness.”43 It is ironic that in the interests of “fairness” disciplinary 
committees actually prop up the very gender discriminatory environment that made 
the sexual violence possible in the first place. This is because character witnesses, 
especially as they apply to the complainant, are damaging regardless of whether 
                                                        
43 http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf 
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those witnesses provide good or bad testimonies about her. A gender 
discriminatory environment makes it more likely that witnesses may draw on a 
complainant’s sexual history in giving testimony about her character, whether they 
do so directly or indirectly. If the complainant has a sexual history that witnesses 
disapprove of and they deem her to be of bad character this in no way detracts from 
the fact that she may be a victim of an alleged crime. It is no better if witnesses 
speak well of her. Even ‘good’ opinions are actually dangerous because individuals 
usually construct them within a gender discriminatory social context that is 
characterized by oppressive gender norms, and these ‘good’ opinions serve to 
perpetuate those norms for the victim and other women. Opinions informed by 
oppressive gender norms reinforce the pressure on the victims, who are 
overwhelmingly women, to worry about the way in which potential witnesses will 
assess their character. The wider social repercussion of such a practice is that it 
fosters an oppressive gender discriminatory social environment in which all women 
develop heightened awareness about the way in which others assess their character. 
This may lead women to police themselves in line with gender discriminatory 
practices and to blame the victim in cases where she does not conform to oppressive 
gender norms. In this way, members of disciplinary committees indirectly re-
inscribe the gender discriminatory environment that enables sexual violence. 
The Clery Act is a federal law that requires all universities and colleges that 
receive federal aid to report on their annual crime rates that include crimes of 
sexual violence in an accurate and timely manner (The White House Council on 
Women and Girls 2014). Universities tend to undermine the scope of the problem 
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by, among other things, just focusing on rapes that women report (Sanday in 
Wilkerson: 1999). Universities may also undermine the scope of the problem by 
mislabeling sexual assault as a lesser injury, as a recent case at the University of 
Southern California (USC) demonstrated. A student at USC wondered in May of 2013 
why, after she had filed a report of sexual assault in March of 2013, neither the Los 
Angeles Police Department nor the school’s Department of Public Safety had 
contacted her regarding her experience. Upon investigation, she found that the 
Department of Public Safety at USC had mislabeled her report of sexual assault as an 
“injury response.” According to the student, campus police told her that the crime 
was not a rape because her assailant did not orgasm (Kingkade 2013h). She 
subsequently filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education against USC 
for violating the Clery Act. This case illustrates that universities frame the problem 
of sexual assault in ways that play to their advantage while clearly discriminating 
against victims of sexual assault.  
Melinda Manning, a former dean of the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill confirms that universities are reluctant to label a case of sexual assault as sexual 
assault. Manning recounts how the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill also 
showed a reluctance to classify an assault as a sexual assault. She told America 
Tonight, “I think we were reluctant to classify an assault as a sexual assault because 
it would be accounted in official numbers……. We absolutely put much more 
emphasis on preventing plagiarism than preventing rape. That was reality.” 
(Manning in Khan 2013). In this way, universities may undermine the scope of the 
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problem of campus rape, and aid in creating a gender discriminatory environment 
on college campuses.  
The problem of mislabeling begins even before a woman’s college years. 
Middle and high school officials also distort information about sexual harassment or 
sexual assault in a comparable way. Murphy argues that in middle and high schools 
most cases of “bullying” involve girls, and most of the “bullying” takes the form of 
sexual harassment or sexual assault. Schools may be inclined to frame the problem 
as one of “bullying” so as to avoid using the term ‘sexual harassment’ or ‘sexual 
assault’, terms that, if used, may open them up to liability and exposure. If schools 
refer to these cases as “bullying” and then do all the wrong things in addressing the 
problem, they have what Murphy calls, “virtually perfect immunity”. In this way 
their liability and exposure diminishes significantly (Murphy 2012). 
The problem that Wendy Murphy refers to as the “liability disparity” 
suggests that should campus rape victims attempt to seek justice from their 
university’s administration, they suffer a little known yet clear disadvantage 
compared to their assailant (Murphy 2012). Murphy argues that if a university does 
nothing for the victim who reports sexual assault, it is at a lower risk of liability. 
Should universities “over-punish” the respondent in sexual assault cases they are at 
a far greater risk of the complainant suing them. This makes it cheaper for schools 
to do nothing for the victim than to punish the perpetrator and then face a far 
greater possibility of the perpetrator bringing a lawsuit against the school. This 
built-in liability disparity then creates a further challenge to campus rape victims 
reporting their assault.  
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Another very effective strategy that university administrations used to 
thwart a campus rape victim’s attempts at obtaining justice was by running out the 
clock on her report. In those cases, university administrations would deliberately 
schedule the case to be heard when the victim (and likely her assailant too) would 
be due to graduate (Murphy 2012). This meant that if the university did not find the 
alleged perpetrator guilty the victim would be less inclined to continue to fight for 
justice because she would have graduated and likely left campus. This was a win-
win situation for the alleged perpetrator and the university – the alleged 
perpetrator could get off lightly because the timing of the hearing precluded his 
victim from filing an appeal against any decision the administration made that 
favored him and the university benefitted from being able to artificially reduce the 
number of rape cases on its campus. The Dear Colleague Letter now provides clear 
time frames within which universities must deal with students’ reports of sexual 
assault. 
The recent spate of cases in which campus rape victims file complaints 
against their universities for failing to adequately address their reports of sexual 
violence may be evidence that university administrations may be less successful 
than they were previously at silencing campus rape victims. From receiving 17 
complaints in 2012, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights received 
30 in 2013. The OCR currently has 39 investigations against universities for 
violating Title IX (Grinberg 2014). 
 
 
 111 
Individuals with Social Roles and Individuals with Institutional Roles 
The problem of underreporting is often not the result of a victim’s lack of 
access to institutions of justice, because access is, in principle, open to all; rather it is 
that family members and friends (individuals with social roles) and campus police, 
university administrators, university counselors, hospital staff etc. (those with 
institutional roles) thwart a victim’s efforts to obtain justice, whether they do so 
directly or indirectly.  
I draw on the ways in which individuals within both groups interact with 
campus rape victims to highlight how all encompassing a victim’s sense of isolation 
can be. The nature of these interactions may make the campus rape victim feel 
isolated and vulnerable before strangers a well as those she considers her friends 
and family. The way in which those with social roles and those with institutional 
roles attempt to thwart a victim’s efforts to obtain justice may vary in some ways 
and share some features in common.  
Both those with social roles and those with institutional roles may lack 
training in or attentiveness to the gender discriminatory nature of campus rape. 
Both individuals with social roles and those with institutional roles may also 
directly or indirectly thwart a victim’s attempt at obtaining justice by subscribing to 
rape myths. Rape myths refer to “attitudes and generally held beliefs about rape 
that are widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual 
aggression against women” (Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1994: 134 in Talbot, Neill and 
Rankin 2010: 171). For example, the myth that women are sexual ‘gatekeepers’ in 
their interactions with men may even result in some rape victims blaming 
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themselves for their victimization (Bridges 1991 in Talbot, Neill and Rankin 2010: 
173).44 
Women tend not to report a rape when it does not involve any other type of 
physical violence, and some researchers have tied this underreporting to 
stereotypical beliefs about a rape including severe physical injury. Individuals who 
subscribe to the myth of rape always involving severe physical injury believe that 
severe injury is “evidence” that the woman valiantly fought back, and this gives 
them reason to view her sympathetically her for being attacked. For example, Bill 
Napoli, a Republican South Dakota representative, argued that the only case in 
which abortion might be justified would be if there “would be a rape victim, brutally 
raped, savaged. The girl was a virgin. She was religious. She planned on saving her 
virginity until she was married. She was brutalized and raped, sodomized as bad as 
you can possibly make it, and is impregnated.” (Napoli in Valenti 2009: 14) When 
individuals with institutional roles propagate the myth that rape must include 
severe physical injury, rape victims whose rape did not involve severe physical 
injury may hesitate to report the assault.  
It is because individuals with institutional roles and those with social roles 
propagate these myths about what a quintessential rape looks like that we see such 
serious underreporting - 43%-73% of women do not label their experience as rape, 
even when it fits the legal definition of rape (Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 2009-
                                                        
44 According to Talbot, Neill and Rankin, myths surrounding rape fall into one of 
three broad categories all of which work towards thwarting the rape victim’s 
attempt at obtaining justice. The first category involves blaming the victim. The 
second category involves excusing the rapist from responsibility for the rape and 
the third category of myths justify the assault (Johnson et al 1997 in Talbot, Neill 
and Rankin 2010: 172). 
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2010: 57). In this way, both individuals with institutional roles and those with social 
roles may directly and indirectly thwart a rape victim’s attempt at obtaining justice. 
Male rape victims tend to be even more reluctant to report being raped. A 
study in the U.K. found that 79% of male rape victims did not seek help after the 
attack, and only 15% reported the attack to police (Sable, Marjorie R., Fran Danis, 
Denise L. Mauzy and Sarah K. Gallagher 2006: 158). Male victims underreport rape 
because rape is a gender discriminatory crime that typically claims female victims. 
Sjoberg and others have made the argument that men’s fear of being raped is at root 
men’s fear of being feminized (Sjoberg 2006; Oliver 2007). Male rape victims also 
carry the added burden of others judging them to be gay (Sable, Marjorie R., Fran 
Danis, Denise L. Mauzy and Sarah K. Gallagher 2006: 157). When men fear reporting 
being raped (or being judged gay) one of the things they fear is society ascribing a 
female identity to them. Bearing a female identity brings with it other forms of 
disadvantage that these men may also want to avoid. The way in which social 
institutions construct shame and silence around the issue of rape prevents both 
male and female rape victims from reporting the crime. 
When individuals with institutional roles subscribe to rape myths this shapes 
their behavior as representatives of those institutions towards the rape victim and 
their behavior in turn serves as a representation of the institutional practices of the 
university or hospital they hold positions within. Rape victims often interact with 
representatives of various social institutions who subscribe to one or another rape 
myth, and these representatives’ belief in these myths shape their behavior towards 
the rape victim, often silencing her. For example, 70% of police officers, doctors, 
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lawyers and counselors in one Singapore study believed that women provoke rape 
through the ways in which they dress (Du Mont and Parnis 1999; Moor 2010). 
Rape myths serve different purposes, depending on the gender of the person 
subscribing to them. When men subscribe to these myths they may believe that the 
rapist bears diminished responsibility for the rape. When women subscribe to 
myths that hold the victim accountable for the rape, they may experience a false 
sense of security if they believe that they do not share the relevant “rape-prone” 
characteristics with the victim. In this way both individuals with social roles and 
those with institutional roles contribute to the continued prevalence of rape on 
college campuses (Talbot, Neill and Rankin 2010: 172). 
One difference between those with institutional roles and those with social 
roles is the following: individuals with institutional roles may shape their behavior 
towards a rape victim in line with the constraints of their office and their efforts at 
maintaining a good public image for the university or for themselves as 
professionals within these institutions. Individuals with social roles, unlike those 
with institutional roles, may directly or indirectly silence a rape victim because their 
encounter with a rape victim may generate feelings of inadequacy or shame if they 
understand their social roles to include certain responsibilities like protecting the 
victim from assault. For example those that have personal involvement with the 
victim like a father or husband may experience shame or a sense of inadequacy that 
they were unable to protect the victim from the attack.  
Both individuals in social roles and those in institutional roles may want to 
believe that the world is a just place, and that “people get what they deserve and 
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deserve what they get” (Idisis 2007 in Shen 2011: 23). On this view the world is a 
safe and protected place and the victim must have deserved what happened to her. 
When we perceive the level of harm to the victim as high, our own fear that ‘this 
could happen to me’ also rises. In this situation, individuals with social roles and 
individuals with institutional roles may blame the victim and convince themselves 
that they would have acted differently, such that someone would not have raped 
them. This then gives individuals who interact with the rape victim a(n albeit false) 
sense of safety, as well as a sense of control over, and protection from, traumatic 
events (Idisis in Shen 2011: 37). 
One of the reasons then that both individuals with social roles and those with 
institutional roles may blame the victim for the rape is because the very fact of 
having to encounter a rape victim heightens their sense of vulnerability to suffering 
a similar attack. Blame may take the form of finding fault with the victim’s character 
(e.g. people may blame the victim for being promiscuous) or for her behavior (e.g. 
people may blame her for drinking or walking home late) (Shen 2011: 20). When 
encountering their own vulnerability to rape, shaming the victim may be a defense 
mechanism through which various individuals try to avoid confronting that 
vulnerability. In an attempt to mitigate their sense of their own vulnerability more 
generally or to rape in particular, individuals try to create a distance between 
themselves and a crime victim. Their need to create this distance leads to 
rationalizations that justify the rape, and these rationalizations emerge from, and in 
turn reinforce, myths that enable them to do this. When these individuals displace 
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their own feelings of inadequacy or shame onto the victim, they contribute towards 
silence around the issue of campus rape.  
Brené Brown describes the process of distancing oneself from those who 
have suffered trauma thus: when Brown’s husband was in his residency he often 
came home and shared with her stories of “dangerous deliveries, dying babies and 
grieving families.” (Brown 2007: 149) Brown admits that when faced with these 
stories, and her own pregnancy at the time, her instinct was to look out for some 
difference that would distance these suffering people from herself. She would look 
for differences in their race, their income level, their potential drug use, their access 
to prenatal care and possible genetic problems they had. Finding some difference 
between herself and those who suffered made her less fearful that someone like her 
would endure similar suffering (Brown 2007: 150). Brown argues, 
It’s hard. We don’t want to connect with people who are in pain, 
especially if we believe they deserve their pain or if their pain is too 
scary for us. We don’t want to reach out. It feels risky. Just by 
associating with them, we could either end up in the same “other” pile 
or be forced to acknowledge that bad things happen to people like us 
(Brown 2007: 151). 
 
While Brown relates her response to victims who suffered the trauma of 
dangerous childbirth and the death of newborn infants, Janoff-Bulman argues that 
individuals react in much the same way when confronted with other trauma victims, 
including rape victims (Janoff-Bulman 1992). 
To sum up the argument of this section, institutions of justice are part of a 
wider range of social institutions that include, among others, the family, police force 
and medical personnel that, while not adjudicating disputes, are supposed to serve 
as resources for victims of campus rape. The gender discriminatory behavior of 
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those with institutional roles within these institutions makes victims’ actual and 
meaningful access difficult, if not impossible. When campus rape victims do follow 
prescriptions laid out by university administrators to report an assault, they face 
challenges from, among others, campus sexual assault counselors, university 
administration and medical personnel. In all these ways, those with institutional 
roles as well as those with social roles may thwart a rape victim’s efforts at 
obtaining justice, whether they do so directly or indirectly. This is why I argue that 
victims have access to institutions of justice but this does not always guarantee 
them access to justice.  
 
Individuals with Institutional Roles 
Even before any legal or disciplinary proceedings are underway, individuals 
with institutional roles who interact with the victim thwart her efforts to obtain 
justice, whether they do so directly or indirectly. Their lack of training in or 
attention to the gender discriminatory nature of campus rape, their efforts at 
maintaining a good public image for the university or for themselves as 
professionals may also shape their behavior towards campus rape victims in ways 
that directly or indirectly thwart her efforts to obtain justice. The way in which 
some individuals with institutional roles treated Angie Epifano, an Amherst campus 
rape victim, illustrates the lack of training in and attentiveness to the gender 
discriminatory nature of campus rape that some individuals who perform 
institutional roles display.  
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An acquaintance allegedly raped Angie Epifano in Crosset Dormitory on 
Amherst College campus on May 25, 2011. After trying to hold things together for 
close to a year after the assault, and before counseling services referred her to the 
psychiatric ward, Epifano approached the campus sexual counselor, and in Epifano’s 
words, this is what the counselor allegedly said to her, 
No you can’t change dorms, there are too many students right now. 
Pressing charges would be useless, he’s about to graduate, there’s not 
much we can do. Are you SURE it was rape? It might have just been a 
bad hookup…You should forgive and forget (Epifano 2012).45 
 
Epifano goes on to say, 
I was continuously told that I had to forgive him, that I was crazy for 
being scared on campus, and that there was nothing that could be 
done. They told me: We can report your rape as a statistic, you know 
for the records, but I don’t recommend that you go through a 
disciplinary hearing. It would be you, a faculty advisor of your choice, 
him, and a faculty advisor of his choice in a room where you would be 
trying to prove that he raped you. You have no physical evidence, it 
wouldn’t get you very far to do this (Epifani 2012).46 
 
When Epifano expressed suicidal thoughts in counseling she was almost 
immediately escorted into an ambulance that took her to Cooley Dickinson’s 
Emergency Room. There, Epifano says,  
The doctor was skeptical to say the least: I really don’t think that a 
school like Amherst would allow you to be raped. And why didn’t you 
tell anybody? That just doesn’t make any sense…Your anger and 
                                                        
45 Joanna Espinosa’s is another recent case in which administrators’ first instinct 
was to disbelieve her when she reported that her now ex boyfriend had raped her 
during their relationship. In her case university administrators at the University of 
Texas-Pan American suggested that she was “acting out as a spiteful ex-girlfriend” 
(Grinberg 2014).   
46 Epifano’s experience echoes that of a sophomore at Emerson College who 
reported a sexual assault to campus administrators only to be told not to make a big 
deal of it. The student subsequently filed a federal complaint against the school 
(Kingkade 2013i) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/08/emerson-sexual-
assault_n_4059083.html 
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sadness right now seem unfounded and irrational, someone your age 
should not be this sad – it’s not normal. We’ll be admitting you in a 
few minutes, they’ll take good care of you. They’ll get you some drugs 
and they’ll make you feel happy again…If you don’t willingly enter 
we’ll have a judge issue a court order legally forcing you to stay there. 
Trust us, this is for your own good (Epifano 2012). 
 
In this example we can see that both the campus sexual assault counselor and 
the doctor attempted to silence Epifano and prevent her from reporting the rape to 
campus (or indeed city) police. The counselor also delegitimized Epifano’s 
experience by questioning whether she was sure that it was rape, and by suggesting 
that it could have just been a “bad hook-up.” In this way she blurred the distinction 
between consensual sex and rape. When individuals with institutional roles, 
perhaps through lack of awareness of the gender discriminatory nature of campus 
rape, blur the distinction between rape and consensual sex, women may refrain 
from reporting a rape because this may reinforce doubts they may have had about 
whether what happened to them was in fact “criminal.” (Sudderth, Leisring and 
Bronson 2009-2010: 57).  
It is alarming that some medical personnel contribute to silencing rape 
victims when rape victims not only rate their current health status lower than non-
victims do, but they also have more health problems when compared to victims of 
other types of crimes (Campbell, Sefl and Ahrens 2003: 90). The doctor 
delegitimized Epifano’s experience by questioning whether the rape happened at all, 
and by arguing that a school like Amherst would not allow anyone to rape one of its 
students. In saying this, he affirmed the positive public image of the university 
despite the fact that he was confronted with a student’s report of a personal 
experience of rape on the campus.  He also cast doubt on her story by asking why 
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she did not tell anyone, as though the only truths are those that we immediately 
make public. The reality is that not all victims of sexual assault report their 
experiences immediately. In one study of 155 survivors of sexual assault, Sarah 
Ullman found that only 34% reported the assault immediately. A full 29,2% delayed 
telling anyone about the assault, and 4, 9% of victims waited a full year before 
telling anyone of the assault (Sudderth, Leisring and Bronson 2010: 59).47 The 
doctor brought into question her rationality by declaring that her anger and sadness 
were “unfounded and irrational.” Likewise he cast doubt on her right to feel angry 
and sad by declaring her sadness “not normal.” It is not at all clear why he would 
have expected a rape victim to be anything but sad and angry at what happened to 
her. The doctor demonstrated a clear lack of awareness of gender discrimination 
and a lack of sensitivity in interacting with a rape victim, both of which may be 
addressed through appropriate training.  
Individuals with institutional roles within the medical establishment exercise 
power when they define the boundaries of what is normal (Foucault 1965).48 When 
they exercise this power to label rape victims abnormal they may discourage victims 
                                                        
47 Male victims of sexual assault are even more unlikely than are female victims to 
report the incident. A U.K. study of 115 male survivors of sexual assault found that 
79% sought no help after the assault, and only 15% reported the assault to police. 
The mean time that passed before these men sought care was 7,3 years for those 
who were assaulted when they were 16 years of age or older (Sable, Danis, Mauzy 
and Gallagher 2006: 158). 
48 Foucault argues that what we take to be naturally occurring categories, for 
example, the category of those with mental illness, are really not naturally occurring 
categories at all. Instead, individuals with power made conscious decisions about 
who would be included in that category and who would be excluded (Foucault 
1965). Our conception of what is normal is likewise not naturally occurring – 
individuals exercise power in ways that include and exclude others from the 
category of what is normal.  
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from attempting to obtain justice. It is important to remember that medical 
personnel construct their definition of what is normal with a particular, oftentimes 
ideal subject in mind, and this ideal subject does not reflect most people’s realities. 
As Young argues, in the reality of all our lives we move into and out of stages of 
dependence – e.g. from total dependence in infancy, temporary disability due to 
illness or accident in youth or middle age, to partial or total dependence in old age 
(Young 1990).  
People tend to view individuals who are committed to psychiatric care as 
having deviated from the norm of mental health, and they tend to view this deviance 
as a source of shame. When medical personnel commit rape victims to psychiatric 
care these victims lose their public reputation, they are cast as being among those 
who hitherto were, but no longer are, ‘normal’ and their standing in the world is 
diminished. Medical personnel drugged Epifano, and locked her into a psychiatric 
ward, and monitored her in much the same way that prison wardens incarcerate 
and monitor prisoners. In this way, medical personnel may treat campus rape 
victims as though the victims rather than the rapists are the criminal elements on 
campus. They may shame rape victims into silence by treating them as being 
abnormal or unhealthy, thus diminishing their confidence in their judgment about 
what happened to them, and also weakening their resolve about whether and if so 
how they should proceed to address the injustice they have suffered. While it is not 
routine for medical personnel to commit all rape victims to a psychiatric ward, it is 
not uncommon for medical personnel to raise doubts about whether the victim is 
giving an accurate account of her experience.  
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Pathologizing rape victims is not confined to college campuses. In an 
interview with Ellen Cole, Phyllis Chesler details how female psychiatrists at the 
National Institute of Mental Health and naval officers are ordered to go for 
psychiatric treatment when they allege that a colleague has harassed them or has 
discriminated against them on the basis of sex. Likewise, mothers who allege that 
fathers are sexually abusing their children can lose custody of their children and 
medical personnel may labeled them with psychiatric diagnoses like Borderline 
Personality and Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy (Cole 1995: 4). Munchausen’s 
Syndrome by Proxy is defined as a type of child abuse in which “a parent induces 
real or apparent symptoms of a disease in a child.”49 Borderline Personality refers to 
a “consistent pattern of functioning and behavior characterized by instability and 
reflecting a disturbed psychological self-organization.”50  
When university administration officials pathologize rape victims they may 
be doing so as one way of maintaining or raising their college rankings. This is 
because university administrators may experience a conflict of interest between 
maintaining or raising their college ranking and being impartial in addressing cases 
of campus rape. Stakeholders within colleges have a vested interest in projecting 
their campuses as safe, because campus safety is an important consideration for 
students and their parents when they ponder on which colleges they should apply 
                                                        
49 A.D.A.M. Medical Encyclopedia 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0002522/ 
50 Pubmed Health 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0015312/#ch2.s1 
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to.51 If a college campus acquires a reputation of being unsafe, parents and friends 
will likely discourage prospective students from applying, students may not want to 
go there, and the college will see a decline in applications. Fewer students would 
mean diminished revenue from student fees, and this would have detrimental 
financial consequences for the university. In light of these considerations, 
stakeholders may be motivated to suppress information about campus rape. In this 
way, when university administrations prioritize the institution’s financial health, 
they may end up suppressing information about rape on their campuses and 
thereby compromise students’ awareness of the problem and relatedly, their on-
campus safety. 
University administrations’ concerns about revenue may also be the reason 
why they may be inclined to grant privileges to members of sports teams – sports 
teams generate high revenues for the university. College sport is so privileged that 
one university administrator told a rape survivor that “rape is like football” and 
asked her to look back at the “game”, and reflect on what she would have done 
differently if she were the quarterback (Clark 2013). The way in which universities 
privilege sports teams and players is also evident in the contrast between the way in 
which the University of Notre Dame responded to the suicide of a student who killed 
herself ten days after she alleged that a football player had sexually assaulted her 
and the way in which Notre Dame’s administration responded to news that one of 
their football players had suffered a hoax in which his fake internet girlfriend had 
                                                        
51 U.S. News is one news agency that uses, among other indicators, assessments by 
administrators at peer institutions, financial resources and student retention rate 
when ranking colleges (Morse and Flanagan 2012). 
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died. While investigators only interviewed the football player accused of rape five 
days after the alleged campus rape victim committed suicide (which was a full 
fifteen days after the alleged attack) Notre Dame’s athletic director showed public 
support for the football player who had suffered a hoax soon after the news broke 
and even hired investigators to look into the hoax (Kingkade 2013l).  
Shen argues that institutional reactions to rape on college campuses are 
“crafted, conscious responses” that “aim to maintain institutional integrity, avoid 
legal culpability, and prevent changes that would disrupt present operations”, 
thereby making institutional responses a form of damage control rather than a 
coping mechanism  (Shen 2011: 69; Murphy 2012) or a transformative tool. Both 
Shen and Murphy argue that in their attempt at orchestrating damage control and 
diminishing the negative impact of public attention on their behavior, universities 
may even create confusion quite consciously about resources for rape victims or the 
procedure victims should follow for redress (Shen 2011: 69; Murphy 2012). In this 
way universities may quite consciously attempt to diminish publicity about the 
prevalence of rape on their campuses. 
Publicity about campus rape at their institution may also draw attention to 
various stakeholders’ failure as individuals under whose watch the rape happened, 
and this may incentivize those with institutional roles to silence campus rape 
victims. To this end, individuals with institutional roles are prone to dissociate 
asocial behavior from the perpetrators and to attribute it, in many cases, to the rape 
victim (Sanday in Wilkerson 1999). When individuals with institutional roles silence 
campus rape victims and deny her justice with a view to projecting a safe image of 
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their campus or protecting their own professional image, justice for the victim 
becomes a casualty of these conflicts of interest university administrators face 
between adequately addressing incidents of campus rape, promoting a safe image of 
their campus to prospective students and maintaining their own professional image. 
Campus administrators can deter women from reporting a rape by failing to 
adequately punish the perpetrator. For example, a student at Yale University alleges 
that even though the university found her assailant responsible for “sexual 
harassment” and “sexual misconduct in the form of intimidation” and suspended 
him for a semester, the fact that his suspension came into effect in the last week of 
the spring final exams and he was given 72 hours to leave campus meant that he 
was in effect suspended for one day only. The university informed the campus rape 
victim via email that her assailant would be back on campus to take summer classes. 
One result of administrators refusing to take serious action against male offenders 
within their student body is that they deter victims from filing reports with the 
university. In the words of the Yale University student, “Yale is actually terrible with 
their penalties and I feel like a lot of verdicts lack any teeth….And I believe it’s 
actually discouraging other people from filing reports.” (Kingkade 2013d)52 A 
second result is that by failing to adequately punish perpetrators, university 
administrators promote male privilege, with the result that female students do not 
experience the same sense of belonging on campus as their male counterparts do, 
and they cannot enjoy the same social opportunities as their male peers (Sanday in 
Wilkerson 1999). If female students do not experience the same sense of belonging 
                                                        
52 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/23/yale-sexual-assault-
punishment_n_3786885.html 
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as their male counterparts they will likely not avail themselves of the rights they in 
principle have, for example, a right to demand a safe campus. A third consequence of 
campus administrators failing to adequately punish perpetrators is that male 
students may get a sense that they can commit rape with relative impunity.53 This is 
not to say that I believe that conviction alone is sufficient to prevent rape – as other 
feminists have argued, preventing rape requires a restructuring of gender relations 
(Nedelsky 2011; Hirschmann 2003; MacKinnon 1997).  
Campus administrators can also deter a woman from reporting a rape by re-
victimizing the survivor. In one recent case, University of North Carolina (UNC) 
administration threatened a student with “intimidating” her alleged rapist by going 
public with her assault and with the way in which the school handled her complaint 
(Kingkade 2013c)54 Bohmer argues that some campus administrations have, in the 
past, charged rape victims with underage drinking or filing a false complaint against 
the victim if she subsequently drops charges (Bohmer 1993: 134-135). The Dear 
Colleague Letter of April 4, 2011 makes it clear that schools should take into 
consideration that drug and alcohol use may deter victims from reporting sexual 
violence and encourages schools to address alcohol or drugs use separately from the 
victim’s allegations of sexual violence.55 Stipulating that schools should address the 
complainant’s report of sexual violence separately from her drug or alcohol use may 
                                                        
53 In one study, 7% of male students admitted to committing rape or attempted 
rape. Of these, 63% admitted multiple offenses, which averaged 6 rapes each (The 
White House Council on Women and Girls 2014: 14). 
54 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/25/unc-sexual-assault-
survivor_n_2760097.html 
55 http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf 
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be insufficient to allay a student’s fears that by reporting sexual violence, she may 
still run the risk of being charged with underage drinking or drug use.  
 There is a noteworthy difference in the way that Amherst College handled 
Angie Epifano’s case in February 2012, and the way in which Vanderbilt University 
handled the case in which four of their football players allegedly raped a female 
student in a dormitory on June 23, 2013. While Amherst College, on Epifano’s 
account, handled her report of rape in an overwhelmingly negative way, Vanderbilt 
University officials acted swiftly when they suspected that Vanderbilt University 
football players had possibly raped a student in a dorm room. They noticed that the 
football players’ behavior was suspicious in a surveillance video taken in the 
university’s Gillette House dormitory and notified campus police two days later on 
June 25. Campus police contacted Nashville’s sex crimes unit on June 26 and the 
university dismissed the four players soon after on June 29 (Burch Jr. 2013). We 
may explain the difference in the way the two universities handled allegations of 
sexual violence on their campuses by pointing to the fact that first, the Dear 
Colleague Letter dated April 4 2011 outlined explicit guidelines that universities 
should follow when faced with allegations of sexual violence. By June of 2013 one 
would expect that campus administrations all over the country would have brought 
their handling of rape cases in line with the April 4, 2011 letter. Second, a number of 
media outlets had publicized the scandalous responses of university officials in 
several highly ranked universities to allegations of rape on their campuses. This 
media coverage may have served to caution other university administrations, 
including the one at Vanderbilt University, to provide a more adequate response to 
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campus rape on their campuses. Third, college students across the country held 
protests against sexual violence on their campuses and vigils in support of campus 
rape victims (Storrow 2012; Culp-Ressler 2013, Haas 2013). The difference in the 
way the two universities handled allegations of sexual violence on their campuses 
points to the necessity for the federal government to lay down explicit guidelines for 
schools to follow in the event of allegations of sexual violence on their campuses, the 
importance of the media raising awareness around sexual violence, as well as the 
significant role that student activism plays in raising awareness and voicing dissent. 
When individuals with institutional roles lack training in or are less attentive 
to the gender discriminatory nature of campus rape, are overly concerned with 
maintaining a good public image for the university or for themselves as 
professionals and/or subscribe to rape myths this may shape their behavior 
towards campus rape victims in ways that directly or indirectly thwart those 
victims’ efforts to obtain justice. 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up the argument of this chapter, I illustrated the problem presented 
by campus rape victims underreporting their experience. I then argued that key 
social institutions like the family, medical institutions, law enforcement and 
universities are inadequate to the task of addressing campus rape. I argued that 
even before any legal or disciplinary proceedings are underway, individuals with 
social roles such as friends and family of victims or individuals with institutional 
roles like campus police, medical personnel or stakeholders in their various 
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capacities within the university who interact with the victim may thwart her efforts 
to obtain justice, whether they do so directly or indirectly. For example, individuals 
with institutional roles like medical personnel sometimes display gender 
discriminatory behavior towards campus rape victims and campus officials are 
under pressure to squash rape statistics on their campus for fear of losing their 
college ranking or jeopardizing their professional reputations. When individuals in 
both social and institutional roles encounter a rape victim they may experience a 
heightened sense of their own inadequacy or shame in being unable to protect her, 
or their own vulnerability to rape, and this fear prompts them to distance 
themselves from the rape victim, and to subscribe to victim blaming myths.  
The contradiction in our reality is that while we express outrage at 
individuals blaming rape victims for being attacked, we also, on a daily basis, 
because of various self-interested concerns, distance ourselves from rape victims, 
thereby creating an isolating experience for them. If we recognize that most of us 
will experience trauma or losses that others may find frightening at some point in 
our lives, and that may lead others to distance themselves from us, we may be better 
able to fully embrace our common human vulnerability together with survivors of 
all kinds of trauma, including rape. Embracing our common human vulnerability is 
the first step towards revisiting the ways in which we, as individuals with social 
roles or individuals with institutional roles, construct shame that, when associated 
with rape, is just as problematic outside of the legal context as it is within it. Most 
importantly “we need to put responsibility where it lies: on men who violate 
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women, and on all of us who let them get away with it while we point accusing 
fingers at their victims.” (Abdulali 2013) 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Some U.S. College Campuses Share Features of a Shame Culture 
 
 
Introduction 
As we saw in the preceding chapter, shame is one of the three leading 
barriers to victims reporting rape (Sable, Danis, Mauzy and Gallagher 2006: 157) 
and one of the mechanisms that various social actors use to silence campus rape 
victims. The fact that U.S. college campuses share features of a shame culture results 
in the rape victim not wanting to proceed with reporting the rape, and her not doing 
so shows up the inadequacy of the social institutions that are tasked with 
supporting the rape victim in her search for justice. Yet the role that shame plays in 
this silencing is under-theorized and relatedly, underestimated.  
With regard to shame, individuals in social roles and those in individual roles 
may perpetrate a triple injustice against campus rape victims. First they may 
attempt to silence campus rape victims through shaming them.  To the extent that 
individuals within the U.S. culture in general, and within college campuses in 
particular, underestimate the role that shame plays in attempting to silence campus 
rape victims, it will be difficult for campus rape victims to speak against the injustice 
they have suffered. Second they may deny that shame even has the ability to silence 
these victims by arguing that shame really does not have this power in a society in 
which shame has been “outted” and is now hypothetically much more amenable to 
therapy. Third, they may focus almost exclusively on foreign cultures like those of 
Afghanistan or Pakistan as being shame cultures, and this deflects attention away 
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from the role that shame plays in silencing victims of campus rape right here in a 
western liberal democracy like the U.S. (Song 2007). This diversionary tactic further 
hampers the effort to address campus rape.56 
I argue that we must acknowledge the dangers of what appears to be a shame 
culture in operation on U.S. college campuses. It is important that individuals with 
social roles and individuals with institutional roles acknowledge the part that shame 
plays in silencing victims of campus rape before individuals in both groups can 
effectively intervene in their own and others’ use of shaming as one gender 
discriminatory practice that reinforces a wider and more systemic set of gender 
discriminatory practices that may thwart a victim’s efforts at obtaining justice. As a 
first step in theorizing about the role that shame plays in silencing campus rape 
victims, I argue that the prevalence with which individuals use shame to attempt to 
silence campus rape victims suggests that the socially intense micro culture of the 
U.S. college campus environment shares features of a shame culture. To the extent 
that individuals in the wider context outside college campuses may construct and 
experience shame with regard to sexual assault, and to the extent that they 
subscribe to rape myths, the wider social context too shares features of a shame 
culture. In what follows I will limit my claims to U.S. college campuses and not the 
wider U.S. culture.  For feminists who have troubled the simplistic distinction 
between majority and minority cultures, my argument that the U.S. college campus 
                                                        
56 Sarah Song argues that majority cultures use gender discriminatory practices that 
occur within minority cultures as a diversionary tactic to keep attention away from 
the gender discriminatory practices within the majority culture (Song 2007).   
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shares features of a shame culture provides one more instance in which this 
distinction is unjustified. 
To make this argument I first argue that one of the mechanisms that various 
social actors use to silence campus rape victims is by shaming them. Second I argue 
that this puts the way in which the law uses shame to punish rapists at odds with 
the way in which various social actors use shame to silence the rape victim. Third I 
challenge the simplistic dichotomy between shame and guilt cultures. Fourth I 
outline a typology of guilt and shame cultures, and fifth, I use the typology of shame 
and guilt cultures that the anthropologist Edward T. Hall developed (1981), and that 
philosopher Gabriele Taylor appears to some extent to have adopted (1985), to 
argue that the U.S. college campus context shares key features of a shame culture. 
 
Literature Review 
Shame is an unpleasant emotion, affect, cognition or state that attends a 
feeling of inappropriateness, shortcoming, guilt, embarrassment, disgrace or 
unworthiness. In everyday life, shame functions to bring about or discourage certain 
forms of conduct - over several centuries, shame has come to regulate many areas of 
life, from blowing one’s nose, to table manners and bodily functions. Interestingly, 
as individuals increased the scope of the issue areas that came under the purview of 
shame, their awareness of shame as a direct mechanism of social control decreased 
(Irvine 2009: 71).  
In general, we tend to experience shame when we believe that we have done 
or thought something bad, or when others see us when we believe it is an intrusion 
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of our privacy and hence it is inappropriate for them to see us on that occasion 
(Taylor 1985: 54). In experiencing shame, “the person concerned believes of herself 
that she has deviated from some norm and that in doing so she has altered her 
standing in the world.” (Taylor 1985: 1) When an individual does something that 
fails to meet the values that form a part of the code that society engenders, that 
individual loses honor in her society.  To lose honor is to lose public reputation 
(Taylor 1985: 54). To lose honor is often accompanied by shame, as much as to be 
shamed is to lose honor. For example, when an individual is observed looking 
through the keyhole of a door she feels shame, but in being observed looking 
through the keyhole she also loses honor by being revealed as someone who has 
committed a dishonorable action. 
 Men and women construct and experience shame in ways that reflects 
gender discrimination in society. Men who belong to a majority culture may 
experience shame in response to an obvious and clearly identifiable shaming event, 
but not as much in a pervasive, less easily identifiable way. Sandra Bartky argues 
that even when individual women may not experience shame consciously as a 
response to an obvious and clearly identifiable shaming event, they tend to 
experience shame in a pervasive way. Women experience shame in a pervasive way 
when what others deem what they say to be less important than what men say; 
when others call on them to speak less than those others call upon men to speak; 
when others ignore them even though they may express a willingness to speak; 
when others ask them more factual questions while they may ask men questions 
that require analytical and critical thinking; when their instructors adopt a 
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dismissive or patronizing attitude towards them and do not make eye contact with 
them as they speak, or when their instructors look at the clock when they speak 
while these same instructors assume postures of attentiveness and make eye 
contact with the women’s male peers when the latter speak (Bartky 1990: 91).  In 
light of these gender discriminatory practices, while it is true that both men and 
women feel shame, in Sandra Bartky’s words,  
[W]omen are more prone to experience the emotion in question and 
that the feeling itself has a different meaning in relation to their total 
psychic situation and general social location than has a similar 
emotion when experienced by men. Some of the commoner forms of 
shame in men, for example, may be intelligible only in light of the 
presupposition of male power, while in women shame may well be a 
mar and token of powerlessness. (Bartky 1990: 84)  
 
This is why those who oppose the gender discriminatory way various social 
actors construct shame, and who oppose the gender discriminatory consequences of 
the social construction of shame will likely also be concerned about the way in 
which shame silences campus rape victims, who are predominantly women.  
Let me be clear that shame is not the only mechanism that individuals use to 
silence rape victims, but it is a statistically significant reason for why women may 
not report sexual violence. Studies show that a significant percentage of women cite 
shame and embarrassment as a reason for why they did not report the assault. In 
Thompson, Sitterle, Clay and Kingree’s 2007 study, 53 out of 134 students who had 
suffered sexual assault cited shame and embarrassment as a reason for not 
reporting their victimization to the police – that is 39,6% of the sample size 
(Thompson, Sitterle, Clay and Kingree 2007: 280). A study conducted among 215 
students by Sable et al revealed that among thirteen barriers to female rape victims 
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reporting the crime, “shame, guilt, and embarrassment” tied with “fear of 
retaliation” as the leading barrier to students not reporting the violence. In a Likert 
scale in which a score of 5 was “extremely important” and a score of 1 was deemed 
“not important” female students in Sable et al’s study assigned a score of 4 out of 5 
for “shame, guilt and embarrassment” as a barrier to their reporting sexual violence  
(Sable, Danis, Mauzy and Gallagher 2006: 159).57 Shame plays an important role in 
silencing victims of sexual violence, and the role this emotion plays in silencing 
victims warrants attention.  
Other reasons that campus rape victims may not report an attack may 
include their wanting to avoid the stigma that is associated with being raped or they 
may fear that others will blame them for being attacked (Sudderth, Leisring and 
Bronson 2010: 57). They may not want the police to get involved or they may not 
want others to know that they have been attacked (Thompson, Sitterle, Clay and 
Kingree 2007: 279). Victims may also avoid reporting the attack because they want 
to avoid revisiting the humiliation they experienced during the rape.  
I argue that the role that shame plays in silencing victims of campus rape is 
one reason why social institutions are unable to deliver justice to campus rape 
victims - it is because even when victims in principle have access to these 
institutions, various social actors within key social institutions may silence campus 
rape victims through shaming them, and campus rape victims, out of shame, may 
silence themselves. The way in which individuals within various social institutions 
construct shame around sexual violence places an unfair emotional burden on 
                                                        
57 For male students the score was even higher - 4,8 out of 5 (Sable, Danis, Mauzy 
and Gallagher 2006: 159).  
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campus rape victims with the result that students who may have suffered rape or 
sexual assault may feel too ashamed to admit to others, and sometimes even to 
themselves, that someone has raped or sexually assaulted them (Sable, Danis, Mauzy 
and Gallagher 2006: 157).58  
The case of Angie Epifano, a student allegedly raped at Amherst College in 
May 2011 illustrates the role that shame plays in silencing her as a rape victim.  
My Enlightenment occurred when I least expected it. Four days into 
the Ward, I was sitting in on an introductory Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Rehabilitation meeting since there was absolutely 
nothing better to do……….As my fellow patients went around the 
circle it all suddenly clicked. I realized why I never spoke about the 
rape, why I had refused to tell my school friends, why I had totally 
broken down, why I had steadily degenerated over the past few 
months. I was ashamed, and because of this shame I could not begin 
healing. (Epifano 2012) 
 
Epifano goes on to write,  
“Silence has the rusty taste of shame,” a fellow survivor wrote…..I had 
been far too silent, far too ashamed…That night I told them 
everything…….For the first time I told my story and I was not 
ashamed. (Epifano 2012)   
 
Common to individuals within both institutions of justice and those within 
other social institutions is a gender discriminatory logic that operates to deploy 
shame and blame in ways that may silence rape victims. For example, when 
individuals who interact with the rape victim suggest that she may have consented 
to what happened she may be shamed into silence rather than face the possibility of 
being cast as promiscuous, confused, or worse, downright dishonest. Rape is the 
most extreme invasion of our privacy, and when individuals who interact with a 
                                                        
58 Hirschmann makes the case for how society constructs stigma, shame and 
responsibility in gender-biased ways that likewise prevents women from acting 
against intimate partner violence (Hirschmann 2003: 113). 
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rape victim lead her to believe that as a result of having suffered sexual violence, she 
has deviated from some norm, and that others see her standing in the world as 
having diminished as a consequence, she may experience shame and be silenced as a 
result.  
 
Shame at Cross Purposes 
Nussbaum argues that there is a disconnect between the way in which the 
law uses shame to deter offenders and the way in which normative trends that 
emphasize value for human dignity and individuality are steering us away from 
stigmatizing and shaming people. This creates a tension between the idea that the 
law should shame malefactors and the idea that the “law should protect citizens 
from insult to their dignity” (Nussbaum 2004: 2). The issue for Nussbaum is for 
society to find ways “to protect the dignity of its members against shame and stigma 
through law.” (Nussbaum 2004: 282) I agree with Nussbaum’s insight that the 
normative goal of emphasizing human dignity is at cross-purposes with the legal 
objective of shaming criminals.  
But I also see another way in which shame works at cross-purposes - the 
ways in which institutions of justice use shame in principle to shame criminals is at 
odds with how individuals within other social institutions, notably family members 
and university officials, may use shame to thwart a rape victim’s efforts at obtaining 
justice. Campus rape is an issue area that allows us to see how shame - as 
individuals within institutions of justice deploy it to shame criminals - works at 
cross-purposes or at odds with the way in which individuals within other social 
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institutions use shame to silence campus rape victims. These include but are not 
limited to universities and hospitals.  
The entire rape experience is stigmatized, and the ways in which individuals 
within various social institutions give meaning to shame outside of institutions of 
justice, e.g. through stigmatizing instances of sexual violence before reports of that 
violence reaches the courts, obstructs the use of shame as a deterrent within 
institutions of justice. This is because people tend to see stigma as “something in the 
person” (Link and Phelan 2001: 366) that is stigmatized, instead of as something 
that others designate to the person concerned. Because of this, the word stigma 
directs our attention more to the person who bears the stigma instead of to those 
who do the discriminating (Link and Phelan 2001: 366). As a result, when 
individuals within various social institutions stigmatize sexual violence, victims may 
draw back from reporting the violence. If the victim does not report the violence, 
institutions of justice are unable to shame the perpetrator or hold him responsible 
for the attack. In this way, shame works at cross-purposes when it attaches not just 
to the perpetrator of a rape, but when it also attaches to the rape victim in a way 
that may thwart her efforts at obtaining justice.  
There are two ironies to note in the tension created by the way in which 
individuals within institutions of justice deploy shame as a deterrent to crime and 
the way in which individuals within various other social institutions deploy shame 
to silence victims of sexual violence. First, it is ironic that the law oftentimes 
successfully uses shame as a deterrent precisely because other social institutions 
give force and meaning to shame as a deterrent outside of the legal context. Second, 
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it is ironic that individuals within universities and hospitals sometimes shame the 
victim when one would expect that they would seek to shame the rapist, much like 
institutions of justice shame and blame perpetrators as one way of deterring them 
and others from committing similar crimes.  
Within the current legal framework, in which the law uses shame as a 
deterrent, I argue that individuals must be attentive to the ways in which they, as 
individuals with institutional roles and individuals with social roles attach shame to 
rape victims outside of and antecedent to the law. This is especially important 
because the ways in which individuals within these social institutions construct 
shame with regard to rape victims works at cross-purposes to the way in which 
institutions of justice construct shame with regard to rapists. This contradiction 
works against the possibility of campus rape victims obtaining justice, even when 
they, in principle, have access to institutions of justice. It also raises the question of 
whether shame serves as an appropriate deterrent to individuals perpetrating 
sexual violence when it also functions as a deterrent to victims reporting the crime 
such that when they do not report, the question of the justice system subsequently 
prosecuting rapists does not even arise. 59 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
59 If legal institutions are to move away from shaming perpetrators of crime, it is not 
clear to me what an effective enforcement mechanism could be, but then, that is not 
the focus of this chapter. 
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The False Dichotomy of Shame and Guilt Cultures  
 
I write in the spirit of Bernard William who argues that the very distinction 
between shame and guilt cultures is baseless, and that our modern views on 
emotions like shame and responsibility have not changed all that much from 
Homeric conceptions, putting to rest ideas of a “progress” in moral enlightenment 
from the time of Homer to Kantian ethics (Williams 2008).  
Janice Irvine, a sociologist who works in the area of culture and sexuality 
studies, argues that beginning in the 1960s a number of social factors in the U.S. 
helped to transform the culture surrounding emotions, and sexual shame in 
particular, “from one of restraint to one of expressiveness” (Irvine 2009: 70). 
Despite the increasing scope of the issues to which society attached shame, the 
Human Potential Movement Activists, lesbian and gay activists, feminists, and Mary 
Calderone battled against sexual shame and worked to transform not only sexual 
politics but also “the culture of emotions,” most importantly the way in which 
women experienced shame. Irvine argues that shame has, as a result of these 
movements, been “outted” and having been “outted” it is hypothetically much more 
amenable to therapy (Irvine 2009: 74). If there were any suspicions about American 
society being a culture characterized by shame, its newfound culture of greater 
expressiveness and the fact that shame is now trendy and amenable to therapy 
creates the impression that U.S. society cannot be characterized as a shame culture. 
Panichas goes so far as to say that there is, on the contrary, a culture of 
shamelessness in the U.S., and that “shame is a word that has no active place in our 
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vocabulary, and when it is occasionally invoked it has no real meaning for us.” 
(Panichas 2003: 3)  
I would argue that Americans’ relationship to shame is conflicted. In general, 
Americans tend not to think of their society as being a shame culture (Irvine 2009; 
Panichas 2003). Yet, as Wayne L. Alloway Jr. argues, while shame is largely hidden in 
American society “many Top 40 song lyrics imply the shame and humiliation of 
rejection” (Alloway 2011: xi). This perception of the U.S. as being less of a shame 
culture is reinforced by the contrast that the media provides when it highlights 
gender-based crimes like acid attacks and ‘honor’ killings as the unfortunate 
product of shame cultures like those of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The suggestion in 
this media representation is that since these crimes are not prevalent in the U.S., the 
U.S. cannot be a shame culture. To the extent that media representations of foreign 
societies as shame cultures are intentional, they serve as a diversionary tactic that 
takes Americans’ attention away from the ways in which their own society is 
characterized by shame (Song 2007).  
To be clear I am not arguing that the U.S. college context has a clearly 
identifiable shame culture but that the prevalence with which various social actors 
use shame to silence rape victims suggests that it is also not clearly a guilt culture 
either, and in troubling the distinction between shame and guilt cultures, I argue 
that the U.S. college culture shares key features of a shame culture. 
Understanding the role that shame plays in various social actors’ attempts to 
silence campus rape victims, and in victims silencing themselves will hopefully 
prompt us to reflect on the ways in which these actors construct shame around both 
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rape and consensual sex. The fact that various social actors attach shame to rape 
victims is related to the way in which various social actors attach shame even to 
consensual sexual activity. This applies to U.S. culture in general, and to the U.S. 
college campus culture in particular. It is important that we deem crimes of a sexual 
nature shameful, but it is also important that we move away from deeming sexual 
activity among consenting adults as shameful.  
Most individuals also construct shame around consensual sex in gender 
discriminatory ways. When women walk across campus in the same clothes they 
wore the day before because they spent the night - and had sex - in someone else’s 
dorm room, this is called “the walk of shame”. When men do the same fellow 
students may refer to their walk as “the walk of fame”.60 If various social actors do 
not attach shame to women having consensual sex, women will not experience 
shame with regard to consenting to sex. Under these conditions, should they have to 
report a rape, they will be less fearful of others accusing them of “playing the rape 
card” as a way of avoiding the shame of having consented to sex. That concern will 
likely not even arise.61 Unburdening women of the shame of consenting to sex, and 
unburdening the rape victim of the shame of being a victim of a crime are 
interrelated. If various social actors remove both these forms of shaming they will 
ensure that rape victims not only have access to institutions of justice in principle 
but that these also ensure them a better chance at access to justice in practice.  
                                                        
60 Cf. the “slut walk” that originated in Canada in 2011 as a protest against rape and 
in particular, as a protest against the ways in which various individuals may blame a 
woman for being raped because of the way she is dressed. It has now become a 
transnational movement with cities all over the world organizing their own slut 
walks. http://www.slutwalktoronto.com/    
61 I am grateful to Brooke Ackerly for calling my attention to this problem.  
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A Typology of Guilt and Shame Cultures 
I will critically draw on Edward T Hall’s work on shame and guilt cultures to 
flesh out the conceptual boundaries of what he identifies as high context or shame 
cultures versus low context or guilt cultures. Hall, an anthropologist, is considered a 
founder in intercultural communication studies. His data on intercultural 
communication come from direct observation, fieldwork (Hall 1959: 10) and the 
reports he heard while training diplomats and technical workers at the Foreign 
Service Institute and while visiting his former trainees on international assignments 
(Rogers, Hart and Miike 2002: 10). The typology has several parts, among them the 
way in which individuals communicate, the way in which they use language (e.g. 
more or less precisely), the amount of information they deem fit to share with 
others, the strict or less strict ways in which individuals adhere to time (Hall 1981) 
and the interpersonal distances they abide by in various situations (Hall 1959).  
I acknowledge that conceptualizing societies as high context or low context is 
idealistic, and that most societies fall along a continuum that has an ideal, purely 
shame based culture on the one hand and an ideal purely guilt based culture on the 
other. All societies have elements of both shame and guilt cultures and are 
characterized by both high context and low context communication. It is important 
to notice, as Zeba Crook argues, “calling a people collectivist does not imply that 
they have no sense of self, nor does it imply a total absence of individual 
aspirations.” (Crook 2009: 599) Instead, “collectivist people tend to be governed less 
by individual desires than by communal expectations.” (Crook 2009: 599)   
These are tendencies: the ancient Mediterranean was no more 
100 percent collectivist than modern North American society is 100 
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percent individualistic. There are elements of each found in the other, 
but the occurrence of collective concerns among North Americans 
(e.g. peer pressure) does not diminish the dominance of an 
individualistic ideology (Crook 2009: 599). 
 
Let me be clear that in drawing on Hall’s typology all I aim to show is 
that U.S. college campuses do share key features of a shame culture.62 
 
Individual versus Collectivist Cultures 
According to Hall’s typology, in individualist cultures like the U.S. 
those who have infringed on societal rules will feel guilt, whether other 
people know about this infringement or not. This makes guilt individual in 
nature, as people’s conscience serves as an inner sanctioning mechanism. 
Likewise, according to this simplistic dichotomy, those in collectivist cultures 
like Pakistan feel a sense of collective obligation, and infringing on societal 
rules, if it becomes known, will leave them with a sense of shame. In the case 
of individuals’ experience of shame in collectivist cultures, it is more a case of 
the infringement becoming known that is a source of shame than the actual 
infringement itself, which makes shame social in nature (Hofstede 2005: 89; 
Taylor 1985: 56-57). Stephen Pattison makes a distinction between 
individualistic cultures and nonindividualistic cultures by arguing, “in many 
nonindividualistic cultures today, shame is not regarded so much as an 
individual psychological condition but as a social one” (Pattison 2011: 13).  
 
 
                                                        
62 Zeba Crook makes a similar claim when she argues that Mediterranean societies 
have collectivist and shame cultures (Crook 2009). 
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High Context versus Low Context Communication 
A different dimension of Hall’s typology in the distinction he makes between 
individualist and collectivist cultures is that between high context and low context 
communication. According to Hall, in collectivist cultures there tends to be ‘high 
context communication’ in which “little has to be said or written down because most 
of the information is either in the physical environment or supposed to be known by 
the persons involved, while very little is in the coded, explicit part of the message.” 
(Hofstede 2005: 89) Individualist cultures tend to be ‘low-context’ in so far as “the 
mass of information is vested in the explicit code.” (Hofstede 2005: 89) What is self-
evident in collectivist cultures must be made explicit in individualist cultures 
(Hofstede 2005: 89). I will now use these two features of Hall’s typology to argue 
that U.S. college campuses share features of a shame culture. 
U.S. college campuses share two features of a shame culture. The first is that 
rape victims may feel shame over the rape, and this shame is social in nature. The 
social nature of the shame victims experience influences the ways in which campus 
rape victims respond to the attack they have suffered. The second is that U.S. college 
campuses are characterized by high context communication, which is evident most 
notably in rape myths. Rape myths are a form of high context communication in that 
they are not written down or codified, but are nonetheless known to individuals 
within the community. 
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Shame and Collective Obligation on the U.S. College Campus 
 
While rape victims may experience guilt over the rape, especially when the 
information about the rape is not known to too many others, they clearly also feel 
shame. Recall from the last chapter that in Thompson, Sitterle, Clay and Kingree’s 
2007 study, 53 out of 134 students who had suffered sexual assault cited shame and 
embarrassment as a reason for not reporting their victimization to the police – that 
is 39,6% of the sample size (Thompson, Sitterle, Clay and Kingree 2007: 280).  
When victims blame themselves for the attack, they may feel shame before 
their own internal spectator, or what Adam Smith refers to as the “tribunal within 
our own breast” (Smith 1759 in Raphael and Macfie 1976: 129) as well as shame 
before others. This makes it difficult to separate out shame and guilt in particular 
instances; all experiences of guilt may include experiences of shame just as all 
experiences of shame may include experiences of guilt. The difference is just one of 
which of the two emotions is salient in a particular instance. Thus, the distinction is 
meant to be analytically useful more than it is meant to separate out shame and guilt 
as two discreetly occurring emotions. Shame and guilt are best thought of as lying 
along a continuum between two ideal conceptions that we never experience in 
isolation from each other.  
The close connection between shame and guilt is evident in the way in which 
social institutions within the U.S. have constructed myths around rape, especially 
the myth of women as sexual gatekeepers, as “asking for it” if they walk down the 
street at night or frequent bars, that rape victims are promiscuous and “deserve” to 
be raped, and so on (Du Mont and Parnis 1999). These myths portray the victim as 
 148 
blameworthy. To incur blame for a sexual transgression may make the campus rape 
victim feel guilty, and when others know of it, it is also a source of shame. The victim 
may experience not just a sense of guilt when individuals with social roles or those 
with institutional roles blame her for the attack, but a sense of shame as well, 
because they may be seeing her as having flouted societal rules by not being a 
successful gatekeeper and not “taking precautions against being raped.” In these 
ways, individuals who subscribe to rape myths may make campus rape victims feel 
shame for infringing on unwritten societal rules regarding appropriate dress for 
women, acceptable times when they may venture out, the venues they may frequent 
and the activities they may undertake. Studies indicate that individuals’ attempts at 
shaming campus rape victims are quite effective.63   
 
High Context Communication in the US 
As far as the construction of shame is concerned, college campuses share a 
feature with collectivist cultures in that there is “high context communication” 
where “most of the information is………. supposed to be known by the persons 
involved, while very little is in the coded, explicit part of the message.” (Hofstede 
2005: 89)64  
                                                        
63 Recall too that another study that Sable et al conducted among 215 students 
revealed that among thirteen barriers to female rape victims reporting the crime, 
“shame, guilt, and embarrassment tied with “fear of retaliation”” were the leading 
barriers to students not reporting the violence (Sable, Danis, Mauzy and Gallagher 
2006: 159). 
64 The same would be true of other high context contexts like the military for 
example. 
 149 
Rape myths are one mechanism through which “most of the information 
is………. supposed to be known by the persons involved, while very little is in the 
coded, explicit part of the message.” (Hofstede 2005: 89) Rape myths refer to 
“attitudes and generally held beliefs about rape that are widely and persistently 
held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual aggression against women” 
(Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1994: 134 in Talbot, Neill and Rankin 2010: 171).  
Individuals who interact with the rape victim may believe myths that include 
the idea that when women walk down the street at night or frequent bars they are 
“asking for it”; that only virgins can be raped (Du Mont and Parnis 1999) and that 
women will be safe from rape if they do not dress or behave in a certain way 
(Talbot, Neill and Rankin 2010: 172). For instance, who has not heard the myth that 
women dress seductively to entice men to sexual activity and that they say ‘no’ 
when in fact they mean ‘yes’?65 The list goes on, that women are bitter and vengeful 
individuals who are “out to get men” (Du Mont and Parnis 1999)- defense attorneys 
in rape cases have used stereotypes about “seductive and vindictive women” (Sable, 
Marjorie R., Fran Danis, Denise L. Mauzy and Sarah K. Gallagher 2006: 160); that 
most women who get raped have bad reputations or are promiscuous; that women 
who “tease” men deserve to be raped; that a woman who goes to a man’s house after 
the first date implies that she is willing to have sex with him; that women cry rape to 
cover up an illegitimate pregnancy; that women derive pleasure from their 
                                                        
65 To the credit of sixteen Yale students, when members of a Yale fraternity tried to 
make their “no means yes and yes means anal” message a part of their explicit 
fraternity initiation code, they filed a complaint with the Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights, accusing Yale University of violating Title IX by not doing 
enough to eliminate the hostile sexual environment on the campus (Foderaro 2011).    
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victimization; that a man is entitled to expect sex if he buys dinner for a woman (Du 
Mont and Parnis: 1999). In one study of 122 West Virginian adolescents aged 14 to 
19, 52% “strongly agreed that some women fantasize about being raped” while 53% 
believed that women provoke men into sexually assaulting them (Du Mont and 
Parnis 1999: 102). One student demonstrated her belief in rape myths as follows,  
When we go out to parties, and I see girls and the way they dress and 
the way they act . . . and just the way they are, under the influence and 
um, then they like accuse them of like, oh yeah, my boyfriend did this 
to me or whatever, I honestly always think it’s their fault. (MacDonald, 
2008: 12) 
 
These myths are certainly not a “coded, explicit part of the message” 
(Hofstede 2005: 89) but persons who subscribe to them reiterate them as self-
evident truths. In this way both campus rape victims and those they interact with 
are familiar with these myths even though these are not written down in an explicit 
code.  
When individuals with social roles and those with institutional roles 
subscribe to rape myths they thwart a rape victim’s efforts at obtaining justice by 
blaming her, absolve her rapist of responsibility for the rape and even justify the fact 
that he assaulted her. Rape victims who buy into some of the myths surrounding 
rape may even silence themselves rather than risk being labeled “loose.” 
Much of the “information” about rape also exists in the physical environment 
on and around college campuses in the form of emergency blue light phones. To the 
extent that their placement is aimed at preventing sexual assault on college 
campuses in addition to preventing other crimes, emergency phones and police 
patrols in quieter areas around campus are physical markers of the myth that taking 
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precautionary measures against the stereotypical rape by a stranger and contacting 
the police in the event of an assault can prevent rape. Another security measure that 
campuses may offer is to walk students to their cars after dark. This type of 
response to the problem of campus rape is helpful in so far as it may make students 
feel safer when they do have to walk to their cars alone at night. But this response 
also has as one of its basic assumptions the idea that it is strangers who assault 
women, and it becomes a means through which university officials may ignore the 
issue of acquaintance rape, and the need for a change in gender relations, rather 
than an increase in policing, to reduce rape.  
 
Conclusion 
Individuals who interact with campus rape victims may attempt to silence 
them by shaming them. The way in which these individuals deploy shame is at odds 
with the way that the law uses shame to deter crimes; it occurs antecedent to and 
outside of the law, and serves to deter victims from approaching liberal legal 
institutions. While the U.S. college campus is characterized by an individualistic 
culture, it shares key features with shame cultures. Rape myths that blame the 
campus rape victim may make her experience the fact that someone attacked her as 
her infringement on societal rules. The shame she may feel for that “infringement”, 
should it become public, may shame her into silence. The U.S. college campus is 
characterized by high context communication in that while rape myths do not form 
part of a written code they are prevalent and inform various individuals’ 
interactions with campus rape victims. The college campus environment also bears 
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markers of these rape myths in the form of the blue emergency lights and other 
safety measures that universities may institute. The ways in which shame and rape 
myths work outside of the law, within social institutions like the university, indicate 
that despite its individualistic underpinnings, the U.S. context in general, and the U.S. 
college context in particular, shares features of a shame culture. Acknowledging and 
addressing the features the U.S. college campus shares with shame cultures will help 
to change the way in which individuals with social roles and individuals with 
institutional roles relate to rape victims, and in so doing they will enhance the 
victims’ access to justice.  The fact that the U.S. college campus shares these two key 
features of a shame culture urge an acknowledgment of the dangers of what appears 
to be a shame culture in operation on U.S. college campuses and relatedly, a 
rethinking on the part of university administration of the gender discriminatory 
practices that reinforces that culture. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this dissertation I have revealed a gap between the assumptions of liberal 
institutions - that victims of gender-based violence will approach them when they 
suffer an assault, and the actions of women who suffer gender-based violence – who 
do not always approach these institutions, although they may act in other ways. 
When women do approach liberal institutions following abuse they often encounter 
the gender discriminatory behavior of the individuals who inhabit these institutions, 
and these may thwart their search for justice. This is why, within liberal societies, 
victims of gender-based violence have access to institutions of justice in principle, 
but these do not always guarantee them access to justice.  
I argue that the gap exists in part because even before any legal or 
disciplinary proceedings are underway, various individuals who interact with the 
victim directly or indirectly may thwart her efforts to obtain justice.  Society creates 
institutions of justice with rules and goals that purport to promote the autonomy of 
victims of gender-based violence in principle, but the people who inhabit these 
institutions may display gender discriminatory behaviors that do not serve to 
further those goals. As a result, victims of gender-based violence may make choices 
within a social context in which various social actors are able to act in ways that 
attempt to compromise their agency.  
The gap also exists because individuals with social roles and those with 
institutional roles may conceive of women’s agency in ways that often do not take 
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account of the ways in which individuals within a range of social institutions 
socialize women in gender discriminatory ways. Some social and political actors 
may in fact depend on the ways in which they have socialized women into accepting 
gender discriminatory norms and practices (Enloe 2003).  
A variety of social and political actors socialize men and women into seeing 
themselves and their good as instrumental to some other end and not as a good in 
itself. In the case of women, this socialization is evident in the ways in which victims 
of gender-based violence who are embedded in meaningful relationships respond to 
the assault. Women may take the good of significant others into account when they 
respond to the violence, and they may do so in ways that make their own good and 
even safety instrumental to the good of these others. They take the good of 
significant others into account when they choose to remain in abusive relationships, 
and they take the good of significant others into account when they choose to leave 
those relationships. When women see themselves as instrumental to the good of 
others even when they suffer intimate partner violence, they demonstrate how 
effectively various social and political actors have socialized them into always 
seeing themselves and their good as instrumental to the good of some further end.  
When women see themselves as instrumental in this way, they extend the ways in 
which a variety of other state and non-state actors construct women as instrumental 
to a variety of social, political and economic ends.  
In cases of campus rape individuals with institutional roles may display a 
range of gender discriminatory behaviors towards the victim and these may directly 
or indirectly thwart her efforts at obtaining justice. Their gender discriminatory 
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behaviors arise from conflicts of interest that these individuals experience between 
serving the cause of justice in the case of campus rape and maintaining an image of a 
rape-free campus. Both individuals with social roles and those with institutional 
roles may socialize women into experiencing shame when they suffer sexual assault, 
and shame serves as a key mechanism that often operates to silence women when 
they suffer rape. The prevalence with which shame silences campus rape victims, 
combined with the prevalence of gender discriminatory rape myths suggest that the 
U.S. college context shares features of a shame culture.   
Institutional reform is necessary but not sufficient to effect a change in the 
social norms that underpin gender-based violence, and to end the gender 
discriminatory behavior that various social actors display in their interaction with 
victims of gender-based violence. The content of the choices that victims make in 
response to the violence they suffer is equally important. I argue that a weak 
substantive conception of autonomy provides the necessary normative content to 
disrupt the social norms that support gender discriminatory practices and to shape 
victims’ choices in ways that allow them access to justice. This is because liberal 
institutions are responsive to women’s choices, so the choices victims of gender-
based violence make have the potential to instigate institutional reform. Victims of 
gender-based violence exercise their agency in choosing to report the violence, in 
choosing to share their experiences with only a few trusted others, or in choosing to 
remain silent altogether. When they make autonomy-enhancing choices this helps to 
create a social context in which it becomes easier for others to make autonomy-
enhancing choices. If they make choices that inhibit their autonomy they contribute 
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to a social environment in which it becomes more difficult for others to make 
autonomy-enhancing choices.   
I trust that my work invites us all to reflect on the ways in which we may be 
implicated in the everyday norms and social practices that contribute to gender 
based violence, and to the silencing of its victims. I ask my readers to think about the 
ways in which various social actors socialize them into accepting and perpetuating 
gender discriminatory behaviors, and the ways in which they may be socializing 
others into these gender discriminatory norms and practices. I hope that readers 
will acknowledge the power that shame has in silencing campus rape victims on U.S. 
college campuses, in much the same way that shame silences women in cultures that 
most of us would more readily identify as shame cultures.  Acknowledging our 
vulnerability to violence and to shame is a first step towards addressing gender-
based violence. 
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